F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH MAR 8 2004 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 03-3045 BRYAN KEITH CARTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS (D.C. NO. 02-40050-01-JAR)
Ronald E. Wurtz, Assistant Federal Public Defender (David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant - Appellant.
Nancy Landis Caplinger, Assistant United Sates Attorney (Eric F. Melgren, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR , McWILLIAMS , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
HARTZ , Circuit Judge.
Defendant Bryan Keith Carter conditionally pleaded guilty to possession of
a firearm after previously being convicted of three felonies, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence. The firearms were in the garage of his mother’s home, where
he was staying at the time. Officers discovered them after obtaining consent to
search the garage from Defendant, his mother, and his mother’s boyfriend.
Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress on the ground that the
consents were tainted by preceding Fourth Amendment violations. We hold that
the officers violated the Fourth Amendment (as applied to the States under the
Fourteenth Amendment) when they conducted a “sweep”of the garage before
obtaining consent. We remand to the district court to determine whether the
consents were fruit of that violation.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, we “view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the district court’s findings,” accepting those findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d 819,
824 (10th Cir. 1997). “[T]he credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to
the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom, are
matters for the trial judge.” United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 876 (10th
Cir. 1994). “The ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment, however, is a question of law which we review de novo.” Toro-
Pelaez, 107 F.3d at 824.
-2- II. BACKGROUND
At about midnight on March 11, 2001, Officers Souma and Garman of the
Topeka Police Department went to the home of Defendant’s mother to investigate
a tip regarding possible drug use and stolen property. (Although the district
court’s opinion recites that the tip concerned “trafficking of drugs,” United States
v. Carter 2002 WL 31385813, *1 (D. Kan. 2002), Officer Souma testified that it
concerned “illegal narcotic use,” Tr. at 16, and Officer Garman testified only
about a report of possible “illegal activity,” id. at 70.) Their intention was to
conduct what they called a “knock and talk”—knock on the door and talk to
whoever answered. The officers drove past the house twice. Upon observing
lights on inside the house, they decided to go ahead with the knock and talk
despite the late hour.
After parking near the front of the house, they proceeded up the driveway.
Each officer wore street clothes except for a police vest; Officer Garman’s vest
was covered by an overcoat. On their way to the front door, the officers shined
their flashlights into a car parked in the driveway to ensure that no one was inside
who could pose a threat to them.
Defendant and a friend were in a garage detached from the house on the
back of the lot. A fence with a gate extended along the driveway from the house
to the garage, separating the driveway from the backyard. A side door to the
-3- garage opened into the backyard. Defendant and his friend observed the officers
by means of a video camera Defendant had installed in the garage. Believing that
the officers might be attempting to steal Defendant’s car, they ran out the side
door of the garage and through the gate to the driveway, where they approached
the officers in a combative manner. The officers identified themselves as police,
while Officer Souma drew his weapon. Defendant and his friend stopped, and
Defendant dropped something. After the officers handcuffed the two men,
Officer Garman examined the object Defendant had dropped. It was a bag of
marijuana.
About this time, Defendant’s mother and her boyfriend came out of the
house. Soon thereafter three narcotics officers arrived, and Officers Souma and
Garman decided to secure the backyard and garage for their safety and to prevent
the destruction of any evidence. They checked out the backyard and entered the
garage, where Officer Souma observed the barrel of a shotgun, a small bag of
white powder he believed to be methamphetamine, and various electronic items
(such as cameras and handheld personal computers).
Officer Souma read Defendant his Miranda rights, and the officers
informed him of what they had seen in the garage. They asked him to consent to
a search of the garage and his car. Defendant signed a consent form, but contends
that he agreed to allow the officers to search only his car. The consent form is
-4- filled out with two different pens, and Defendant testified that when he signed the
form it was filled out only for the vehicle, not for the garage. The district court,
however, found that Defendant’s testimony was not credible, and chose to believe
the testimony of the officers, who said that Defendant had consented to the search
of the garage.
