United States v. Brown

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 United States v. Brown No. 02-6407 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0175P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0175p.06 OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. John T. Tibbetts, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee. FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , X OPINION Plaintiff-Appellee, - _________________ - - No. 02-6407 DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge. Under the federal v. - sentencing guidelines, a criminal defendant may be given a > prison sentence exceeding the range prescribed in the , guidelines manual’s sentencing table if the criminal history CHALMERS BROWN , - Defendant-Appellant. - category to which the defendant has been assigned does not adequately reflect his past conduct or the likelihood that he N will commit additional crimes. See the Sentencing Appeal from the United States District Court Commission’s Policy Statement at U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis. No. 02-20059—Samuel H. Mays, Jr., District Judge. The appropriate extent of an upward departure can often be measured by reference to the sentence range for a person in Argued: February 5, 2004 the next criminal history category above the defendant’s. But where a defendant’s criminal record has earned him so many Decided and Filed: June 10, 2004 criminal history points that he is already in the highest of the six criminal history categories created by the guidelines, the Before: NELSON, GILMAN, and ROGERS, Circuit Policy Statement directs the sentencing court to “structure” Judges. the departure by moving to successively higher offense levels (the defendant’s offense level being the other variable in the _________________ sentencing table) until the court comes to “a guideline range appropriate to the case.” Id. COUNSEL The defendant in the case at bar, who had at least 13 prior ARGUED: Stephen B. Shankman, OFFICE OF THE felony convictions, pleaded guilty to a charge of knowingly FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE WESTERN possessing a certain Norberto Arizmendi shotgun in violation DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, Memphis, Tennessee, for of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the statute that criminalizes possession Appellant. David N. Pritchard, ASSISTANT UNITED of a firearm by a convicted felon. The defendant’s lengthy STATES ATTORNEY, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee. criminal record made him a prime candidate for an upward ON BRIEF: Stephen B. Shankman, April R. Goode, departure from the sentence range (168-210 months) specified

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in the table. Employing a methodology endorsed in United her money was. The tall, thin man likewise demanded States v. Williams, No. 99-6030, 2000 WL 1872059 (6th Cir. money. In the course of the ensuing tumult, Ms. Thompson’s Dec. 15, 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 988 (2001) statement says, the oldest child was repeatedly hit in the head (unpublished), the district court sentenced the defendant to with the shotgun and the weapon was fired once. The blast imprisonment for a term of 360 months. hit Ms. Thompson’s dog in the foot, and some of the pellets struck Ms. Thompson in the face and arm. We cannot tell whether the sentence range (360 months to life) produced by the Williams methodology was one which As the police were arriving in response to the 911 call, the the district court, in the exercise of its independent judgment, robbers escaped with a Playstation and some money Mr. considered appropriate to the particular circumstances of this Williams had in his pants. Two days later a crime stoppers particular case. We shall therefore vacate the challenged tip implicated Chalmers Brown (the defendant herein) and judgment and remand the case for resentencing. two other suspects. Shown a photo-array, according to the presentence report, Ms. Thompson “positively identified I Chalmers Brown as the person who shot her, assaulted her family and shot her dog.” (The presentence report does not At 10:15 on the morning of November 25, 2001, according comment on the anomalous circumstance that Ms. to a subsequently prepared presentence investigation report, Thompson’s statement to the police described the masked three robbers broke into Tara Thompson’s house on Laclede man with the shotgun as being much taller and thinner than Avenue in Memphis, Tennessee. Inside the house were Ms. Mr. Brown; one wonders if in fact Ms. Thompson did not Thompson, her boyfriend Tallen Williams, and three children simply identify the bare-faced Mr. Brown as a member of the ranging in age from three to 14. trio, without claiming that he personally wielded the shotgun.) One of the intruders — described by Ms. Thompson as a On the day after Ms. Thompson identified Mr. Brown’s bearded man about 6 feet tall, weighing about 160 pounds and picture, a police officer spotted Brown getting into his wearing a homemade ski mask — was said to have been Cadillac automobile. Mr. Brown was detained, and a search armed with a shotgun of the “pistol pump” variety. A second of the Cadillac turned up a black ski mask behind the driver’s intruder — a “short, chubby” man, not wearing a mask — seat and a loaded shotgun in the trunk. Mr. Brown admitted had a small handgun. (Chalmers Brown, the defendant in the ownership of the shotgun. case at bar, stands 5'6" in height and weighs 187 pounds, according to the presentence report; he would thus seem to Charged with both state and federal crimes, Mr. Brown bear a closer resemblance to the short, chubby man with the found himself moved along the federal track first. A handgun than to the tall, thin man with the shotgun.) The superseding indictment handed up by a federal grand jury in third intruder, who wore a black ski mask, was apparently April of 2002 charged him with three counts of violating the unarmed. felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Mr. Brown pleaded guilty to the first count of the superseding indictment Ms. Thompson called 911 while the intruders were kicking pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement. (It was the first count, in her front door. Once inside, according to a statement Ms. as we have indicated, that charged him with illegal possession Thompson was to give the police, the short, chubby man of a Norberto Arizmendi shotgun.) The other two counts pointed his handgun at her and her children and asked where were dismissed by the government. No. 02-6407 United States v. Brown 5 6 United States v. Brown No. 02-6407

