[552] Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the opinion, in which Judge BEATY joined. Judge NIEMEYER wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Judge BEATY wrote a separate concurring opinion.
OPINION
KING, Circuit Judge:
The five appellants in these consolidated appeals, Robert Brooks, Winifred Sparks (“W.Sparks”), William Witherspoon, Ver-nard Sparks, Jr. (“V.Sparks”), and Ver-nard Mathis (collectively, the “Defendants”), were each convicted by jury for offenses arising from a drug trafficking scheme in South Carolina. Specifically, the Defendants were each convicted of a single count of conspiracy to distribute less than 500 grams of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (the “Count 1 crack conspiracy”); V. Sparks and W. Sparks were convicted of possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (the “Count 10 substantive offense”); and W. Sparks was also convicted of possession with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of crack, again in violation of § 841(a)(1) (the “Count 4 substantive offense”).
The Defendants, who were indicted and tried together, present multiple challenges to their convictions and sentences. In particular, Mathis and Witherspoon contend that the trial court’s instructions eontra-vened the principles of United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304 (4th Cir.2005), by failing to instruct the jury that it was obliged, in connection with the Count 1 crack conspiracy offense, to determine the threshold drug quantities attributable to each individual defendant on trial.1 As explained below, we agree that the court erred in failing to give the appropriate Collins instruction and that, as to defendant Mathis, such error warrants relief. In so ruling, we reject the Government’s post-argument contention that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), overruled our decision in Collins.
The Defendants also pursue other contentions of error involving, inter alia, evidence admitted at their trial and sentencing hearings, the denial of judgment of acquittal, and the calculation of their advisory Sentencing Guidelines ranges. We reject these contentions of error and affirm the convictions and sentences of Brooks, Witherspoon, V. Sparks, and W. Sparks. We vacate Mathis’s sentence on the Count 1 crack conspiracy and remand for resentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
I.
A.
On March 19, 2003, a twenty-two count superseding indictment (the “Indictment”) was returned in the District of South Carolina, charging the Defendants with the Count 1 crack conspiracy,2 as well as con[553] spiracy to use and carry firearms during and in relation to drug trafficking crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (the “Count 2 firearms conspiracy”). These conspiracies were both alleged to have begun by at least January 1994 and to have ended in March 2003. V. Sparks and W. Sparks were charged with the Count 10 substantive offense; and W. Sparks was also charged with the Count 4 substantive offense.3
The Defendants pleaded not guilty and them trial commenced on July 7, 2003. At trial, the Government’s evidence was, in substance, that the Defendants — four of whom were full- or half-brothers, while the fifth (Mathis) was a cousin — had participated in a major drug distribution scheme in and near Lancaster, South Carolina.4 This scheme centered on a residence known as “The Circle,” on Willow Oak Circle in Lancaster. The Circle was owned by Vernard Sparks, Sr., who was not charged in the Indictment. When law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at The Circle in August 2000, they discovered 51.3 grams of crack and several firearms. They also found $5000 in cash in a bedroom belonging to W. Sparks, who lived at The Circle. In addition to evidence relating to drug activities at The Circle, other evidence reflected that officers had, in August 1998, stopped a vehicle that W. Sparks was driving, also containing two other occupants. The officers found a .25 caliber pistol in W. Sparks’s back pocket and discovered a bag containing approximately .62 grams of crack under a tire on the driver’s side of the car. Because there were no tire tracks on the drugs, the officers concluded that the drugs had been thrown from the car by W. Sparks.
At the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted judgment of acquittal to the Defendants on the Count 2 fire-arms conspiracy. Before the court instructed the jury on the remaining three charges, the Defendants objected to the instructions on the Count 1 crack conspiracy, contending that the jury was obliged to make a finding regarding the drug quantities that were attributable to each individual conspiracy defendant.5 The court overruled the objection, however, and instead instructed the jury to the contrary, i.e., that it was obliged to find “not the amount a single defendant may have been [554] involved with, but rather the amount of controlled substances involved in the conspiracy as a whole.” Supp. J.A. 47.6
The jury returned its verdict on August 6, 2003, finding the Defendants guilty of the Count 1 crack conspiracy. The verdict also found W. Sparks and V. Sparks guilty of the Count 10 substantive offense, for possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of crack, and W. Sparks guilty of the Count 4 substantive offense, for possession with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of crack. The verdict form included an interrogatory relating to the Count 1 crack conspiracy, requiring the jury to complete the following by checking the box next to one of the specified drug quantities: “We unanimously find that the amount and type of drugs involved in the conspiracy as a whole were as follows.... ” Verdict Form, August 6, 2003. In response, the jury checked the boxes corresponding to “50 grams or more” of crack and “less than 500 grams” of cocaine.7
B.
