RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 United States v. Burke No. 02-5470 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0349P (6th Cir.) File Name: 03a0349p.06 FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Frederick H. Godwin, ASSISTANT UNITED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS STATES ATTORNEY, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee. FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ _________________ OPINION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , X _________________ Plaintiff-Appellee, - ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Leon Burke - - No. 02-5470 pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a weapon, in v. - violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He now appeals the > judgment against him and his sentence, arguing that the , district court erred by conducting a suppression hearing via LEON BURKE , - Defendant-Appellant. - video-conferencing, by applying a four-level sentencing enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines N (USSG) § 2K2.1(b)(5) for possessing a firearm in connection Appeal from the United States District Court with another felony offense, and by applying a two-level for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis. enhancement for obstruction of justice, under USSG § 3C1.1. No. 01-20191—Robert H. Cleland, District Judge. Finding no merit to his claims, we affirm.
Argued: August 6, 2003 Facts
Decided and Filed: October 1, 2003 In September of 1996, Tennessee state officers were investigating members of the Burke family, including two Before: NORRIS, BATCHELDER, and ROGERS, Circuit brothers, Leon Burke (“Leon”) and Billy Burke (“Billy”). Judges. Together the Burkes operated Burke’s General Auto Repair (“Auto Shop”) in Memphis. The officers suspected that they _________________ were stealing cars, taking them to the Auto Shop, installing in the stolen cars the vehicle identification number (“VIN”) COUNSEL plates from junked cars the Burkes purchased inexpensively at Memphis Police Department (“MPD”) salvage auctions, ARGUED: J. Patten Brown III, OFFICE OF THE and reselling the cars to innocent buyers. This process of FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE WESTERN exchanging the VIN plates of wrecked cars for those of stolen DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, Memphis, Tennessee, for cars is known as “flipping.” Appellant. Frederick H. Godwin, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee. The officers obtained a search warrant for the Auto Shop, ON BRIEF: J. Patten Brown III, OFFICE OF THE located at 3338 Weaver Road, and for the adjacent house that
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Leon and Billy lived in, at 3340 Weaver Road. Inside the should move the car somewhere else because police were house they found various items that incriminated the brothers. trying to track down all cars bearing the VINs of cars Leon Stowed between a refrigerator and the wall was an SKS had bought at MPD auctions. Jimmy also told the officers Norinco 7.62 x 39 millimeter military assault rifle, with a 30- where he and Leon had parked the car, and there they found round banana clip magazine that held six live rounds. In a it—stolen and with the VIN flipped, as expected. metal wall-locker in a bedroom they found a fully loaded .44 magnum Astra revolver, an unloaded Browning .22 caliber The following year, Tennessee convicted Leon of theft of rifle, and a 12-gauge Mossberg pump shotgun that contained property worth over $500, and he was sentenced to two three- six live rounds in the magazine and one spent round in the year sentences, to run concurrently. Leon served his sentence chamber. The shotgun was noteworthy because, like a police and was released. Federal authorities then indicted Leon for assault shotgun, its shoulder-stock had been removed and a being a felon in possession of a weapon, and both Leon and pistol grip added, so the gun could only be fired like a two- Billy for conspiring to tamper with VIN numbers and steal handed pistol. Also in the metal locker were four VIN plates, cars, and for actually tampering with VINs on several an envelope that said “84 Olds” and had “Leon Burke” occasions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 511(a). stamped on a corner and contained a fifth VIN plate, ten applications for certificates of title, and other documents After the federal proceedings commenced, Leon having to do with vehicle titles. Elsewhere in the house they (hereinafter “Burke”) filed a motion to suppress the evidence found a book explaining how to modify certain guns to make seized at his house, arguing that the search had been them fully automatic, and another book describing how to unconstitutional for various reasons. A hearing was make functional silencers. Behind the house, in a trailer, the scheduled, but because there was a severe shortage of judges officers found four more firearms. And scattered around the in the Western District of Tennessee just then, it was arranged property were pieces of cars and stripped car bodies, some of that Judge Robert Cleland of the Eastern District of Michigan which were pierced with bullet holes. would hear the case as a visiting judge. Prior to the hearing, Judge Cleland notified the parties that he would be presiding Four days after the search, Sergeant Farris McCarthy, the over the case from Michigan, participating in the proceedings officer who had led the search, drove to the home of Jimmy via live two-way video, with a two-way audio feed so he Burke (“Jimmy”), another brother of Leon. McCarthy was could hear the parties and also talk to them, and everything interested in Jimmy because Jimmy held the title to a car else would be normal, with the parties and witnesses together bearing the VIN of a certain 1980 Chevrolet Impala that Leon in the court room in Memphis. Burke’s counsel did not object had bought at a MPD auction, and McCarthy suspected that until