CRAVEN, Circuit Judge:
Six defendants, Burl A. Sawyers, Vincent J. Johnkoski, Alfred W. Schroath, Bonn Brown, Truman Gore, and William Wallace Barron, were indicted February 14, 1968, under 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (1966).1 The one count indictment charged conspiracy to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952 (1951) (Supp.1969).2 A mistrial was granted [1337]*1337to defendant Gore when his attorney became ill during trial. Former Governor W. W. Barron was acquitted, and defendants Sawyers, Johnkoski, Schroath, and Brown were convicted. Defendants Brown and Schroath were each fined $10,000 and sentenced to four years imprisonment, while defendants Sawyers and Johnkoski were sentenced to two years each and fined $5,000 and $10,000, respectively. We affirm the convictions.
The indictment charged that Brown and Schroath represented to legitimate business firms that they could be of assistance in obtaining business from the State of West Virginia and would procure state government contracts if paid to do so. Numerous selling firms employed Brown and Schroath and paid substantial sums of money into several corporations established and controlled by Brown and Schroath to receive these payments. It was part of the conspiracy that the Brown and Schroath corporations receiving payments for obtaining state business were to be taken over later by another corporation, which all six defendants would own equally. In this way, the indictment charged that state officials were bribed to grant or cause to be granted favorable contracts to business firms paying for them through Brown and Schroath.
On appeal, ingenious and diligent counsel have taken a shotgun approach to the validity of the trial, asserting that reversible error occurred in 13 respects. So many points of error suggest that none are valid. Even so, we have carefully considered the points assigned, to the extent of preparing a rough draft discussion of each, but upon reflection we think that most of the points do not merit doubling the length of the final opinion to include them. The two points of most interest relate to the so-called “Allen” charge and the asserted question of pretrial publicity.
I. THE ALLEN CHARGE.
Defendants complain about the giving of a “dynamite” or “Allen” charge3 to the jury after that body indicated it was deadlocked. The jury had deliberated for about 15 hours when its foreman sent the following note to the court:
We have a juror that stated: “the judge will get all over those that vote not guilty.”
This juror has cursed, made slanderous remarks along with another juror throwing chewings [sic] gum. These two jurors are sister-in-law [sic] and want to go home.
The vote is 10 guilty & 2 not guilty. It is a solid-vote and no one will give.
When the court reconvened after lunch, the jury was brought into the courtroom and given the supplemental charge.4 [1339]*1339Defendants contend that this charge was erroneous in several respects: (1) in order to counterbalance the pressure to choose between guilty and not guilty verdicts, a reminder of the burden of proof should have been included in the charge; (2) because the defense rested at the end of the prosecution’s ease, language in the supplemental charge stating that no better, or more exhaustive, evidence could be produced by either side on a retrial should have been eliminated; (3) because the charge was given in response to the jury note, it confirmed the jury’s belief that the judge would “get all over those that vote not guilty;” and (4) language in the charge indicating that the jury might be leisurely was coercive in view of the approaching Labor Day weekend. For these reasons, the defendants urge, that the supplemental charge was sufficiently coercive to require a new trial.
To bolster their position defendants point to a second inquiry made by the jury about 15 minutes after the supplemental charge had been given and the jury had retired. The second note sent by the jury read:
If two or more defendants are found guilty and the remaining defendants are declared not guilty, are all defendants considered guilty ?
In your last additional charge, you so indicated that each defendant should be voted on separately (as the verdict sheet and reads [sic]). However, during the trial the impression was conceived that if one was guilty —all were guilty.
After receiving this note the judge informed the jury that it was permissible to find one or more defendants not guilty and two or more guilty, provided that unless two defendants, at least, were found guilty, all had to be acquitted. Record at 1999-2001. Thereafter the jury retired and deliberated about one and a half hours before returning a verdict acquitting former Governor Barron and convicting Sawyers, Johnkoski, Brown, and Schroath.
