United States v. Buckley

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: January 21, 2026
• Docket: 25-266
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25-266 United States v. Buckley

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of January, two thousand twenty-six.

PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, SUSAN L. CARNEY, BETH ROBINSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. No. 25-266

RYAN BUCKLEY,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________________

FOR APPELLEE: Zachary B. Stendig, Michelle M. Arra, Eugenia A. P. Cowles, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Michael P. Drescher, Acting United States Attorney for the District of Vermont, Burlington, VT.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Michael J. Straub, Law Offices of Michael J. Straub, Esq., Burlington, VT.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District

of Vermont (Reiss, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on January 21, 2025, is

AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Ryan Buckley pled guilty to being a felon in

possession of a firearm, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court

sentenced Buckley principally to 46 months’ imprisonment to be served

concurrently with any state sentences from his pending state charges. On appeal,

Buckley challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 1 We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and arguments

on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.

1Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), Buckley’s plea agreement preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment on this basis.

2 Buckley argues that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the

indictment on the ground that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional both facially and as

applied to him under the Second Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s

decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

We review both a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss charges in an

indictment and challenges to the constitutionality of a statute without deference.

United States v. McCray, 7 F.4th 40, 45 (2d Cir. 2021).

We upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) against a facial constitutional

challenge in United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013), and recently

confirmed that Bogle remains good law after Bruen. See Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th

68 (2d Cir. 2025). We explained in Zherka that “before, during, and shortly after

the Founding, legislative bodies regulated firearms by prohibiting their possession

by categories of persons perceived to be dangerous.” Id. at 88. 2 These were

considered lawful regulations. Id. This historical practice persisted after the

adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 88–89. For these reasons, we held

that Congress has “a legislative power, consistent with the Second Amendment,

2In quotations from caselaw, this summary order omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations, and accepts all alterations, unless otherwise noted.

3 to disarm categories of persons presumed to be dangerous,” including felons like

Buckley. Id. at 90.

Buckley’s as-applied challenge is also foreclosed by Zherka. “Because

history reveals a tradition of categorical legislative bans on firearms possession by

classes of people perceived as dangerous, a prohibition directed at persons

convicted of serious crimes is among the easiest classifications to justify.” Id. at 93.

People who have been convicted of all felony crimes, not just violent crimes, have

violated the “basic terms of the social contract,” so Congress could reasonably and

constitutionally conclude that such people lack the “character of temperament

necessary to be entrusted with a weapon.” Id. at 94. For these reasons, the district

court did not err in denying Buckley’s motion to dismiss the indictment under

§ 922(g)(1).

Finally, Buckley acknowledges that Zherka is dispositive of this appeal. We

decline his request to overturn it pursuant to the procedure described in United

States v. Peguero, 34 F.4th 143, 158 n.9 (2d Cir. 2022).

* * *

For the above reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court