United States v. Carpenter

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 5, 2024
• Docket: 23-1593
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 5 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-1593 D.C. No. 4:21-cr-00077-BLW-1 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. MEMORANDUM* JEREMY JAMES CARPENTER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 29, 2024**

Before: FRIEDLAND, BENNETT, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Jeremy James Carpenter appeals from the district court’s judgment and

challenges his guilty-plea conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited

person in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part and dismiss in part.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). In his plea agreement, Carpenter preserved his right to appeal the district

court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found in his car when it was

searched after he was arrested on a parole violation. Carpenter contends that the

district court should have suppressed that evidence because, under Idaho law, an

agent’s warrant was required to effectuate Carpenter’s arrest. As the district court

explained, however, the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant to arrest a

parole violator. See Sherman v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 502 F.3d 869, 883-84 (9th

Cir. 2007). The state statutory violation alleged by Carpenter does not transform

his arrest into a constitutional violation. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176

(2008) (“[W]hile States are free to regulate [warrantless] arrests however they

desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections.”).

Carpenter next contends that his conviction is infirm because 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. As Carpenter acknowledges, his

appeal waiver, which expressly applies to “any right to appeal” his conviction and

sentence, and “any challenge to the constitutionality of any statute of conviction,”

bars this claim. See United States v. Goodall, 21 F.4th 555, 561-65 (9th Cir.

2021). This court has not previously applied a “miscarriage of justice” exception

to the enforcement of an appeal waiver, and we decline to do so here.

AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.

2 23-1593