The probation officer who prepared Mr. Brown’s have said, was one approved by the Sixth Circuit’s presentence investigation report originally assumed that the unpublished decision in the Williams case, available Norberto Arizmendi shotgun was the same weapon with electronically at 2000 WL 1872059. which Ms. Thompson and her son and dog had been assaulted. Based on this assumption, and using the 2001 The sentencing court in Williams used a criminal history edition of the guidelines manual, the probation officer scale of its own creation, with phantom categories designed assigned Mr. Brown an offense level of 31. In a subsequent to trigger incremental increases in the defendant’s offense addendum to the presentence report, however, the officer level. See Williams, 2000 WL 1872059, at **2. The noted that whereas Ms. Thompson had described the shotgun Williams methodology provides for no increase in the offense used in the robbery as a “pistol pump” weapon, the Norberto level of a defendant whose criminal history score is 15 or less. Arizmendi referred to in Count One of the indictment did not A criminal history score of 16 to 18 points produces a one- have a pistol pump feature. The addendum recommended level increase in the offense level. A criminal history score of that Brown’s total offense level be set at 30, rather than 31, 19 to 21 leads to a two-level increase, and higher brackets of unless the United States could prove that the weapon criminal history points lead to further increases in the offense recovered at the time of the arrest was the same one used level. A criminal history score of 48 or more yields an during the home invasion. increase of 10 in the offense level.

The government could not prove that the weapons were one Accepting the Williams methodology as “persuasive and and the same, and the district court therefore accepted the logical,” the court below treated Mr. Brown as having an revised computation of Brown’s offense level. Under the offense level of 40 rather than 30. As can be seen from a manual’s sentencing table — an abbreviated version of which glance at the sentencing table set forth in the appendix, infra, is included as an appendix to this opinion — a defendant who the range prescribed for a defendant in Criminal History has earned a place in Criminal History Category VI and who Category VI who has an offense level of 40 is imprisonment has an offense level of 30 is assigned a guideline sentence for a term in the range of 360 months to life. range of 168-210 months. The government sought to have the 39-year-old Mr. Brown Prior to issuance of the addendum to the presentence report, sentenced to life imprisonment. The district court, however, the government had moved for an upward departure from the opted to impose a sentence — 30 years — at the bottom of range (188-235 months) specified in the original report. The the guideline range determined under Williams. Mr. Brown basis for the motion was that while a minimum of only 13 has perfected a timely appeal from this 30-year sentence. criminal history points suffices to place a defendant in Criminal History Category VI, Mr. Brown had amassed more II than four times that number of points — 53, to be precise. Category VI thus failed adequately to reflect Mr. Brown’s In general, a departure is permissible if the sentencing court past criminal behavior, the government argued. finds “that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken The district court agreed. The court also accepted the into consideration” by the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). methodology proposed by the government for determining the Thus U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 stated (before adoption of a change in extent of the upward departure. That methodology, as we wording not relevant here) that “[i]f reliable information No. 02-6407 United States v. Brown 7 8 United States v. Brown No. 02-6407