We think these supplemental charges, under the circumstances of the complexity of the trial and its duration of some two weeks, were not so coercive as to impair the integrity of the verdicts. Previously the trial judge had properly and clearly placed the burden of proof. We think it was not error that he failed to repeat it in his supplemental instructions. Moreover, he was not asked to do so. Under the correct formulation of that burden jurors may arrive at a verdict of not guilty either because they find the facts to be consistent with innocence or because they are unable to determine the facts after conscientious effort. Since the prosecution may obtain a verdict of guilty only if the jury is convinced of the facts alleged beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas the defendant has the double opportunity of findings consistent with innocence or an inability to determine what the truth is, we think some reasonable degree of encouragement to arrive at a verdict is not inherently unfair to defendants.
Because the defendants rested their case without offering evidence, they complain of language in the supplemental charge to the effect that there was no “reason to believe that the case can be tried again better or more ex[1340]*1340haustively than it has been, on either side.” We perceive nothing unfair in such a comment. Defendants were well represented by competent counsel. Nothing in the record suggests that the trial judge should have assumed that in the event of a retrial the defendants would change their tactics and choose to offer evidence.
The defendants’ other two points of error with respect to the Allen charge are simply different formulations of their contention that such a charge is coercive and should be outlawed in this circuit. An examination of the dynamite charge used by the trial judge in this case shows that the court twice included language emphasizing that no juror should surrender his or her conscientious convictions because of the opinions of other jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. Indeed, to properly balance his instruction, the trial judge charged:
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CRAVEN, Circuit Judge:
Six defendants, Burl A. Sawyers, Vincent J. Johnkoski, Alfred W. Schroath, Bonn Brown, Truman Gore, and William Wallace Barron, were indicted February 14, 1968, under 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (1966).1 The one count indictment charged conspiracy to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952 (1951) (Supp.1969).2 A mistrial was granted [1337]*1337to defendant Gore when his attorney became ill during trial. Former Governor W. W. Barron was acquitted, and defendants Sawyers, Johnkoski, Schroath, and Brown were convicted. Defendants Brown and Schroath were each fined $10,000 and sentenced to four years imprisonment, while defendants Sawyers and Johnkoski were sentenced to two years each and fined $5,000 and $10,000, respectively. We affirm the convictions.
The indictment charged that Brown and Schroath represented to legitimate business firms that they could be of assistance in obtaining business from the State of West Virginia and would procure state government contracts if paid to do so. Numerous selling firms employed Brown and Schroath and paid substantial sums of money into several corporations established and controlled by Brown and Schroath to receive these payments. It was part of the conspiracy that the Brown and Schroath corporations receiving payments for obtaining state business were to be taken over later by another corporation, which all six defendants would own equally. In this way, the indictment charged that state officials were bribed to grant or cause to be granted favorable contracts to business firms paying for them through Brown and Schroath.
On appeal, ingenious and diligent counsel have taken a shotgun approach to the validity of the trial, asserting that reversible error occurred in 13 respects. So many points of error suggest that none are valid. Even so, we have carefully considered the points assigned, to the extent of preparing a rough draft discussion of each, but upon reflection we think that most of the points do not merit doubling the length of the final opinion to include them. The two points of most interest relate to the so-called “Allen” charge and the asserted question of pretrial publicity.
I. THE ALLEN CHARGE.
Defendants complain about the giving of a “dynamite” or “Allen” charge3 to the jury after that body indicated it was deadlocked. The jury had deliberated for about 15 hours when its foreman sent the following note to the court:
We have a juror that stated: “the judge will get all over those that vote not guilty.”
This juror has cursed, made slanderous remarks along with another juror throwing chewings [sic] gum. These two jurors are sister-in-law [sic] and want to go home.
The vote is 10 guilty & 2 not guilty. It is a solid-vote and no one will give.