the hearing itself was underway, at which time he argued Jimmy’s car was actually a stolen 1980 Impala into which that the use of video violated what was then Rule 26 of the Leon had installed the auctioned-car’s VIN. McCarthy drove Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that past Jimmy’s house and saw the Impala in question parked “[i]n all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally out front, but instead of going in by himself he parked down in open court.” After discussing the objection, Judge Cleland the street and called for some uniformed officers to support denied it, and went on to deny the motion to suppress as well. him. When the uniformed officers arrived, however, the car was gone. The officers questioned Jimmy, who explained Burke thereafter entered into a Rule 11 plea agreement that he had bought the car from Leon, and that Leon had under which he agreed to plead guilty to the felon in appeared at his house that morning and told him that he possession charge, and the government agreed to drop the No. 02-5470 United States v. Burke 5 6 United States v. Burke No. 02-5470
other charges against him. The agreement additionally Cir. 1998). In evaluating Burke’s Rule 26 claim, which he provided that Burke could appeal the adverse suppression did timely raise, we review the district court de novo, because finding. the claim concerns a matter of law. See United States v. Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1997) Judge Cleland held a sentencing hearing, in person this (“Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is time. He applied a four-level enhancement pursuant to USSG a legal issue subject to de novo review.”). § 2K2.1(b)(5) for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony (i.e., in connection with VIN flipping), a two- A. Rule 43 level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1 for obstructing justice by telling Jimmy to move his car, and a three-level We begin our analysis with Rule 43, because this is where reduction for accepting responsibility, but he denied Burke’s Burke concentrates his argument on appeal, and because it is request for a downward departure. In the end, he sentenced under this rule that most cases involving video-conferencing Burke to the bottom of the Guidelines range: 78 months, plus have arisen. At the time of Burke’s hearing, Rule 43(a) three years of supervised release. Burke now appeals. provided that “[t]he defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial Analysis including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise I. The Propriety of Holding the Suppression Hearing Via provided by this rule.”1 Burke’s argument fails because the Video-Conference rule does not extend to pre-trial motions. Burke argues that the judgment in this case should be Four Courts of Appeals have held that video-conferencing reversed and the case remanded for resentencing because the in the context of a proceeding that is covered by Rule 43 does district court’s use of video-conferencing violated Rules 26 not satisfy the rule’s requirement that the defendant be and 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and “present.” See United States v. Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d 1244, because it violated constitutional due process. The arguments 1248 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that video-conferencing at are without merit. sentencing violated Rule 43); United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300, 303–04 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. At the outset, we note that at Burke’s video-conferenced Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 235–39 (5th Cir. 1999) (same); suppression hearing, his counsel objected solely on the basis Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. United States Dist. Court for Dist. of of Rule 26, and he did not mention Rule 43 or the Constitution. Consequently, we review his Rule 43 and constitutional arguments only for plain error. See Rule 52(b); 1 United States v. Crouch, 288 F.3d 907, 909 (6th Cir. 2002). This version of Rule 43 was revised in December 200 2, when the To prevail on these claims, Burke must show “(1) that an Advisory Committee changed the rules to provide explicitly for video- error occurred in the district court; (2) that the error was plain, conferencing in initial appearances and arraignm ents. See Rule 5 (f) (2003) (providing that for initial appearances, “[v]ideo teleconferencing i.e., obvious or clear; (3) that the error affected his substantial may be used to conduct an appearance unde r this rule if the defendant rights; and (4) that this adverse impact seriously affected the consents”); Rule 1 0(c) (2003) (“Vid eo teleconferencing may b e used to fairness, integrity or public reputation of his suppression arraign a defendant if the defendant consents.”); Rule 43(a) (2003) hearing.” United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946, 949 (6th (“Unless . . . Rule 5, or Rule 1 0 provides otherwise, the defendant must be present . . . .”). No. 02-5470 United States v. Burke 7 8 United States v. Burke No. 02-5470
