United States v. C. J. Tower & Sons

31 C.C.P.A. 185, 1944 CCPA LEXIS 7
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMarch 6, 1944
DocketNo. 4449
StatusPublished

This text of 31 C.C.P.A. 185 (United States v. C. J. Tower & Sons) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. C. J. Tower & Sons, 31 C.C.P.A. 185, 1944 CCPA LEXIS 7 (ccpa 1944).

Opinion

Hatfield, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States Customs Court, First Division.

Merchandise, consisting of “old discarded junk X-ray films, in chief value of cellulose acetate, which have been exposed and developed, and are no longer fit for use in taking an X-ray or other pictures,” was assessed for duty by the collector at the port of Búllalo, N. Y., as waste wholly or íd chief value of cellulose acetate, at 25 cents per pound under paragraph 31 (a) (1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the trade agreement with the United Kingdom, which became effective January 1, 1939 (T. D. 49753).

The importer protested, claiming, among of her things, that the merchandise was properly dutiable as waste, not specially provided for, at 7}i per centum ad valorem under paragraph 1555 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the aforesaid trade agreement.

The rate of duty provided in paragraph 1555 of the Tariff Act of 1930 was lowered from 10 per centum ad valorem to 7K per centum ad valorem by the trade agreement.

Paragraph 31 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930- reads as follows:

Par. 31. (a) Cellulose acetate, and compounds, combinations, or mixtures containing cellulose acetate:
[187]*187(1) In blocks, sheets, rods, tubes, powder, flakes, briquets, or other forms, whether or not colloided, and waste wholly or in chief value of cellulose acetate, all the foregoing not made into finished or partly finished articles, 50 cents per pound;
(2) made into finished or partly finished articles of which any of the foregoing is the component material of chief value, and not specially provided for, 80 per centum ad valorem.

Paragraph 31 (a) (1) as modified by the trade agreement is identical with paragraph 31 (a) (1), supra, except that the rate of duty has been lowered from 50 cents per pound to 25 cents per pound by the trade agreement. Paragraph 31 (a) (2), which had been modified by a trade agreement with the French Republic (concluded May 6, 1936, T. D. 48316), was not expressly referred to in the trade agreement with the United Kingdom.

The trial court, in an opinion by Oliver, Presiding Judge, stated that it agreed with counsel for the parties that the merchandise was waste, and quoted from our decision in the case of Harley Co. v. United States, 14 Ct. Cust. Appls. 112, T. D. 41644, as follows;

In the tariff sense, waste is a term which includes manufactured articles which have become useless for the original purpose for which they were made and fit only for remanufacture into something else. It also includes refuse, surplus, and useless stuff resulting from manufacture or from manufacturing processes and commercially unfit, without remanufacture, for the purposes for which the original material was suitable and from which material such refuse, surplus, or unsought residuum was derived. The latter class of waste might be appropriately designated as new waste and includes such things as tangled spun thread, coal dust, broken or spoiled castings fit only for remanufacture. T. D. 33376; Willets v. United States, 11 Ct. Cust. Appls. 499, 500, 501; Schlesinger v. Beard, 120 U. S. 264; Seeberger v. Castro, 153 U. S. 32; Patton v. United States, 159 U. S, 500, 505, 509; Latimer v. United States, 223 U. S. 501-503.

As appears from the quoted statement in the Harley Co. case, supra, there are two kinds of waste; namely, one, a manufactured article which, because of use or otherwise, has become useless for the purpose for which it was designed and is fit only for remanufacture; and, two, so-called “new waste,” which is refuse material resulting from a manufacturing process and which is commercially unfit without remanu-facture for the purpose for which the original material was suitable.

The trial court stated in its opinion that, as the involved merchandise was waste in chief value of cellulose acetate, the question presented was whether it was of the class or kind of waste intended by the Congress to be included in paragraph 31 (a) (1), supra, as modified by the trade agreement.

No change having been made in paragraph 31. (a) (1), supra, by the framers of the trade agreement, except as to the rate of duty, the court was obviously right in its statement as to the issue presented.

The trial court further stated that the language of paragraph 31 . (a) (1) “leaves some doubt as to just what waste was intended to be covered” thereby.

[188]*188The court having found that the provisions in' question were ambiguous, although counsel for the Government contend that it did not, turned to the legislative history of those provisions in an effort to ascertain whether waste like that here involved was intended by the Congress to be included in the provision in paragraph 31 (a) (1) for “waste wholly or in chief value of cellulose acetate.” In so doing, the court called attention to the following facts: That the provision for waste wholly or in chief value of cellulose acetate appeared for the first time in the Tariff Act of 1930; that, as passed by the House of Representatives, paragraph 31 (a) (1) of H. R. 2667 (H. R. 2667 later became the Tariff Act of 1930) provided for waste in the following language: “cellulose acetate rayon waste ahd other cellulose acetate waste”; that the Senate Committee on Finance deleted that provision and substituted in lieu thereof the provision as it appears in paragraph 31 (a) (1), supra, to wit, “waste wholly or in chief value of cellulose acetate” (amendment No. 69), .and reported to the Senate (Report No. 37, page 5) as follows:

The phrase “cellulose acetate rayon waste and other cellulose acetate waste” was stricken out of the House bill and “waste wholly or in chief value of cellulose acetate” inserted in lieu thereof. The new language is intended to cover the cellulose acetate waste resulting from the manufacture of blocks, sheets, rods, and other forms as well as from the manufacture of the above forms into finished articles. In addition, it is intended to cover the waste filaments, fibers, and yarns from cellulose actate artificial silk * * *;

that the Senate adopted the committee’s amendment; and that, relative to that amendment, the conferees representing the House of Representatives a.dvised acceptance of the Senate amendment, and in Conference Report No._;1326, page 36 (71st Congress, 2nd Sess.), reported as follows: .

Amendment No. 69: This amendment is a clarifying amendment to make certain that the rate provided will apply to all waste wholly or in chief value of cellulose acetate; and the House recedes. .

The trial court concluded that it was the purpose of.the Congress to limit the provision for waste wholly or in chief value of cellulose acetate, contained in paragraph 31 (a) (1), supra, to so-called “new waste,” that is, refuse material resulting from the manufacture of blocks, sheets, rods, and other forms provided for in paragraph 31 (a) (1), supra,

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Related

Schlesinger v. Beard
120 U.S. 264 (Supreme Court, 1887)
Seeberger v. Castro
153 U.S. 32 (Supreme Court, 1894)
Latimer v. United States
223 U.S. 501 (Supreme Court, 1912)
Willits & Co. v. United States
11 Ct. Cust. 499 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1923)
Harley Co. v. United States
14 Ct. Cust. 112 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1926)

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31 C.C.P.A. 185, 1944 CCPA LEXIS 7, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-c-j-tower-sons-ccpa-1944.