NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-7479 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:24-cr-05054-DGE-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JOSEPH ANTHONY CANNAROZZI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington David G. Estudillo, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 22, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and McKEOWN and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Joseph Anthony Cannarozzi (“Cannarozzi”) waived indictment and pled
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and §
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 841(b)(1)(B) and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). As part of the
underlying crime, Cannarozzi sold P.H. drugs that caused P.H.’s death. Cannarozzi
appeals the district court’s restitution order, which compensated P.H.’s estate for
costs associated with his death. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
we affirm.
“The legality of a restitution order is reviewed de novo . . . .” United States
v. Gagarin, 950 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “[I]f the order is
within the statutory bounds, we review the amount for abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir. 2004). “[A]ny underlying factual
findings [are] reviewed for clear error.” Gagarin, 950 F.3d at 607. “If the district
court’s findings are plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, we cannot
reverse even if we are convinced we would have found differently.” United States
v. Torlai, 728 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation modified).
1. As part of his plea agreement, Cannarozzi agreed to waive his right to
appeal, including the right to appeal any restitution order. Because we conclude
that Cannarozzi’s appeal fails on the merits, we need not address Cannarozzi’s
appeal waiver. United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007)
(en banc) (appeal waiver is not jurisdictional).
2 2. Cannarozzi challenges the legality of the restitution order by arguing
that P.H is not a victim eligible for restitution because: (1) P.H. was a “participant
in the offense which Mr. Cannarozzi pleaded guilty to”; (2) the district court did
not identify victims eligible for restitution in its Statement of Reasons filed at
sentencing; and (3) the presentence investigation report did not identify any
victims. We address each in turn.
First, Cannarozzi does not cite any legal authority for the proposition that
merely purchasing and consuming a controlled substance constitutes participation
in the crime of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21
U.S.C. § 841. Moreover, P.H.’s purchase does not constitute a commission of a 21
U.S.C. § 841 offense because it is undisputed that P.H. purchased the controlled
substance for his own consumption. United States v. Vargas-Castillo, 329 F.3d
715, 719 (9th Cir. 2003) (a required element of a 12 U.S.C. § 841 offense is that
“the defendant possessed the controlled substance with the intent to deliver it to
another person”). Furthermore, P.H.’s purchase did not aid and abet the
commission of a 21 U.S.C. § 841 offense because “a conviction for aiding and
abetting requires proof of all the elements of the completed crime.” United States
v. Eckford, 77 F.4th 1228, 1237 (9th Cir. 2023) (emphasis in original), overruled
on other grounds by United States v. Gomez, 165 F.4th 1199, 1206-07 (9th Cir.
2026) (en banc). Finally, P.H. was not a 21 U.S.C. § 841 co-conspirator because
3 “the buyer-seller rule dictates that mere sales to or purchases from other
individuals do not establish a conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to
distribute.” United States v. Mendoza, 25 F.4th 730, 736 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation
modified). Therefore, P.H. was not a participant in Cannarozzi’s 21 U.S.C. § 841
offense.
Second, Cannarozzi does not cite any legal authority requiring the district
court to specifically identify victims in the Statement of Reasons. Additionally,
because the district court deferred the issue of restitution for a later restitution
hearing, there was no reason for the district court to make formal findings
regarding the individuals eligible for restitution or the amount of restitution at
sentencing. See United States v. Mikaelian, 168 F.3d 380, 390-91 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“The court awarding restitution is not required to make findings of fact; the record
must merely reflect that the court had at its disposal information bearing on the
requirements of § 3664.”).
Third, whether the presentence investigation report identified victims is not
dispositive because the statute authorizing the district court to order restitution, “by
its plain language, gives the district court discretion to identify victims other than
those brought to its attention by the government or the probation office.” United
States v. Gamma Tech Indus., 265 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2001).
4 3. Cannarozzi also argues that the district court abused its discretion in
ordering restitution because Cannarozzi showed that he was indigent at the time of
sentencing and therefore unable to pay restitution. However, “[a] sentencing court
is not prohibited from imposing restitution even on a defendant who is indigent at
the time of sentencing so long as the record indicates that the court considered the
defendant’s future ability to pay.” United States v. Newman, 6 F.3d 623, 631 (9th
Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-7479 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:24-cr-05054-DGE-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JOSEPH ANTHONY CANNAROZZI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington David G. Estudillo, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 22, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and McKEOWN and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Joseph Anthony Cannarozzi (“Cannarozzi”) waived indictment and pled
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and §
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 841(b)(1)(B) and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). As part of the
underlying crime, Cannarozzi sold P.H. drugs that caused P.H.’s death. Cannarozzi
appeals the district court’s restitution order, which compensated P.H.’s estate for
costs associated with his death. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
we affirm.