Because it was not clear to the officers who had authority to consent to the
search of the garage, they also sought the consent of Defendant’s mother and her
boyfriend. They explained to the two why they were there and what they wanted
to do. Officer Garman explained the mother’s rights in such detail that she asked
him whether he was trying to convince her not to give consent. She and her
boyfriend consented to the search. During the subsequent search of the garage,
the officers seized the two firearms that formed the basis of the indictment.
Defendant appeals, contending that (1) the police had insufficient cause to
initiate a knock and talk, and the procedure was executed in an unreasonable
manner; (2) the police had insufficient cause to enter the backyard and garage
without a warrant; and (3) any consent obtained was fruit of the preceding Fourth
Amendment violations. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
remand for further proceedings.
-5- III. DISCUSSION
A. Initial Entry and Seizure of Defendant
Defendant argues that “[t]he police entry onto the premises . . . at midnight
on the basis of an anonymous, uncorroborated tip about drug use and stolen
property was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Aplt. Br. at 8. He
contends that the officers had insufficient cause to initiate a knock and talk, and
that the officers conducted the procedure in an unreasonable manner. As he
describes the episode, “[b]ased on an entirely unsubstantiated tip,” the officers
unreasonably “went to a dark residential street at midnight, dressed in dark
civilian clothing, and began shining their flashlights into cars parked in the
driveway of the private residence.” Id. at 10. According to Defendant, although
a knock and talk is ordinarily a consensual encounter, the officers’ encounter with
him was not at all consensual. He points to the hour at which the officers
approached the house, the officers’ use of weapons and handcuffs, their decision
not to park directly in front of the house, the resemblance of the officers’
behavior to that of car thieves, and the arrival of other officers shortly after the
initial encounter with Defendant and his friend.
We are not persuaded. These actions of the officers (which, as it turned
out, did not constitute a knock and talk) were lawful.
-6- The officers’ initial conduct—driving by the house two times, parking
nearby, walking up the driveway, and shining their flashlights into a car in the
driveway—do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. The officers had not seized
anything or anyone. Nor had they conducted a search. See United States v.
Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen the police come on to
private property to conduct an investigation . . . and restrict their movements to
places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches),
observations made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth
Amendment.” (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment § 2.3(f), at 506-08 (3d. ed. 1996))); United States v. Rascon-
Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 754 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[T]here is no legitimate expectation
of privacy in a car’s interior if an officer looks through the car’s window”); id. at
755 (“‘[T]he use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area simply does not
constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection.’”
(quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983))). Defendant conceded this
much at oral argument.
Nonetheless, Defendant contends that a Fourth Amendment violation
occurred when one officer drew his weapon and Defendant was placed in
handcuffs. He asserts that the officers should have instead heeded his command
that they leave the premises. It is uncertain when Defendant told the officers to
-7- leave. (Defendant testified that it was only after he was in handcuffs; the district
court made no finding on the issue.) But in any event, the officers had sufficient
cause to act as they did.
A brief detention is permissible if based on “reasonable suspicion to
believe that criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Quintana-Garcia,
343 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[C]ourts must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see
whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The officers had received a tip that persons at the house were using drugs
and possessed stolen property. Although the government does not contend that
the tip alone was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, it is a factor for
consideration. See United States v. Soto-Cervantes, 138 F.3d 1319, 1322-23 (10th
Cir. 1998). As the officers walked up the driveway, Defendant and his friend
came running out of the garage in an aggressive manner. When the men
Defendant was confronting identified themselves as police officers, Defendant
proceeded to drop something. The officers then had reasonable suspicion to
suspect that criminal activity was afoot, and could detain Defendant for
investigation. See United States v. Dupree, 202 F.3d 1046, 1049 (8th Cir. 2000)
(individual’s “evasive action in dropping a small object off the bridge before
-8- talking to the police gave [the officer] reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot, as the anonymous tipster had reported”).