Ariz., 915 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding a violation hearing could be covered by Rule 43 is if the hearing where video-conferencing was used in an arraignment, based somehow qualified as a “stage of the trial.”3 on a combination of Rule 10’s requirement that arraignments be held in “open court” and Rule 43’s requirement that the The background of Rule 43 makes it clear that a pre-trial defendant be “present”). But see Navarro, 169 F.3d at motion hearing is not a “stage of the trial.” The Advisory 240–41 (Politz, J., dissenting) (arguing that Rule 43 permits Committee Notes to the 1944 adoption of Rule 43 explained sentencing by video-conference).2 that “[t]he first sentence of the rule setting forth the necessity of the defendant’s presence at arraignment and trial is a But Rule 43 does not apply to Burke’s suppression hearing. restatement of existing law.” Rule 43, 1944 Advisory By its text, the rule applies through “every stage of the trial” Committee Notes, ¶1 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. beginning with the impaneling of the jury, and it applies to 370 (1892), and Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912)). only two pre-trial events—the arraignment and the plea. The Notes added, next, that “[t]his principle does not apply to Consequently, the only way Burke’s pre-trial suppression hearings on motions made prior to or after trial.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1942)). 2 These decisions rely primarily upon the plain, common-sense, An investigation into this “existing law” that the rule dictionary meaning of “prese nt” as “physical existence in the same place codified reveals, predictably enough, that “trial” denoted the as whatever act is done there.” Navarro, 169 F.3d at 236; see also Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1247 (agreeing with Navarro’s analysis); time between the impaneling of the jury and the delivery of Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 303 (“[D]ictionaries confirm that presence means the sentence. For example, in the Lewis case cited in the physical prese nce.”); Valenzuela-Gonzalez, 915 F.2d at 128 1 (“[W ]e hold that the plain language of the rules must be followed.”). These decisions have also relied on four other factors to support their interpretation: (1) 3 the Confrontation C lause ge nerally requires that a defendant be able Burke’s counsel argues that under Rule 43, a defendant has the right physically to confront the witnesses against him, and Rule 4 3’s to be present not only at “every stage of the trial,” as Rule 43 provide s, protections—mo re extensive than those of the Confrontation Clause—are but also at every “critical stage” of the judicial pro ceedings taken as a nonetheless given context by that Clause, see Navarro, 169 F.3d at whole. Support for this conclusion is found in dictum in United States v. 236–37; (2) R ule 43 (b)(3 ) notes that the defendant can be physically Johnson, 859 F.2d 1 289 (7th Cir. 1988). In Johnson, which was a Rule excluded from “the co urtroo m” for being disrup tive, and for this to 43 case challenging the defendant’s absence from a suppression hearing, happen it must be the case that the defendant initially had the right to be the court noted that “[t]he parties do not dispute that an accused person physically present in “the courtroom,” see id.; Lawrence, 248 F.3d at has a right to b e present at every critical stage of a criminal proceeding 303–04; (3) various passages from the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule against him and that a pretrial suppression hearing is a critical stage.” Id. 43 evidence that “presence” means “physical presence,” see Navarro, 169 at 1294. The court, then, assumed that the suppression hearing was a part F.3d at 237–39 ; and (4) television is not the same thing as physical of the “trial” for purposes of Rule 43, because it was a “critical stage,” but presence, see Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 304 (“[V ]irtual reality is rarely a went on to hold that the exception to Rule 43 for a “ conference or substitute for actual presence and . . . even in an age of advancing argument upon a question of law” applied. Id. at 1294–95. W e disagree techno logy, watching an event on the screen remains less than the with the “critical stage” d ictum, ho wever. Though the right to have com plete equivalent of actually attending it.”). In contrast, Judge Politz, counsel present depends upon whether a judicial proceeding is a “critical dissenting on this point in Navarro, argues that “present” for Rule 43 stage,” see, e.g ., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (197 0), this standard purposes should be given the alternative dictionary meaning of “within does not ap ply to Rule 43 beca use Rule 43 sets out its own, different, sight or call” and that such a de finition would “giv[e] appropriate effect standard: the defendant has the right to be present at “every stage of the to the clear intent of Rule 2 . . . directing us to construe the R ules so as to trial.” Further, we know o f no other Rule 43 cases that employ the eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay[.]” 169 F.3d at 240. “critical stage” standard. No. 02-5470 United States v. Burke 9 10 United States v. Burke No. 02-5470
Notes, the Supreme Court reversed a death sentence for proceedings held before the jury was impaneled, courts murder where the defendant had not been allowed to be considering such circumstances have consistently held that a present in court during preliminary challenges to the jury. defendant’s absence does not violate Rule 43.6 This is true See 146 U.S. at 372–73. The Court relied upon and quoted even with respect to post-trial evidentiary hearings—in from Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), which rejected a proceedings, that is, where the Rule 43(c)(3) exception for government argument that the trial did not begin until the jury “when the proceeding involves only a conference or hearing was sworn in, and which instead held that “where the upon a question of law” did not apply. 7 indictment is for a felony, the trial commences at least from the time when the work of empanelling the jury begins.” Overall, the authorities are nearly unanimous that Rule 43’s Hopt, 110 U.S. at 578; see also Lewis, 146 U.S. at 373-74. right to be present does not apply to pre-trial suppression The Lewis case, then, which Rule 43 was built upon, supported the proposition that the “trial” begins with jury impaneling. This proposition is strengthened by the other 43(b)(1) [the exception for a defendant’s voluntary absence after ‘trial has cases that the Notes cite.4 commenced ’], a ‘trial has comm enced’ when the jury selection pro cess has begun”); United States v. Krout, 56 F.3d 643, 646 (5th Cir. 1995) Cases handed down since the enactment of Rule 43 have (finding for the same purpose that trial begins with jury selection and typically construed the word “trial” in a similarly restrictive noting that “our research[] does not reveal a contrary interpretation of the fashion.5 Though none of the cases cited so far dealt with Rule”); see also Ganne tt Co. v. DeP asquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“By d efinition, a hearing on a motion before trial to suppress evidence is not a trial; it is a pretrial hearing.”) (emph asis omitted). 