When the court reconvened after lunch, the jury was brought into the courtroom and given the supplemental charge.4 [1339]*1339Defendants contend that this charge was erroneous in several respects: (1) in order to counterbalance the pressure to choose between guilty and not guilty verdicts, a reminder of the burden of proof should have been included in the charge; (2) because the defense rested at the end of the prosecution’s ease, language in the supplemental charge stating that no better, or more exhaustive, evidence could be produced by either side on a retrial should have been eliminated; (3) because the charge was given in response to the jury note, it confirmed the jury’s belief that the judge would “get all over those that vote not guilty;” and (4) language in the charge indicating that the jury might be leisurely was coercive in view of the approaching Labor Day weekend. For these reasons, the defendants urge, that the supplemental charge was sufficiently coercive to require a new trial.
To bolster their position defendants point to a second inquiry made by the jury about 15 minutes after the supplemental charge had been given and the jury had retired. The second note sent by the jury read:
If two or more defendants are found guilty and the remaining defendants are declared not guilty, are all defendants considered guilty ?
In your last additional charge, you so indicated that each defendant should be voted on separately (as the verdict sheet and reads [sic]). However, during the trial the impression was conceived that if one was guilty —all were guilty.
After receiving this note the judge informed the jury that it was permissible to find one or more defendants not guilty and two or more guilty, provided that unless two defendants, at least, were found guilty, all had to be acquitted. Record at 1999-2001. Thereafter the jury retired and deliberated about one and a half hours before returning a verdict acquitting former Governor Barron and convicting Sawyers, Johnkoski, Brown, and Schroath.
We think these supplemental charges, under the circumstances of the complexity of the trial and its duration of some two weeks, were not so coercive as to impair the integrity of the verdicts. Previously the trial judge had properly and clearly placed the burden of proof. We think it was not error that he failed to repeat it in his supplemental instructions. Moreover, he was not asked to do so. Under the correct formulation of that burden jurors may arrive at a verdict of not guilty either because they find the facts to be consistent with innocence or because they are unable to determine the facts after conscientious effort. Since the prosecution may obtain a verdict of guilty only if the jury is convinced of the facts alleged beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas the defendant has the double opportunity of findings consistent with innocence or an inability to determine what the truth is, we think some reasonable degree of encouragement to arrive at a verdict is not inherently unfair to defendants.
Because the defendants rested their case without offering evidence, they complain of language in the supplemental charge to the effect that there was no “reason to believe that the case can be tried again better or more ex[1340]*1340haustively than it has been, on either side.” We perceive nothing unfair in such a comment. Defendants were well represented by competent counsel. Nothing in the record suggests that the trial judge should have assumed that in the event of a retrial the defendants would change their tactics and choose to offer evidence.
The defendants’ other two points of error with respect to the Allen charge are simply different formulations of their contention that such a charge is coercive and should be outlawed in this circuit. An examination of the dynamite charge used by the trial judge in this case shows that the court twice included language emphasizing that no juror should surrender his or her conscientious convictions because of the opinions of other jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. Indeed, to properly balance his instruction, the trial judge charged:
[I] f a majority or even a lesser number of you are for acquittal, other jurors ought to seriously ask themselves again whether they do not have reason to doubt the correctness of a judgment which is not concurred in by many of their fellow jurors, and whether they should not distrust the weight or sufficiency of evidence which fails to convince the minds of several of their fellows to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt.
There was not the slightest intimation of impatience with the minority, nor any words that could be construed as a threat or even an expression of displeasure. It is not suggested to us that the judge’s tone of voice and facial expression (aspects that cannot appear in the record) were other than calm and dispassionate. That he knew of the division may be significant in judging his motivation, especially where he makes inquiry, Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926), but not of significance, we think, with respect to potential impact of his supplemental instructions on minority jurors. They always know their minority status, and if fearfully inclined, may presumably suspect a disgruntled judge can find them out.
It is impossible to measure precisely in time units how long a given jury may reasonably be required to deliberate. To require continued deliberation after some 15 hours does not seem to us unreasonable or coercive for a case of this complexity and duration. The documentary evidence alone that was offered to the jury fills three boxes stacked to a height of approximately four feet. The testimony and introduction of the documentary evidence consumed some 12 trial days. Under such circumstances as these, a quick acquiesence to an indication of difficulty in arriving at a verdict would have, we think, been contrary to the district judge’s duty to exert every reasonable effort to keep the criminal dockets current.