The district court conducted sentencing hearings for the Defendants between May 31 and June 7, 2005, at which it made findings of fact and calculated their advisory Sentencing Guidelines ranges. In addition to criminal history determinations, the court found that: (1) Brooks was responsible for 2001 grams of crack and had possessed a firearm during the conspiracy; (2) Mathis was responsible for 3249 grams of crack and had possessed a firearm during the conspiracy; (3) W. Sparks was responsible for 194 grams of crack and had possessed a firearm during the conspiracy; (4) Witherspoon was responsible for 2200 grams of crack; and (5) V. Sparks was responsible for 1714 grams of crack and had possessed a firearm during the conspiracy. After calculating the advisory Guidelines ranges and considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court sentenced each of the Defendants, except W. Sparks, to 360 months’ imprisonment. W. Sparks was sentenced to 200 months.8 The court ordered Mathis’s sentence to run consecutive to five concurrent life sentences he was already serving in South Carolina state prison. In imposing Mathis’s consecutive sentence, the district court opined that “[i]t is my understanding they normally parole state inmates who are serving life sentences reasonably soon or as soon as possible if they know that they are going to go on and serve a lengthy sentence in the federal system.” J.A. 704. The sentences imposed were each within the Defendants’ advisory Guidelines ranges — 188 to 235 months for W. Sparks, 324 to 405 months for Wither-spoon, and 360 months to life for the other defendants.
Each of the Defendants has appealed. Two of the Defendants, Mathis and With-erspoon, contend that the court contra[555] vened the principles of United States v. Collins by failing to have the jury determine the threshold drug quantity attributable to each Defendant on trial, in order to establish their respective statutory ranges under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).9 In addition, all of the Defendants, save W. Sparks, contend that the district court violated their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by finding facts on drug quantity and firearms possession that led to the enhancement of their sentences, and defendants Brooks, W. Sparks, and V. Sparks contend that the court improperly enhanced their sentences based on its finding of possession of a firearm, even though they had been acquitted of the Count 2 firearms conspiracy; W. Sparks contends that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; Witherspoon contends that the court erred in permitting the jury to consider evidence of events that occurred prior to January 1994; V. Sparks contends that the court erred in permitting a witness to testify at sentencing to clarify his trial testimony; and Witherspoon and V. Sparks assert that, in connection with their 360 month sentences, the court incorrectly calculated their criminal history points. We address these contentions in turn, beginning with the Collins claim pursued by Mathis and Witherspoon.10
II.
We first address the contention, pursued on appeal by Mathis and Wither-spoon only, that United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304 (4th Cir.2005), required the jury to “determine beyond a reasonable doubt the quantity of drugs attributable to [each defendant] individually, and not the [556] overall conspiracy,” and that the district court thus erred in failing to instruct the jury to make such determinations. Br. of Appellants 29. As a preliminary matter, although this issue was preserved as to all the Defendants, see supra note 5, Brooks, V. Sparks, and W. Sparks have abandoned it on appeal by failing to raise it in their opening brief.11 Furthermore, any Collins error as to Witherspoon has been rendered harmless by his admission on appeal that he is responsible for 50 grams or more of crack.12 In his appellate brief, Witherspoon asserts that the “only issue as to drug weight which was before the jury was whether Witherspoon conspired to sell more than 50 grams of crack” and, accordingly, he “submits that he should only be held accountable for that amount of drugs based on the jury’s verdict.” Br. of Appellants 40-41. Thus, our analysis of this contention focuses only on the relief to which Mathis is entitled on the Collins issue.13
A.
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 846, “any person who ... conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the ... conspiracy.” The Count 1 crack conspiracy charged the Defendants under § 846 with [557] conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (making it an offense to, inter alia, intentionally distribute or possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance). Because the object of the Count 1 crack conspiracy was a violation of § 841(a), the Defendants are, pursuant to § 846, subject to the penalties prescribed in § 841(b). As outlined above, § 841(b) creates a three-part graduated penalty scheme for drug distribution offenses, premised on the type and quantity of the drugs involved. See supra note 9. Accordingly, the drug quantity attributed to a particular defendant dictates the § 841(b) penalty subsection that is applicable to such defendant, and controls the statutory sentencing range to which that defendant is exposed. In 2001, our en banc Court determined in United States v. Promise that “specific threshold drug quantities must be treated as elements of aggravated drug trafficking offenses, rather than as mere sentencing factors.” 255 F.3d 150, 156 (4th Cir.2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1098, 122 S.Ct. 2296, 152 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2002).14
B.