4 See Diaz, 223 U.S. at 45 5 (“In cases of felony our courts, with 6 substantial acco rd, have regarded [the d efendant’s right to be present] as See, e.g., United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 63 2, 653 (11th Cir. 1984) extending to every stage of the trial, inclusive of the empaneling of the (“The first advisory committee note shows clearly that proceedings such jury and the reception of the verdict, and as being scarcely less important as [pretrial hearings to determine the admissibility of the evidence the to the accused than the right of trial itself.” (emp hasis ad ded )); Lynch, 132 government intends to offer at trial] do not fall into the Rule 43 catch-all, F.2d at 113 (“We do not understand that the right of a defendant to be ‘every stage of the trial.’”); Taylor v. United States, 385 F.2d 835, 836 present in court throughout his trial has ever been considered to embrace (8th Cir. 1967) (in which the defendant complained that Rule 43 had been a right to be present also at the argument of motions prior to trial or violated because he had not been present at several preliminary motions subsequent to verd ict.”); see also Sny der v. Ma ssach usetts, 291 U.S. 97, disposed of prior to commencement of trial, and the court responded that 107 (1934) (noting “the distinction everywhere drawn between “it is doubtful whe ther such motions co nstitute a part of defendant’s proceedings at the trial and those before and after,” and observing that trial”). “[m]any motions before trial are heard in the defendant’s absence, and many motions after trial or in the prosecution of appeals”) (overruled on 7 See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 131 F.3d 951, 953 n.3 (11th Cir. other ground s, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (19 64)). See 1997) (“It is clear that R ule 43 did no t entitle Boyd to attend the [po st- gen erally Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 (199 3) (discussing trial] evidentiary hearing: The rule does not mention post-trial the law that Rule 43 was meant to restate). proceedings, and in fact the Advisory Committee’s note to the original 5 enactment notes that the principle behind the rule ‘doe s not ap ply to See, e.g., United States v. Bra dford, 237 F.3d 130 6, 13 09– 10 (11th hearings on motions mad e prio r to or after trial.’”); United States v. Cir. 2001) (noting that “every other circuit to address the issue” has “held Gradsky, 434 F.2d 8 80, 882 (5th Cir. 1970 ) (“The Sixth Amendment and that a trial commences unde r Rule 43 when jury selection begins,” and Fed.Rules Cr.Proc. 43 do guarantee a defendant the right to be present at stating that “[a]fter reviewing this precedent from other circuits, we find the arraignment and ‘at every stage of the trial.’ No appellate court has their reasoning compelling and conclude that, for purposes of Rule extended this right to an evidentiary hearing.”). No. 02-5470 United States v. Burke 11 12 United States v. Burke No. 02-5470
hearings.8 Consequently, we conclude that Burke did not Cir. 2001) (“This Court deems issues presented in a enjoy Rule 43’s right to be “present,” and his Rule 43 perfunctory manner on appeal to have been waived.”). challenge to the use of video-conferencing at those proceedings must fail. In light of this conclusion, it is Even if Burke had not forfeited this argument, we would unnecessary to proceed to harmless-error review, which reject it on the merits. The only support for Burke’s would otherwise be the next step. See, e.g., United States v. contention that the term “open court” precludes video- Harris, 9 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir. 1993) (“As we previously conferencing is found in the Ninth Circuit’s have held, the rule requiring a defendant’s presence at every Valenzuela-Gonzalez case, in which the court partially based stage of the trial must be considered with Rule 52(a) of the its no-video-arraignment holding on Rule 10’s provision that Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, [which provides] that “[a]rraignment shall be conducted in open court.” 915 F.2d at harmless error is to be disregarded.”). 1280 (emphasis added). There is no need for us to consider the persuasiveness of this reasoning, however, because Rule B. Rule 26 26, like Rule 43, applies by its terms to “trials,” and Burke’s suppression hearing was a pre-trial proceeding. Rule 26 provides that “[i]n all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise C. Constitutional Arguments provided[.]” We reject Burke’s contention that this rule applied to his suppression hearing, and that the use of video- The use of video-conferencing at Burke’s suppression conferencing violated the rule’s “open court” requirement. hearing, moreover, did not violate Burke’s fair trial right to have the judge “present.” Nor did it violate Burke’s Though Burke discussed Rule 26 at the suppression constitutional right to be “present” himself at trial. We will hearing, on appeal he refers to Rule 26 only in his Summary consider these arguments in turn. of Argument, and then only in a conclusory fashion. See Burke Br. at 16 (“The defendant was not ‘present’ in Burke relies upon his constitutional right to “have all ‘open court’ because the district court was absent from the critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with courtroom.”). We find, then, that he has forfeited this ground. jurisdiction to preside.” Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. See Smoot v. United Transp. Union, 246 F.3d 633, 647 (6th 858, 876 1989) (invalidating a magistrate’s conduct of jury selection on statutory grounds and reversing the conviction for that structural error). Burke analogizes his situation to that in United States v. Mortimer, 161 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 8 Interestingly, the W right & Miller treatise d isagree s with this 1998), in which the judge was unaccountably absent during conclusion, suggesting that Rule 43 should apply in such circumstances counsel’s summation and unable to consider an objection by desp ite the Ad visory C omm ittee’s 1944 note. See 3A W R IG HT ET AL., opposing counsel. Id. at 241. The Third Circuit found that F EDERAL P RACTICE & P ROCEDURE § 72 1.1; see also United States v. Da lli, this was a structural error, reasoning that “[a] trial consists of 424 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1970) (dictum citing W right & Miller for the a contest between litigants before a judge. When the judge is proposition that “a defendant has a right to be presen t at a suppression hearing where testimony is to be taken,” but finding that the defendant absent at a ‘critical stage’ the forum is destroyed.” Id. had waived this right). But the Wright & M iller treatise does not justify its conclusion, except to state that “it would seem that defendant has a It is true that courts have held that a judge’s actual absence right to be present,” and it cites no federal cases besides Da lli that adopt from certain phases of the trial can constitute a structural such a holding. No. 02-5470 United States v. Burke 13 14 United States v. Burke No. 02-5470
error, depriving a defendant of the right to a fair trial. But against him.” See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, Burke has failed to cite any cases establishing that this right 526 (1985) (“The constitutional right to presence is rooted to is violated where the judge is present through video- a large extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth conferencing, nor do we know of any. Indeed, United States Amendment[.]”). Of the various elements to the v. Kone, 307 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2002), a somewhat more confrontation right—“physical presence, oath, closely analogous case that involved the use of a cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier speakerphone, suggests that there was no violation in this of fact”—physical presence, or a defendant’s right to confront case. In Kone the trial judge needed to leave immediately for the witnesses against him face-to-face, forms “the core of the a judicial conference, so he arranged for another federal values furthered” by the Clause. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. judge, in a different city, to handle jury questions that might 836, 846–47 (1990); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, arise during deliberations and to receive the verdict and poll 1016 (1988) (finding a violation of the right to confront the jurors via speakerphone. See id. at 441–42. Relying upon witnesses where a screen was placed between the defendant a series of Second Circuit cases, this court distinguished and two child witnesses in a child abuse case). But the Mortimer and found no structural error, holding that “[t]his is physical confrontation right is not absolute, and alternatives not the case of a judge who completely abdicated his judicial such as video-confrontation may be acceptable where responsibilities, as in Mortimer, but rather the case of a judge “necessary to further an important policy.” See Craig, 497 who presided telephonically at important stages of the trial.” U.S. at 852 (holding that “use of [a] one-way closed circuit Id. at 443. television procedure, where necessary to further an important state interest, does not impinge upon the truth-seeking or Furthermore, whatever right Burke had to the presence of symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause”); see also the judge, this right is implicated to a lesser degree in a United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 672 (2d Cir. 1972) suppression hearing than it is in an actual trial. See, e.g., (finding no Confrontation Clause violation where a defendant United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980) (“[T]he was excluded from part of his suppression hearing while a process due at a suppression hearing may be less demanding certain witness testified, a witness whose testimony the and elaborate than the protections accorded the defendant at government wanted to keep secret). Further, the Supreme the trial itself.”). In this case the judge could see, hear, and Court has repeatedly explained that “[t]he right to speak to the witnesses, and they could see, hear, and speak to confrontation is basically a trial right.” Barber v. Page, 390 him. Though presence through a television is not the same U.S. 719, 725 (1968); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 thing as direct physical presence, in this case the difference U.S. 39, 52-53 (1987) (plurality opinion); California v. between the two was not of constitutional dimension. The Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970). judge’s presence via video-conferencing did not deprive Burke of due process by rendering his suppression hearing In this case, even ignoring the fact that the video- fundamentally unfair, and it did not constitute a structural conferencing was at a suppression hearing rather than during error. a trial, Burke’s right to confront the witnesses against him physically was not implicated. Unlike in cases where the Burke’s companion argument that the Constitution requires defendant is present only via video-conferencing, Burke was the defendant to be present is largely based on the Sixth in the courtroom, physically facing the witnesses, and it was Amendment Confrontation Clause, which guarantees that the only the judge who was remote. accused has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses No. 02-5470 United States v. Burke 15 16 United States v. Burke No. 02-5470