As for the propriety of drawing a weapon and handcuffing Defendant, we
have recognized that “[a] law enforcement agent, faced with the possibility of
danger, has a right to take reasonable steps to protect himself and an obligation to
ensure the safety of innocent bystanders, regardless of whether probable cause to
arrest exists.” United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Given that Defendant and his friend were
combative when they first encountered the officers, the drawing of the weapon
was lawful. Officers may use guns when they “reasonably believe the weapons are
necessary for their protection.” United States v. Neff, 300 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th
Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, with respect to
handcuffs, their use is proper so long as there is “a reasonable, articulable ground
for fearing danger” from a particular individual. Id. at 1221. Although the
officers may have later learned that Defendant believed them to be car thieves,
the weapon was drawn and Defendant was handcuffed within a very brief time
period, when the officers could not be sure what type of threat Defendant and his
friend posed. The officers acted reasonably in the circumstances.
The initial entry onto the premises and the subsequent detention of
Defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
-9- B. Sweep of the Backyard and Garage
Defendant next argues that the officers’ entry into the backyard and sweep
of the garage violated the Fourth Amendment. He asserts that the officers could
enter the backyard and garage only under exigent circumstances, and that such
circumstances did not exist.
The government concedes that the garage should be treated as a home for
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, and does not challenge Defendant’s
assertion that the backyard should likewise be treated as a home because it is
within the curtilage of the residence. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
180 (1984) (“[T]he curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity
associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life, . . . and
therefore has been considered part of home itself for Fourth Amendment
purposes.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The government argues, however,
that the officers properly conducted a limited protective sweep of the backyard
and garage “out of concern for their safety and to insure against the potential
destruction of evidence.” Aplee. Br. at 13.
“It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.” Id. at 590.
-10- “[A]bsent consent or exigent circumstances, police may not enter a citizen’s
residence without a warrant.” United States v. Scroger, 98 F.3d 1256, 1259 (10th
Cir. 1997). “The government bears the burden of establishing exigency. In our
assessment of whether the burden is satisfied, we are guided by the realities of the
situation presented by the record. We should evaluate the circumstances as they
would have appeared to prudent, cautious and trained officers.” United States v.
Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
We first consider the government’s assertion that the officers’ entry into the
backyard and sweep of the garage was justified by the possibility of destruction of
evidence. “When officers have reason to believe that criminal evidence may be
destroyed, . . . or removed, . . . before a warrant can be obtained, the
circumstances are considered sufficiently critical to permit officers to enter a
private residence in order to secure the evidence while a warrant is sought.”
United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1983). There are “four
requirements for a permissible warrantless entry when the police fear the
imminent destruction of evidence.” Scroger, 98 F.3d at 1259. Such an entry must
be “(1) pursuant to clear evidence of probable cause, (2) available only for serious
crimes and in circumstances where the destruction of evidence is likely, (3)
limited in scope to the minimum intrusion necessary, and (4) supported by clearly
-11- defined indicators of exigency that are not subject to police manipulation or
abuse.” Id. (quoting United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir.
1988)).
Here, the second factor is dispositive. There was simply no evidence that
destruction of evidence was likely. Indeed, the government points to no reason to
believe that other people were in the garage, or even the house. All indications
were to the contrary. Defendant and his friend charged out of the garage.
Defendant’s mother and her boyfriend came out of the house shortly thereafter.
Who was left to tamper with evidence? See United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d
1560 (10th Cir. 1992) (insufficient risk of destruction of drugs in house when no
evidence to support reasonable belief that someone remained in the house).
Moreover, the only crime for which there was probable cause was possession of a
small quantity of marijuana, in all likelihood a misdemeanor, a crime that does
not reach the level of “serious crime” required by Aquino. Cf. Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (in the context of entry of home to effect a
warrantless arrest, “application of the exigent-circumstances exception . . . should
rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor
offense . . . has been committed”); Scroger, 98 F.3d at 1260 (drug manufacturing
and drug trafficking are serious crimes).
