United States v. Buller

46 M.J. 467, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 45, 1997 WL 522831
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Armed Forces
DecidedAugust 25, 1997
DocketNo. 96-0232; Crim.App. No. 31265
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 46 M.J. 467 (United States v. Buller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Buller, 46 M.J. 467, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 45, 1997 WL 522831 (Ark. 1997).

Opinions

Opinion of the Court

EFFRON, Judge:

At his general court-martial, appellant pleaded guilty to separate specifications of use and distribution of marijuana and use and distribution of cocaine, in violation of Article 112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 912a. The military judge sentenced him to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 15 months, total forfeitures, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. Pursuant to a pretrial agreement, the convening authority reduced the confinement to 12 months and approved the balance of the adjudged sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.

On appellant’s petition, we granted review to consider “whether the staff judge advocate [SJA] erred, in his addendum to his post-trial recommendation to the convening authority, by including new matters without serving the same upon appellant.” For the reasons discussed below, we hold that appellant was not prejudiced by the failure to serve the addendum on the defense for comment under the circumstances of this case.

I

After the SJA’s post-trial recommendation to the convening authority was served on appellant and his counsel, defense counsel submitted matters for consideration by the convening authority. See RCM 1105 and 1106(f), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1994 ed.). The defense submission included a letter from appellant in which he acknowledged that both the discharge and [468]*468the adjudged reduction in grade were “appropriate” punishments. He requested that the period of confinement be reduced to 6 months, however, in view of the assistance that he had provided to law enforcement authorities. Appellant also requested that the sentence to total “forfeitures be reduced to $500 a month.” He explained that he had debts to “honorable people” totaling $1,500 and that he made “payments of $100 a month to these creditors.” He requested the reduction in adjudged forfeitures so that he would not become “financially irresponsible to these people.”

On May 3, 1994, the SJA signed an addendum to his earlier recommendation in which he addressed appellant’s request for clemency. In his comment on appellant’s clemency request with respect to forfeitures, the SJA noted that

forfeitures do not take effect until you sign the action, so that the accused has received his pay of over $900 per month since his trial and confinement in January. I see no reason to add to this amount by further reducing his forfeitures.

There is no indication in the record that this addendum was served on the defense before the convening authority approved the sentence as modified to reflect the terms of the pretrial agreement.

II

Appellant contends that the SJA inserted information regarding his continued receipt of full pay in order to rebut his clemency plea for reduced forfeitures. In that context, according to appellant, the information constituted “new matter” under RCM 1106(f)(7). Under that Rule, if an addendum contains “new matter,” the defense must be provided with notice and an opportunity to respond before the convening authority takes action on the sentence. See RCM 1107(b)(3)(A).

RCM 1106(f)(7) does not define the term “new matter,” and this Court has not suggested a comprehensive definition. The nonbinding Discussion accompanying the Rule provides a number of illustrations of new matter, which this Court has cited with approval, such as “the effect of new decisions on issues in the case, matter from outside the record of trial, and issues not previously discussed.” See United States v. Chatman, 46 MJ 321, 323 (1997); United States v. Leal, 44 MJ 235, 236 (1996). The non-binding Discussion also notes that “‘[n]ew matter’ does not ordinarily include any discussion by the staff judge advocate ... of the correctness of the initial defense comments on the recommendation.”

Under the circumstances of this case, it is not necessary for us to attempt a more precise definition or to determine whether the material constituted “new matter” under RCM 1106(f)(7). Assuming for purposes of our discussion that the information constituted “new matter” that should have been served on the defense, we conclude that appellant was not prejudiced by the failure to do so.

The essence of the SJA’s statement in this case is that the accused continued to receive pay and allowances during the period between the court-martial and the convening authority’s action. This statement reflected the routine administration of the sentence under the law in effect during the trial and initial review of this case.1 Under certain circumstances, it is possible that such neutral information could be used in an addendum in such a way that failure to provide the defense with an opportunity to comment would be prejudicial to an accused. For example, if the information is believed to be “erroneous, inadequate, or misleading,” see United States v. Narine, 14 MJ 55, 57 (CMA 1982), then failure to serve the addendum on the defense could be viewed as prejudicial.2

There is no reason for us to conclude that this is such a case. The SJA’s comments [469]*469responded to an issue raised by appellant— his need for funds — by describing the routine and direct consequences of a court-martial sentence. Because this matter involved appellant’s pay and financial situation, he is in the best position to tell this Court whether the SJA’s otherwise neutral comments were erroneous, inadequate, or misleading (e.g., that he did not, in fact, receive his full pay after trial and before the convening authority’s action). No such showing has been made.

The essence of RCM 1106(f)(7) is fair play — providing the accused with notice of new issues or new information raised by the SJA and an opportunity to respond. In general, we have presumed prejudice when the defense has not been provided with notice of new matter and an opportunity to respond, see Leal, supra at 237,3 but we have not engaged in such a presumption when the information is neutral or “trivial.” See United States v. Jones, 44 MJ 242, 233-44 (1996). Neither the rule nor our precedents require otherwise.

Ill

The decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.4

Chief Judge COX and Judges CRAWFORD and GIERKE concur.

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Bluebook (online)
46 M.J. 467, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 45, 1997 WL 522831, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-buller-armfor-1997.