The other constitutional foundation of the right of II. The USSG § 2K2(b)(5) Enhancement for Use of A defendant to be present is the Fifth Amendment Due Process Firearm in Connection With Another Felony Offense clause, and the Supreme Court has held that this clause guarantees “that a defendant be allowed to be present ‘to the We review for clear error the district court’s factual extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his findings, and accord “due deference” to the district court’s absence[.]’” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987) determination that the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108 (1934)); applies. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); United States v. Ennenga, see also id. at 745–46 (holding that due process guarantees 263 F.3d 499, 502 (6th Cir. 2001). Section 2K2.1(b)(5) were not violated where a defendant was excluded from a instructs a court to increase a defendant’s felony offense by witness competency hearing, and noting that the hearing did four levels “[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm not concern the witnesses’ substantive testimony); Gagnon, or ammunition in connection with another felony offense[.]” 470 U.S. at 526 (“[W]e have recognized that [the] right [to be A court can apply this enhancement “only . . . if the present] is protected by the Due Process Clause in some Government establishes by a preponderance of the evidence situations where the defendant is not actually confronting that the defendant possessed or used a gun in connection with witnesses or evidence against him.”); United States v. Brown, another felony.” United States v. Hardin, 248 F.3d 489, 495 571 F.2d 980, 986 (6th Cir. 1978) (“The Constitution only (6th Cir. 2001). The section “was created in response to a grants to the criminal defendant the ‘right to be present at all concern about the increased risk of violence when firearms stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the are used or possessed during the commission of another fairness of the proceedings[.]’” (quoting Faretta v. California, felony.” United States v. McDonald, 165 F.3d 1032, 1037 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15 (1975))). Here again, however, the (6th Cir. 1999) (emphasis omitted). Court has held that “the process due at a suppression hearing may be less demanding and elaborate than the protections In this case, the district court did not err in applying this accorded the defendant at the trial itself.” Raddatz, 447 U.S. enhancement. The court found a sufficient connection at 679. between the guns in Burke’s house and the VIN-flipping operation based on a number of factors: Burke was running It is questionable whether Burke’s right to a fair and just the VIN-flipping operation from the Auto Shop, which was hearing would have been thwarted even had he been entirely located just across the driveway from the house; three of the excluded from his suppression hearing. See, e.g., Yates v. guns were found in the same metal cabinet that held detached United States, 418 F.2d 1228, 1229 (6th Cir. 1969) (“It is . . . VIN numbers and other VIN-flipping evidence; the metal claimed that the appellant’s constitutional rights were violated cabinet was kept in the master bedroom, and people who have because he was excluded from the hearing to suppress significant contraband tend to keep such things in their evidence. We find no merit to this claim.”). Given that bedrooms; Burke’s VIN-flipping business appears to have Burke was physically present at the hearing, and it was only been his chief source of income during this time; some of the the judge who was in any sense “absent,” Burke’s Fifth weapons were loaded, and one had been discharged; and the Amendment right to be present was not violated. On this Mossberg shotgun had been modified to make it more like an constitutional ground, as in the other constitutional arguments assault weapon. On the basis of this evidence, the judge Burke asserts, the district court committed no error, let alone concluded that “[i]t is abundantly clear to me far beyond any plain error. preponderance of the evidence that these firearms were No. 02-5470 United States v. Burke 17 18 United States v. Burke No. 02-5470
possessed in connection with another felony offense, reliance on the theory in this case and adhere to the text of specifically, auto theft and VIN-flipping[.]” § 2K2.1(b)(5), simply asking whether the government met its burden of showing that “the defendant . . . possessed any In making its finding, the judge also found that the “fortress firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony theory” applied at least to some extent, even though no drugs offense,” and remembering that possession can be actual or were involved here. This theory originated in cases involving constructive. See Covert, 117 F.3d at 948. The fortress 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which provision penalizes anyone theory played a role in relation to § 924(c)(1) because in that who, “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug context there was a leap to be made: using a weapon is trafficking crime[,] . . . uses or carries a firearm.” The theory different from merely possessing one, and the theory was a means for courts to find that a defendant “used” a permitted courts to infer use from possession. But the theory firearm, even where there was no evidence that the defendant is less useful where § 2K2.1(b)(5) is concerned, because had fired, brandished, or even picked up the weapon. See § 2K2.1(b)(5) already says “possession,” and there is no leap United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir. 1976) to be made; rather, the government must merely establish a (finding “use,” based on the fact that the social club that factual connection by a preponderance of the evidence. housed the defendants’ drug operation was a “veritable Further, in the present case the theory has only introduced fortress”); see also United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 944 confusion, inciting the parties to argue about the meaning and (6th Cir. 1989) (“[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms extension of the theory, and diverting attention from the real found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant question, whether § 2K2.1(b)(5) itself has been satisfied. and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, Based on the above-noted evidence relied upon by the then such firearms are used ‘during and in relation to’ a drug district court, we find that the court did not clearly err in trafficking crime.