“The legality of a restitution order is reviewed de novo . . . .” United States
v. Gagarin, 950 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “[I]f the order is
within the statutory bounds, we review the amount for abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir. 2004). “[A]ny underlying factual
findings [are] reviewed for clear error.” Gagarin, 950 F.3d at 607. “If the district
court’s findings are plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, we cannot
reverse even if we are convinced we would have found differently.” United States
v. Torlai, 728 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation modified).
1. As part of his plea agreement, Cannarozzi agreed to waive his right to
appeal, including the right to appeal any restitution order. Because we conclude
that Cannarozzi’s appeal fails on the merits, we need not address Cannarozzi’s
appeal waiver. United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007)
(en banc) (appeal waiver is not jurisdictional).
2 2. Cannarozzi challenges the legality of the restitution order by arguing
that P.H is not a victim eligible for restitution because: (1) P.H. was a “participant
in the offense which Mr. Cannarozzi pleaded guilty to”; (2) the district court did
not identify victims eligible for restitution in its Statement of Reasons filed at
sentencing; and (3) the presentence investigation report did not identify any
victims. We address each in turn.
First, Cannarozzi does not cite any legal authority for the proposition that
merely purchasing and consuming a controlled substance constitutes participation
in the crime of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21
U.S.C. § 841. Moreover, P.H.’s purchase does not constitute a commission of a 21
U.S.C. § 841 offense because it is undisputed that P.H. purchased the controlled
substance for his own consumption. United States v. Vargas-Castillo, 329 F.3d
715, 719 (9th Cir. 2003) (a required element of a 12 U.S.C. § 841 offense is that
“the defendant possessed the controlled substance with the intent to deliver it to
another person”). Furthermore, P.H.’s purchase did not aid and abet the
commission of a 21 U.S.C. § 841 offense because “a conviction for aiding and
abetting requires proof of all the elements of the completed crime.” United States
v. Eckford, 77 F.4th 1228, 1237 (9th Cir. 2023) (emphasis in original), overruled
on other grounds by United States v. Gomez, 165 F.4th 1199, 1206-07 (9th Cir.
2026) (en banc). Finally, P.H. was not a 21 U.S.C. § 841 co-conspirator because
3 “the buyer-seller rule dictates that mere sales to or purchases from other
individuals do not establish a conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to
distribute.” United States v. Mendoza, 25 F.4th 730, 736 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation
modified). Therefore, P.H. was not a participant in Cannarozzi’s 21 U.S.C. § 841
offense.
Second, Cannarozzi does not cite any legal authority requiring the district
court to specifically identify victims in the Statement of Reasons. Additionally,
because the district court deferred the issue of restitution for a later restitution
hearing, there was no reason for the district court to make formal findings
regarding the individuals eligible for restitution or the amount of restitution at
sentencing. See United States v. Mikaelian, 168 F.3d 380, 390-91 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“The court awarding restitution is not required to make findings of fact; the record
must merely reflect that the court had at its disposal information bearing on the
requirements of § 3664.”).
Third, whether the presentence investigation report identified victims is not
dispositive because the statute authorizing the district court to order restitution, “by
its plain language, gives the district court discretion to identify victims other than
those brought to its attention by the government or the probation office.” United
States v. Gamma Tech Indus., 265 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2001).
4 3. Cannarozzi also argues that the district court abused its discretion in
ordering restitution because Cannarozzi showed that he was indigent at the time of
sentencing and therefore unable to pay restitution. However, “[a] sentencing court
is not prohibited from imposing restitution even on a defendant who is indigent at
the time of sentencing so long as the record indicates that the court considered the
defendant’s future ability to pay.” United States v. Newman, 6 F.3d 623, 631 (9th
Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). A court’s determination that a defendant has the
ability to pay restitution is a finding of fact reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard, and whether the district court considered the defendant’s ability to pay in
determining whether to order restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that “if a district
court fails to consider a defendant’s ability to pay, the court abuses the discretion
afforded it by the Act,” and evaluating the district’s finding regarding the
defendant’s ability to pay for clear error).
The district court considered Cannarozzi’s future ability to pay and did not
clearly err in finding that Cannarozzi could pay restitution in the future. As the
government argued at the restitution hearing, “significant assets were forfeited to
the State,” and “Cannarozzi made quite a bit of money prior to this, . . . some
through legal means.” Cannarozzi did not present any argument that he would not
be able to pay restitution in the future, even after the district court invited
5 Cannarozzi to do so. Thus, it is “plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety” that Cannarozzi could pay restitution in the future. Torlai, 728 F.3d at
937. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by ordering Cannarozzi
to pay restitution based on Cannarozzi’s future ability to pay.
AFFIRMED.