17-4140 United States v. Campos 17‐4140‐cr United States v. Campos
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of March, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., DENNY CHIN, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,
v. 17‐4140‐cr
CHRISTOPHER CAMPOS, Defendant‐Appellant.*
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x
FOR APPELLEE: SAGAR K. RAVI, Assistant United States Attorney (Dina McLeod, Won S. Shin,
* The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform to the above.
Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), for Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT: DANIEL D. BARNES, Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC, New York, New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Caproni, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant‐appellant Christopher Campos appeals from a judgment
entered December 11, 2017, convicting him, following a jury trial, of wire fraud, bank
fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343,
1344, and 1349. Campos was sentenced principally to a term of 30 monthsʹ
imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, followed by three years of supervised
release.
The evidence at trial established that Campos, a lawyer, recruited ʺstraw
buyersʺ to purchase multiple vehicles, purportedly for personal use, financed by
fraudulently obtained bank loans, for use in a livery cab business. On appeal, Campos
challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence as to whether Campos had the requisite
ʺintent to defraud,ʺ and (2) the admissibility of (a) the testimony of two witnesses, and
‐ 2 ‐
(b) certain excerpts of recorded conversations. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with
the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
I. Sufficiency of Evidence
The government presented sufficient evidence that Campos participated
in the conspiracy with an intent to defraud, and thus the district did not err in denying
his motion for acquittal on this basis. This Court reviews a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge de novo, ʺbut defendants face a heavy burden, as the standard of review is
exceedingly deferential.ʺ United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the government, drawing all inferences in the governmentʹs favor and deferring to the
juryʹs assessments of the witnessesʹ credibility. See id.; see also United States v. Santos, 541
F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 2008) (ʺWhen a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
in a conspiracy case, deference to the juryʹs findings is especially important . . . because
a conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation, and it is a rare case where all
aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in court with the precision of a surgeonʹs
scalpelʺ (internal quotation marks omitted)). ʺA judgment of acquittal can be entered
ʹonly if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent or so
meagerʹ that no ʹrational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.ʹʺ United States v. Taylor, 816 F.3d 12, 22 (2d Cir. 2016)
(quoting United States v. Espaillet, 380 F.3d 713, 718 (2d Cir. 2004)).
‐ 3 ‐
Camposʹs contention that the evidence ʺleans heavily toward innocence,ʺ
Appellantʹs Br. at 25, is unpersuasive given the cumulative evidence of his participation
in, and attempts to cover up, the conspiracy. For instance, the government presented
evidence, including the testimony of coconspirators, that: (1) Campos was present at a
February or March 2013 meeting where he overheard discussion of the scheme and
expressed interest in the same; (2) Campos recruited his wife, cousin, and an associate
as straw buyers to purchase multiple cars for use in the livery business even though the
loan applications falsely stated that the vehicles were for personal use by the borrowers;
(3) Campos wrote a note to a car dealership with instructions to use a New York
address for his wifeʹs car loan applications although Campos and his wife lived in New
Jersey; and (4) Campos wrote a letter misrepresenting to a bank the nature of his legal
representation of a straw buyer to conceal the scheme. Thus, viewed as a whole, the
evidence undercuts Camposʹs assertion that there was no evidence that he had
knowledge of the fraud. See Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2016)
(reasoning that ʺ[t]he government does not have to prove that the defendant intended
to commit the underlying offense himself/herselfʺ because one coconspiratorʹs conduct
is attributable to another coconspirator if each acted to facilitate the crime (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, Campos took the stand and denied knowledge of the scheme.
The jury rejected his testimony as well as his defense of good faith; and he has shown
‐ 4 ‐
no basis to question the juryʹs findings. See Baker, 899 F.3d at 130 (ʺʹWe will not attempt
to second‐guess a juryʹs credibility determination on a sufficiency challenge,ʹ
particularly when . . . trial counsel already presented these same credibility arguments
to the jury.ʺ (quoting United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 156 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Accordingly, the juryʹs verdict was supported by the evidence.
II. Admissibility of Evidence
We review a district courtʹs decision to exclude evidence at trial for abuse
of discretion. See United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). Campos contests
two of the district courtʹs evidentiary rulings: first, the decision to bar testimony from
two defense witnesses pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, and second,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
17-4140 United States v. Campos 17‐4140‐cr United States v. Campos
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of March, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., DENNY CHIN, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,
v. 17‐4140‐cr
CHRISTOPHER CAMPOS, Defendant‐Appellant.*
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x
FOR APPELLEE: SAGAR K. RAVI, Assistant United States Attorney (Dina McLeod, Won S. Shin,
* The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform to the above.
Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), for Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT: DANIEL D. BARNES, Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC, New York, New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Caproni, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant‐appellant Christopher Campos appeals from a judgment
entered December 11, 2017, convicting him, following a jury trial, of wire fraud, bank
fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343,
1344, and 1349. Campos was sentenced principally to a term of 30 monthsʹ
imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, followed by three years of supervised
release.
The evidence at trial established that Campos, a lawyer, recruited ʺstraw
buyersʺ to purchase multiple vehicles, purportedly for personal use, financed by
fraudulently obtained bank loans, for use in a livery cab business. On appeal, Campos
challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence as to whether Campos had the requisite
ʺintent to defraud,ʺ and (2) the admissibility of (a) the testimony of two witnesses, and
‐ 2 ‐
(b) certain excerpts of recorded conversations. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with
the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
I. Sufficiency of Evidence
The government presented sufficient evidence that Campos participated
in the conspiracy with an intent to defraud, and thus the district did not err in denying
his motion for acquittal on this basis. This Court reviews a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge de novo, ʺbut defendants face a heavy burden, as the standard of review is
exceedingly deferential.ʺ United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the government, drawing all inferences in the governmentʹs favor and deferring to the
juryʹs assessments of the witnessesʹ credibility. See id.; see also United States v. Santos, 541
F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 2008) (ʺWhen a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
in a conspiracy case, deference to the juryʹs findings is especially important . . . because
a conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation, and it is a rare case where all
aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in court with the precision of a surgeonʹs
scalpelʺ (internal quotation marks omitted)). ʺA judgment of acquittal can be entered
ʹonly if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent or so
meagerʹ that no ʹrational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.ʹʺ United States v. Taylor, 816 F.3d 12, 22 (2d Cir. 2016)
(quoting United States v. Espaillet, 380 F.3d 713, 718 (2d Cir. 2004)).
‐ 3 ‐
Camposʹs contention that the evidence ʺleans heavily toward innocence,ʺ
Appellantʹs Br. at 25, is unpersuasive given the cumulative evidence of his participation
in, and attempts to cover up, the conspiracy. For instance, the government presented
evidence, including the testimony of coconspirators, that: (1) Campos was present at a
February or March 2013 meeting where he overheard discussion of the scheme and
expressed interest in the same; (2) Campos recruited his wife, cousin, and an associate
as straw buyers to purchase multiple cars for use in the livery business even though the
loan applications falsely stated that the vehicles were for personal use by the borrowers;
(3) Campos wrote a note to a car dealership with instructions to use a New York
address for his wifeʹs car loan applications although Campos and his wife lived in New
Jersey; and (4) Campos wrote a letter misrepresenting to a bank the nature of his legal
representation of a straw buyer to conceal the scheme. Thus, viewed as a whole, the
evidence undercuts Camposʹs assertion that there was no evidence that he had
knowledge of the fraud. See Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2016)
(reasoning that ʺ[t]he government does not have to prove that the defendant intended
to commit the underlying offense himself/herselfʺ because one coconspiratorʹs conduct
is attributable to another coconspirator if each acted to facilitate the crime (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, Campos took the stand and denied knowledge of the scheme.
The jury rejected his testimony as well as his defense of good faith; and he has shown
‐ 4 ‐
no basis to question the juryʹs findings. See Baker, 899 F.3d at 130 (ʺʹWe will not attempt
to second‐guess a juryʹs credibility determination on a sufficiency challenge,ʹ
particularly when . . . trial counsel already presented these same credibility arguments
to the jury.ʺ (quoting United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 156 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Accordingly, the juryʹs verdict was supported by the evidence.
II. Admissibility of Evidence
We review a district courtʹs decision to exclude evidence at trial for abuse
of discretion. See United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). Campos contests
two of the district courtʹs evidentiary rulings: first, the decision to bar testimony from
two defense witnesses pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, and second,
the exclusion of certain audio recordings of conversations between Campos and a straw
buyer pursuant to Rule 106. Camposʹs evidentiary challenges fail in both respects.
a. Admission of Defense Witnessesʹ Testimony
The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of
the two proposed defense witnesses. To be relevant, evidence must have a ʺtendency to
make a fact more or less probableʺ and ʺthe fact [must be] of consequence in
determining the action.ʺ Fed. R. Evid. 401. Under Rule 403, ʺ[r]elevant evidence may
be excluded ʹif its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair
prejudice.ʹʺ United States v. Litvak, 889 F.3d 56, 69 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Evid.