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1))). Though concluding that Burke’s possession of the various firearms in the Supreme Court has curtailed the theory in relation to his house was connected with his VIN-flipping operation. § 924(c)(1) by holding that the term “use” in § 924(c)(1) Unlike where drugs are involved, there is no widely means “active employment” and not merely possession, see acknowledged consensus that VIN-flipping is a dangerous Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995), the theory activity that frequently involves guns. Nevertheless, the guns is still applicable in § 2K2.1(b)(5) cases because the latter and the VIN paraphernalia were found in close proximity, the provision contains the additional word “possessed.” See illegal operation could have been protected by guns (e.g., to United States v. Covert, 117 F.3d 940, 947–48 (6th Cir. 1997) fend off disgruntled car buyers, to deter thieves, and to defend (holding that the theory continues to apply under the operation from the police), and overall there was § 2K2.1(b)(5) post-Bailey). sufficient evidence for the district court reasonably to conclude that the guns and the operation were connected. A difficulty in applying the theory in the present case is that it normally comes into play where drugs are involved, and III. The USSG § 3C1.1 Enhancement for Obstruction of there were no drugs here. Burke argues that this difficulty Justice means that the theory is inoperative, and the enhancement was therefore improper. The government argues that the We also uphold the district court’s sentencing enhancement theory should be extended into non-drug cases. In our for obstruction of justice, based on Burke’s having told opinion, however, the more sensible course is to forgo any Jimmy to move a car so that the police would not find No. 02-5470 United States v. Burke 19 20 United States v. Burke No. 02-5470
evidence of VIN-flipping. Insofar as the district court made Appendix C, Amend. 581 (setting out the amendment, and factual determinations in finding that the USSG § 3C1.1 explaining the rationale). Prior to that time, however, the enhancement applied to Burke, we review for clear error. See circuits adopted one position or the other. United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d 369, 390 (6th Cir. 2002). Insofar as the court’s interpretation of the This court has tipped its hat to both sides of the split. In Guidelines was purely legal, we review de novo. See United United States v. Horry, 49 F.3d 1178 (6th Cir. 1995), we held States v. Canestraro, 282 F.3d 427, 431 (6th Cir. 2002). that the term “instant offense” in § 3C1.1 required that “the obstruction must occur solely with respect to the offense of Though § 3C1.1was substantially amended in 1998, the conviction.” Id. at 1180–81. Subsequently, however, in pre-amendment version of the guideline applied at Burke’s United States v. Nesbitt, 90 F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 1996), we held sentencing. It provided that “[i]f the defendant willfully that the enhancement could be upheld if the evidence of obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, obstruction of justice is “sufficiently related” to the offense of the administration of justice during the investigation, conviction.10 prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.” USSG § 3C1.1 (1995); see also In Nesbitt, the defendant had been convicted of money id., cmt. n.3 (listing, as an example of obstructive conduct, laundering for using drug proceeds to purchase a Mercedes “procuring another person to . . . conceal evidence that is Benz and having it titled in the name of his girlfriend. Id. at material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding”). 168. In a related charge that was dropped pursuant to a plea In the 1990s, a circuit split developed over whether “instant offense” referred to obstruction in both the defendant’s case and in other cases closely related to the defendant’s case—so that the enhancement would apply if the defendant obstructed USSG § 3C1.1 (20 02). justice in a co-defendant’s case, see, e.g., United States v. Acuna, 9 F.3d 1442, 1446 (9th Cir. 1993)—or whether 10 Horry was also limited in United States v. Walker, 119 F.3d 403 “instant offense” meant “offense of conviction,” so that the (6th Cir. 1997), a case that the Sentencing Commission would later cite enhancement would apply only where the obstruction as an exa mple of the view adopted in the amended § 3C 1.1. See USSG specifically related to the offense for which the defendant was Supp. to Appendix C, Amend. 581. In Walker the defendant, Mr. Walker, convicted. The Sentencing Commission in 1998 resolved the was indicted along with a co-defendant for consp iring to distribute cocaine and for possessing a gun in connection with the conspiracy. 