We are aware that in recent years there has been increasing criticism of Allen type charges. Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1966); Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir. 1962); Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom dissenting); Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown dissenting). What fuels the criticism seems to be a composite of two ideas:
(1) That since the trial judge cannot coerce a verdict, Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965), he may not persuade or induce further deliberation once the jury has retired; and
(2) That from some source there is derived the right to a hung jury, which right is a bulwark of liberty. See Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 755 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown concurring and dissenting); Comment, on Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 Yale L.J. 100 (1968).
We reject both conceptions. The right to a hung jury, we think, is embraced within the larger right to a ver[1341]*1341diet of acquittal when the jury is simply unable to ascertain the facts upon which guilt must depend. This “second chance” of acquittal, as distinguished from a determination of innocence, is bound up in our burden of proof and is similar to the Scotch verdict “not proven.” It is true, of course, that hung juries have sometimes shored up liberty and it will doubtless occur again, but to assert that anyone has the right to hang a jury rather than the right to a true verdict is erroneous.
The so-called “right” to a hung jury is at most no greater than the right to an irrational verdict. See United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969); compare United States v. Davis, 413 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1969). With respect to either “right,” it is clear that a defendant may not insist upon a jury instruction advising jurors they may irrationally acquit and that any one of them may deliberately hang the jury. Yet the power of jurors to do both is beyond question.
A defendant has no “right” to either an irrational verdict or a hung jury. He has only the right to have the jury speak without being coerced. The very premise of our system is that juries are empaneled to ascertain the truth, which is the meaning of “verdict.”
When a defendant occasionally benefits, if he does, from a hung jury, he is getting not what he is entitled to have but something less. Beneath the criticism of verdict inducing instructions is the apparent assumption that such an instruction is always detrimental to defendants. We are unaware of any statistical survey proving or disproving such an assumption. We do know, however, that not infrequently verdicts of acquittal follow Allen type instructions.5 So far as we know, there is no reason to suppose that an Allen type instruction is more likely to induce a verdict of guilty than of not guilty.6 Indeed, the trial judge may not inquire as to how the jury stands, Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926), and thus may not knowingly press for a verdict either way except in the rare instance when the jurors disclose to him, without inquiry, their division. E.g., Bowen v. United States, 153 F.2d 747, 751 (8th Cir. 1946).
A calmly dispassionate balanced effort on the part of a trial judge [1342]*1342to induce a verdict does not seem to us to invade the province of the jury. What, after all, is the purpose of the judge’s initial charge to the jury? Is it not to induce a verdict based upon the evidence and the law as he has given it to them? Why is the trial judge in the federal system given the power to comment on the evidence, and to place the burden of proof, and to advise the jury that it is their duty to accept the law as he gives it to them, unless it is to help the jury arrive at a true verdict? If the jurors misunderstand the instructions, no one, we think, would seriously suggest that the judge may not subsequently clarify or repeat them. If, at the same time, he urges further deliberation in an effort to agree upon a verdiet, and in doing so his comments are balanced and not slanted toward conviction, we are unable to perceive harm to the defendant.
We confess that we would like the Allen type charge given here better if it did not mirror so exactly the language of the original Allen charge.7 It would be better balanced, and fairer, if mention had been made of the duty of the majority to listen and consider any minority viewpoint, for we concede that being in the majority does not necessarily make one right. In United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961), Chief Judge Haynsworth, writing for the court and reversing a conviction because of an Allen type charge omitting reference to a juror’s duty not to yield [1343]*1343his conscientious conviction, said that if “the charge approved in Allen [had] been given here, there would be no open question of its propriety.” Whether or not the question has opened a bit, we adhere to the rule in this circuit that appropriate use of the pure Allen charge is not per se reversible error. Even so, we strongly recommend use of a modified version of Allen that includes that part of the recommendation of the Judicial Conference italicized in footnote 7.