-12- The government also asserts that the entry into the backyard and garage was
justified as a “protective sweep” to ensure the officers’ safety. “Threats to public
safety are widely accepted as one of the exigent circumstances exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” Rhiger, 315 F.3d at 1288-89
(warrantless entry of home justified by danger of methamphetamine
manufacturing going on at the time). “A ‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited
search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of
police officers or others. It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of
those places in which a person might be hiding.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325,
327 (1990). Such a sweep is permissible “if the searching officer possesse[d] a
reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[ed] the officer in
believing that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer
or others.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The protective-sweep doctrine arose in the context of an arrest in a home.
See, e.g., id. Officers within the home of an arrestee may be particularly
vulnerable to a dangerous confederate out of sight within the home. The risk is
substantially diminished when the officers effect the arrest outside the home. See
id. at 333 (“An ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more to
be feared than it is in open, more familiar surroundings.”). Here, the government
-13- has pointed to no specific, articulable facts suggesting that the backyard or garage
harbored anyone who posed a danger to them. It relies on the fact that Defendant
and his friend came running out of the garage in a combative manner. But the
officers had no reason to believe a third person had stayed behind, or that such a
person would attack them while they were outside. See United States v. Hogan,
38 F.3d 1148, 1150 (10th Cir. 1994) (protective sweep of murder suspect’s house
after his arrest was not justified when “[t]here was no indication that the officers
were in danger from a hidden accomplice”). Cf. United States v. Cavely, 318 F.3d
987, 996 (10th Cir. 2003) (protective sweep of residence was reasonable even
though defendant was arrested outside, when defendant “admitted he had ‘a
friend’ inside the house, but the friend did not appear or answer when officers
knocked,” and prior search of residence had discovered firearms); 3 LaFave,
supra, § 6.4(c) at 333-34 (discussing very limited circumstances in which
protective sweep of home may be justified even though arrest is outside home).
Of course, there could always be a dangerous person concealed within a structure.
But that in itself cannot justify a protective sweep, unless such sweeps are simply
to be permitted as a matter of course, a result hardly indicated by the Supreme
Court in Buie. Accordingly, we conclude that the officers’ entry into the
backyard and garage was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We do not
read United States v. Hutchings,127 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 1997), as
departing from the recognized requirements for a sweep.
-14- C. Consent
Finally, Defendant challenges the district court’s determination that the
search was valid based on consent. Having found that the officers’ entry into the
backyard and sweep of the garage violated the Fourth Amendment, we conduct a
dual inquiry regarding the validity of the subsequent consents. “When a
consensual search is preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation, . . . the
government must prove not only [1] the voluntariness of the consent under the
totality of the circumstances, but the government must also establish [2] a break
in the causal connection between the illegality and the evidence thereby
obtained.” United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir.
1994) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The district court found that the consents of Defendant, his mother, and his
mother’s boyfriend were all voluntary. Defendant apparently does not challenge
the district court’s determination that the consents were voluntary under the
general totality-of-the-circumstances standard set forth in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). His argument instead concerns the second
part of the analysis—whether the consents were the fruit of preceding
constitutional violations. Because the district court did not find a constitutional
violation, it did not address this argument. In these circumstances—when the
district court has determined that a consent was voluntary under Schneckloth but
-15- did not consider whether the consent was the fruit of a preceding illegality—we
must review the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree issue de novo, or remand for the
district court to make a finding. See Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1054. Here, we
believe that the district court is better able to address this issue, so we remand the
matter. The district court should decide in the first instance whether any of the
consents was valid despite the preceding constitutional violation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The officers’ initial entry onto the premises and their seizure of Defendant
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Their subsequent entry into the backyard
and sweep of the garage, however, were unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, necessitating a consideration of whether the consents were fruit of
the violation. Because the district court did not evaluate whether the consents
were tainted by the preceding illegality, we REMAND this matter to the district
court to make that determination. We retain jurisdiction over this appeal pending
supplementation of the record by the district court.
-16-