119 split in favor of the former position.9 See USSG Supp. to F.3d at 405. W hen they were arrested they were together at W alker’s apartment, with some drugs sitting on the table; Walker pointed a pistol at the officers and, in self-defense, they opened fire. Id. Walker survived, 9 and after he pleaded guilty he falsely testified at his co-defendant’s trial The present version provid es that that the co-defendant had nothing to do with the drugs and that Walker had not po inted the gun at the police but instead had d ropped it. Id. [i]f (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or W alker received a § 3C1.1 enhancement on the basis of his perjured attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice testimony, and on appeal he argued that his perjury could not have been during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing during the “instant offense” because he did it after he had pleaded guilty. of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive Id. at 406. We rejected this argument, holding that the enhancement can conduct related to (i) the defendant’s offense of conviction and app ly in a separate but related proceeding, and finding that it did apply any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense, increase because “defendant and code fendant were inextricably related in the the offense level by 2 levels. criminal offenses charged against both.” Id. at 406–07. No. 02-5470 United States v. Burke 21 22 United States v. Burke No. 02-5470
bargain, the defendant was charged with using drug money to the same government investigation that eventually resulted in purchase a different Mercedes that he registered in his aunt’s Burke’s plea bargain and conviction. It was clearly related to name. Id. The district court granted an obstruction the VIN-flipping charge that the government dropped against enhancement, based on the defendant’s alleged perjury (and Burke as part of the plea bargain. It was, moreover, related to his instructions to his aunt to commit perjury) at a civil the VIN-flipping charge that Burke’s co-defendant, his forfeiture proceeding regarding the second Mercedes. Id. On brother Billy, was convicted of.12 appeal, the defendant argued that the district court had violated Horry, because the forfeiture proceeding in which he We recognize that the gun possession and VIN-flipping in committed his obstructive conduct was not his “offense of this case are not as obviously related as the criminal money- conviction.” Id. at 168–69. This court rejected his argument, laundering and civil forfeiture cases in Nesbitt. Indeed, the and distinguished Horry: district court in this case indicated that it would take the marginal nature of the connection into account in determining unlike the Horry case, [the defendant’s] behavior in where to sentence within the guidelines range. And we do not relation to the [dismissed] charge should not be viewed hold that proceedings resulting from the same government as collateral conduct irrelevant to the “instant offense.” investigation will in all circumstances be related for purposes Instead, this conduct was related to the “instant offense” of applying the pre-amendment version of § 3C1.1. But here, in that it was intended to impede the same government as indicated in the previous section, the district court investigation that eventually resulted in [the defendant’s] reasonably found a connection between the weapons and the plea bargain and conviction. VIN-flipping activity. The weapons charge grew directly out of the VIN-flipping investigation. The guilty plea on the Id. at 169 (emphasis added). weapons charge was based in part on dismissal of the VIN- The district court in this case properly relied upon our holding in Nesbitt.11 Burke’s action was intended to impede quoted Horry’s rule—that “the obstruction must occur solely with respect to the offense of conviction,” id. (quoting Ho rry, 49 F.3d at 11 118 0–8 1)— this did not mean that we were thereby changing the position Burke also argues that a more recent pre-am endment case, United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946 (6th Cir. 1998), reaffirmed Horry’s we adopted in Nesb itt and Walker, that obstruction applies both to the narrow “offense of conviction” requirement. In Koeberlein the defendant, offense of conviction and to related conduct. Rather, Koeberlein merely Mr. Koeberlein, was convicted for stealing a rented front-end loader. 161 reaffirmed something that we had established prior to Horry, and that we F.3d at 948. The district court applied the § 3C1.1 enhancem ent because reaffirmed in Nesb itt: that “related conduct” must be conduct that Ko eberlein— in incidents that happened prior to the front-end loader occurred “during the investigation, prosecution, and sentencing of the theft—had failed to appear in state court for prosecutions of similar thefts, instant offense[.]” Koeberlein, 161 F.3d at 95 1 (quoting United States v. and had evaded officers who were pursuing him for one of these thefts. Crou sore, 1 F.3d 382, 384 (6th Cir. 1993)); see also Nesbitt, 90 F.3d at See id. at 950–51. Koeberlein appealed, arguing that “although he had 169. Consequently, Koeberlein does not make generally applicable the missed court dates related to state prosecutions, he did not fail to appear restrictive “offense of conviction” rule from Horry that subsequent cases for any proceedings related to the instant offense, which is what the limited. See Walker, 119 F.3d at 407 (distinguishing Horry, and holding Sentencing Guideline’s language contemplates.” Id. at 951. We agreed, that “this circuit has given a broad reading to the ‘instant offense’ finding that the obstructive conduct had to have occurred no sooner than language”). the investigation of the offense of co nviction , and since K oeb erlein’s 12 conduct had occurred prior to his front-end loader theft, the district court This conc lusion is suppo rted b y our d ecision in Walker. See erred. See 161 F.3d at 95 1. Though in the cour se of this holding we footnote 10, supra. No. 02-5470 United States v. Burke 23
flipping charge. And a co-defendant was convicted on a VIN- flipping charge. In the presence of these factors, the holding of Nesbitt permits our conclusion that the district court properly applied the obstruction enhancement. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment and the sentence of the district court.