Despite all of the adverse criticism of Allen type charges, we think it significant that not a single one of the circuits has outlawed supplemental instructions to juries for the purpose of inducing further deliberation and agreement upon a verdict.8 United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1969), is typical. What appears to be withdrawn from the discretion of the district judges in the main body of that opinion is all but restored in final footnote 32. The only real change resulting is a direction to the district judges in the Third .Circuit that they shall not give instructions, either in the main body of the charge or in the form of a supplement, that direct a juror to distrust his own judgment if he finds a large majority of the jurors taking a view different from his own. We agree that this improves the original Allen charge.
II. PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
The defendants also complain of the denial of their motion for a change of venue, alleging that intensive pretrial publicity made it impossible for them to receive a fair trial. Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). Here the district judge thought that the pretrial publicity did not warrant a change of venue, and after an examination of the clippings in the record we find ourself in agreement.
There are 176 clippings in the record; of these, 55 reported various proceedings that occurred in the trial, including the appointment of Judge Martin from South Carolina to hear the case, the granting of a continuance, and excerpts from the indictment. Of the rest, 113 clippings dealt with events in the local politics of West Virginia. The political scene in that state had been thrown into an upheaval by the charges leveled against the defendants. Many of the clippings did not concentrate directly on the appellants, however, but on the West Virginia gubernatorial race, which had been affected by the indictments. Four of the excerpts dealt with matters other than the case against the defendants and would have required intimate familiarity with the case and the defendants to have any bearing at all. Another four dealt with exculpatory statements given by the defendants themselves to the press. It is significant, we think, that only 8 of the 176 clippings mentioned the other defendants to the exclusion of former governor Barron. The great bulk of the publicity hit Barron far harder than the others,9 yet Barron was the only defendant acquitted.
This was not Sheppard-type publicity. There were no editorials or slanted articles demanding conviction. Indeed, our careful examination of all publicity reveals little more than what any prospective juror would learn when the indictment was read, or the opening statements made. The information published here amounted to little more than publication of the charges contained in the indictments and denials by the defend[1344]*1344ants of their guilt. So far as we know, it has never been suggested, either by the Supreme Court, the Reardon Committee, or the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System of the Judicial Conference of the United States, that accusations of crime are to be kept secret. Publicity per se is not necessarily prejudicial. Neither in the briefs nor in oral argument were counsel for the defendants able to point out to us any item of publicity containing information or conjecture that could not be shown at the trial and that might reasonably affect an otherwise impartial juror.
The defendants also complain, however, that the voir dire conducted by the district judge was inadequate. The court, among other questions, asked the prospective jurors: “Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of any defendant?” If the answer was “no,” the next question was: “Do you know of any reason that you could not give both the government and the defendants a fair and impartial trial, and a true and just verdict render [sic] according to the law and evidence in the case?” If the answer to the first question was “yes,” the next question would be: “Now listen closely, would it require evidence to remove from your mind the opinion that you say that you have formed or expressed?” No juror who indicated that he had formed or expressed an opinion was seated.
The defendants object to the voir dire because the court refused to question prospective jurors about what they had read of the case and what they had heard on radio or television. We think the trial judge’s refusal to conduct a general inquisition was correct. What we have said about the nature of pretrial publicity governs here. There were no specific headlines, news reports, or editorials brought to the attention of the trial judge as possible sources of prejudice. Had there been, it would, of course, have been his duty to inquire about their impact upon the veniremen, but absent specific Sheppard-type items of prejudicial publicity, there was no such duty. To have asked the entire panel whether any of them had heard anything prejudicial to defendants and, if so, to state the nature of it might well have caused a mistrial, for every trial lawyer is aware that general questioning of veniremen can elicit some startling replies. Absent a basis for conjecture that specific prejudicial items may have reached the venire, we agree with the district judge that it was wiser to phrase the voir dire questioning in general terms.10
Affirmed.