403). ʺ[S]o long as the district court has conscientiously balanced the proffered
‐ 5 ‐
evidenceʹs probative value with the risk for prejudice, its conclusion will be disturbed
only if it is arbitrary or irrational.ʺ United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir.
2006).
Camposʹs first proposed witness, Christopher Meatto, was prepared to
testify that (1) even though he was an experienced attorney, he perceived the business
as legitimate; (2) he was unaware of any involvement by Campos in any conspiracy
after he began representing the business in September 2013; and (3) he found Campos to
be credible despite the governmentʹs insinuation that Campos misrepresented his legal
credentials. The district court concluded that the proposed testimony was irrelevant.
We agree.
First, what Meatto knew or believed sheds little, if any, light on what
Campos knew or believed. Meattoʹs knowledge regarding the propriety of the straw
buyer scheme is irrelevant because there is no evidence that Meattoʹs ʺknowledge was
communicated to [Campos]ʺ or that Campos ʺhad been exposed to the same sources
from which [Meatto] derived [his] knowledge.ʺ United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 121
(2d Cir. 2007) (holding that evidence of othersʹ knowledge should only be admitted to
indicate the knowledge of another if there is some other evidence in the record from
which to conclude that the persons have the same knowledge). Second, Meattoʹs
unawareness of Camposʹs involvement in the fraudulent scheme is similarly irrelevant
because Camposʹs participation in the conspiracy, enlisting straw buyers between
‐ 6 ‐
March and July 2013, predated Meattoʹs representation of the business starting in
September 2013. Third, Meattoʹs views as to Camposʹs credibility were inadmissible
because Camposʹs credibility was for the jury to assess based on his testimony, and his
competence as a lawyer was not relevant to the issues before the jury. See United States
v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding lay opinion testimony inadmissible
where the witness merely tells the jury which inferences to draw from the evidence).
Campos also sought to call a second defense witness, Bernie Martins, to
testify as to Camposʹs motivation in assisting one of the enlisted straw buyers in
returning her fraudulently obtained vehicles. The district court deemed the evidence
irrelevant because the evidence did not tend to show that Camposʹs actions were ʺnot a
cover‐up.ʺ Appʹx at 1188. Instead, the district court determined that Campos wanted to
introduce the otherwise inadmissible hearsay ʺto show . . . that in fact [Campos is] a
good guy who was trying to make the best out of a bad situation.ʺ Id. We find no abuse
of discretion in the district courtʹs reasoning.
b. Admissibility of Recorded Conversation Excerpts
The government offered into evidence only six excerpts from eight hours
of thirty recorded conversations between Campos and a straw buyer. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in precluding Campos from introducing more of the
recordings. Once a party produces all or part of a recorded statement, ʺan adverse
party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part ‐‐ or any . . . recorded
‐ 7 ‐
statement ‐‐ that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.ʺ Fed. R. Evid. 106.
ʺ[E]ven though a statement may be hearsay, an ʹomitted portion of [the] statement must
be placed in evidence if necessary to explain the admitted portion, to place the admitted
portion in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure fair and impartial
understanding of the admitted portion.ʹʺ United States v. Johnson, 507 F.3d 793, 796 (2d
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 575‐76 (2d Cir. 1987)).
Here, the district court rejected Camposʹs assertion that all the recordings
were one, long continuing conversation. The district court then determined that the
proposed additional excerpts, between Campos and the straw buyer regarding the
straw buyerʹs possible conversations with government investigators, were not related to
or necessary to explain the excerpts that the government introduced. Rather, the
government offered its excerpts for a limited purpose: the falsity of the assertion that
the fraudulently obtained cars were for personal rather than business use. In substance,
the district court concluded that Campos could not use the completeness rule as an end‐
run around the hearsay rule. We conclude that the district courtʹs ruling was not
arbitrary or irrational, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
proposed additional excerpts.
‐ 8 ‐
* * *
We have considered Camposʹs remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk
‐ 9 ‐