United States v. Carl E. Hinton, United States of America v. Eugene Cooper

D.C. Circuit

United States v. Carl E. Hinton, United States of America v. Eugene Cooper

436 F.2d 909, 141 U.S. App. D.C. 179, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 6300

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit·Decided November 23, 1970·No. 23085, 23086·Published

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Appellants were tried jointly and convicted by jury verdict of second degree burglary and grand larceny. On this appeal they attack an in-custody identification under non-lineup circumstances following their arrest and in the absence of counsel, which allegedly furnished the basis of their identification in court.

Although the case has been accorded full consideration on the record and briefs, no need for argument or detailed opinion is found here.

The question of the in-court personal identification was imported into the ease through the cross-examination by appellants’ counsel of the government’s main witness whose related testimony on direct had been rather narrowly confined to the appearance of certain clothing observed at the time of the crime and at the time of a scene-of-arrest confrontation. Assuming that appellants now have standing to complain, we believe that the scene-of-arrest identification, if it mhy be called that, shortly following the crime was warranted under the particular circumstances of this case, was not unduly suggestive, and the doctrine of Russell v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 77, 408 F.2d 1280, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928, 89 S.Ct. 1786, 23 L.Ed.2d 245 (1969), is controlling. See also Stewart v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 418 F.2d 1110 (1969), and Solomon v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 103, 408 F.2d 1306 (1969).

Accordingly, the judgments of the District Court are

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM:

Appellants were tried jointly and convicted by jury verdict of second degree burglary and grand larceny. On this appeal they attack an in-custody identification under non-lineup circumstances following their arrest and in the absence of counsel, which allegedly furnished the basis of their identification in court.

Although the case has been accorded full consideration on the record and briefs, no need for argument or detailed opinion is found here.

The question of the in-court personal identification was imported into the ease through the cross-examination by appellants’ counsel of the government’s main witness whose related testimony on direct had been rather narrowly confined to the appearance of certain clothing observed at the time of the crime and at the time of a scene-of-arrest confrontation. Assuming that appellants now have standing to complain, we believe that the scene-of-arrest identification, if it mhy be called that, shortly following the crime was warranted under the particular circumstances of this case, was not unduly suggestive, and the doctrine of Russell v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 77, 408 F.2d 1280, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928, 89 S.Ct. 1786, 23 L.Ed.2d 245 (1969), is controlling. See also Stewart v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 418 F.2d 1110 (1969), and Solomon v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 103, 408 F.2d 1306 (1969).

Accordingly, the judgments of the District Court are

Affirmed.

United States v. Carl E. Hinton, United States of America v. Eugene Cooper, 436 F.2d 909, 141 U.S. App. D.C. 179, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 6300 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

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