indicates that the criminal history category does not move horizontally across the guideline grid because there are adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s past no criminal history categories greater than VI,” as we put it in criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will United States v. Thomas, 24 F.3d 829, 834 (6th Cir.), cert. commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing a denied, 513 U.S. 976 (1994), “[the court] should move sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline vertically down the offense level axis until it locates a range range.” which it deems appropriate to the facts of the case.” Mr. Brown does not deny that an upward departure was Our earlier decision in United States v. Carr, 5 F.3d 986, warranted in light of his remarkable criminal history. He 994 (6th Cir. 1993), had suggested that § 4A1.3 requires a contends, rather, that it was inconsistent with U.S.S.G. district court to consider the sentencing ranges that would § 4A1.3 for the district court to determine the extent of the result from an increase of one offense level, two offense departure by employing jerry-built criminal history categories levels, and so on, increasing the defendant’s offense level by not tailored to his individual case. more than one only if the court “demonstrate[s] why it found the sentence imposed by each intervening level to be too Although § 4A1.3 is designated a policy statement, rather lenient.” Carr, 5 F.3d at 994.1 See also United States v. than a guideline, it is binding on the district courts. See Gray, 16 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 1994). But Thomas held that Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42 (1993). Failure to Carr’s interpretation of § 4A1.3 did not “require[] a follow § 4A1.3 constitutes an incorrect application of the sentencing court to explain formalistically, gridblock-by- sentencing guidelines, see id., and is thus an abuse of gridblock, why each intervening range is inappropriate.” discretion. See United States v. Valentine, 100 F.3d 1209, Thomas, 24 F.3d at 835. 1210 (6th Cir. 1996). “We read [§ 4A1.3] to require a court to continue moving The 2001 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual down offense-level ranges only until it finds a range contained a passage (subsequently the subject of minor which would provide an appropriate sentence for the changes in wording) that read as follows: defendant, but no further. We do not read this to require the court to move only one level, or to explain its “Where the court determines that the extent and nature of rejection of each and every intervening level. The the defendant’s criminal history, taken together, are language indicates quite clearly that the court should sufficient to warrant an upward departure from Criminal continue to consider ranges ‘until it finds’ an appropriate History Category VI, the court should structure the sentence for the defendant before it, but nothing in departure by moving incrementally down the sentencing § 4A1.3 calls for a more detailed, gridblock-by-gridblock table to the next higher offense level in Criminal History approach . . . .” Id. at 834. Category VI until it finds a guideline range appropriate to the case.” 1 Carr’s statements as to ho w a sentencing court is to effect a multi- (The reader who does not have a clear mental image of the level increase in a defendant’s offense level may be regarded as dicta, configuration of the matrix to which the foregoing passage given that we were not reviewing such an increase in that case. The alludes may wish to examine the sentencing table at this departure issue in Carr was whether the distr ict court had erred by juncture. See Appendix, infra.) “[W]hen the court cannot hypothesizing a criminal history category greater than VI rather than increasing the defendant’s offense level. See Carr, 5 F.3d at 994. No. 02-6407 United States v. Brown 9 10 United States v. Brown No. 02-6407

“The approach required of the sentencing court when accepted the resulting sentence range without comment. As departing beyond Criminal History Category VI,” Thomas far as the record indicates, the court gave no independent holds, “is to consider carefully all of the facts and thought to whether that range was appropriate under the circumstances surrounding the case which affect the individual circumstances of Mr. Brown’s case. departure, and from them determine an appropriate sentence for the particular defendant.” Id. at 835. If a court selects an It is true that, in rejecting the government’s appropriate sentence range in this manner, and if the court recommendation of a sentence of life in prison, the district increases the defendant’s offense level no more than court said that “360 months is adequate punishment for these necessary to arrive at that range on the sentencing table, offenses.” But we do not interpret this comment as a § 4A1.3 is satisfied. determination that 360 months to life is an appropriate sentence range. The question is whether a departure to a This is not to say that § 4A1.3 prohibits a district court range starting below 360 months would be adequate and from using the Williams construct (or some similar expedient) appropriate for Mr. Brown’s offense. That is a question the as a reference point when determining the extent of an upward court does not seem to have addressed. departure. But the use of such a construct – particularly one developed by a different judge in a different case – cannot The sentence is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED replace the exercise of the court’s independent judgment. If for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. a district court chooses to follow the Williams approach in the beginning, the resultant sentence range is not to be treated as definitive; at the end of the day the court must decide, in light of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case before it, whether the range in question is “appropriate to the case.” (As Thomas makes clear, the process of “moving incrementally down the sentencing table to the next higher offense level,” see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, is simply a means to an end; the whole point of the exercise is to “find[] a guideline range appropriate to the case.” Id.) If, having elected to use the Williams methodology as a navigational aid, the court finds that the range to which that methodology points is not “a guideline range appropriate to the case,” the court must select a different range. In the case at bar, it seems to us, the record does not reflect an independent determination by the district court that the Williams range is appropriate for this particular case in light of the particularized facts of the case. The court knew, to be sure, that it was not required to use the Williams methodology; the court twice referred to Williams as an “example.” But after choosing to apply Williams, the court No. 02-6407 United States v. Brown 11

APPENDIX SENTENCING TABLE (in months of imprisonment) Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)

OFFENSE I II III IV V VI LEVEL (0-1) (2 or 3) (4, 5, 6) (7, 8, 9) (10, 11, (13 OR 12) MORE )

1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7 3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9

\ \ \ *** *** *** [ [ [

30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 43 life life life life life life