In the present case, the jury attributed 50 grams or more of crack to the Count 1 crack conspiracy as a whole, after being instructed that “the amount of controlled substances you will need to determine ... is not the amount a single defendant may have been involved with, but rather the amount of controlled substances involved in the conspiracy as a whole.” Supp. J.A. 47. Thus, absent an individualized determination of drug quantity, the verdict (attributing 50 grams or more of crack to the “conspiracy as a whole”) exposed Mathis to a statutory maximum sentence of life, and a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
Four years thereafter, in 2005 in Collins, “we addressed the issue of whether a defendant found guilty of a conspiracy to violate § 841(a) should be sentenced under § 841(b) by considering the amount of drugs distributed by the entire conspiracy,” or whether, on the other hand, the statutory sentencing range specified by § 841(b) depends upon the quantity of drugs attributable to the individual defendant. See United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 250 (4th Cir.2007) (summarizing Collins ).15 The Collins decision ruled that a jury must utilize the principles outlined in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), to determine the specific quantity of drugs “attributable to” each individual defendant for the purpose of setting a threshold drug quantity under § 841(b). Collins, 415 F.3d at 314.16
[558] In Collins, as in this case, the defendant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack, after the trial court failed to instruct the jury to determine the quantity of drugs attributable to each individual defendant. See 415 F.3d at 311-12. In evaluating the contention that such failure to instruct was erroneous, we first examined our 1993 ruling in United States v. Irvin, 2 F.3d 72, 77 (4th Cir.1993), that “the most reasonable interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions [in §§ 841(b) and 846] requires a sentencing court to assess the quantity of narcotics attributable to each coconspirator by relying on the principles set forth in Pinkerton.” Accordingly, we recognized in Collins that, under the Irvin precedent, “the subsection of § 841(b) applicable to an individual defendant is determined by a consideration of the amount of narcotics attributable to that defendant.” Collins, 415 F.3d at 313.
When Irvin was decided, a trial court was obliged to find by a preponderance of the evidence the drug quantity attributable to a particular defendant in order to fix the § 841(b) threshold drug quantity. Collins, 415 F.3d at 313 (citing Irvin, 2 F.3d at 76). Irvin, however, was modified in 2000 by the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Applying Apprendi to § 841(b), we determined in 2001, in Promise, that a jury, rather than a trial court, must determine the threshold drug quantity used to establish a defendant’s statutory sentencing range under § 841(b). See Promise, 255 F.3d at 156 (“Apprendi dictates that in order to authorize the imposition of a sentence exceeding the maximum allowable without a jury finding of a specific threshold drug quantity, the specific threshold quantity must be treated as an element of an aggravated drug trafficking offense, i.e., charged in the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”). As we recognized in Collins, although Apprendi modified the fact-finder aspect of Irvin, effectively replacing the words “a district court” with “the jury,” and requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, “Irvin’s holding that Pinkerton principles should be used to determine, for sentencing purposes, the amount of narcotics attributable to any one individual in a conspiracy, remains good law.” Collins, 415 F.3d 314. Thus, under Collins, a trial court is obliged to “instruct a jury to use Pinkerton principles” to determine the quantity of drugs attributable to each individual defendant involved in a drug conspiracy. Id. “In other words, in order for the statutory máximums and mandatory mínimums of § 841(b) to apply in a drug conspiracy case, the jury must determine that the threshold drug amount was reasonably foreseeable to the individual defendant.” Foster, 507 F.3d at 250-51 (finding Collins error where jury failed to determine individualized quantity of crack attributable to conspiracy defendant for penalty purposes of § 841(b), but declining, on plain error review, to award relief).
Just as in Collins and Foster, the jury in this case was not asked to determine the threshold quantity of crack attributable to each individual defendant on trial, for the purpose of determining the applicable penalty subsection of § 841(b). The jury instead determined only the amount of crack attributable to the “conspiracy as a whole.” Accordingly, the trial [559] court erred in declining the request that it give an instruction requiring the jury to make the essential threshold determination of drug quantity, and thus establish the § 841(b) penalty range for each individual conspiracy defendant.17
C.
The Collins legal principles remain sound, and, as explained below, we reject the Government’s post-argument assertion that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), renders them inoperative. In its initial briefing in this case, the Government sought to distinguish this case from Collins and maintained that any Collins error that occurred was harmless. At oral argument, the Government conceded that a Collins error had occurred in the trial of the Defendants, in that the court failed to instruct the jury to apply Pinkerton principles to determine the quantities of crack attributable to each individual defendant, for the statutory penalty purposes of § 841(b). The Government maintained, however, that we should nevertheless affirm the Defendants’ sentences because the Collins error was harmless.18 After an oral argument discussion concerning the possible impact of Booker on the Collins principles, the parties submitted post-argument supplemental briefs. In its post-argument submission, the Government, for the first time, espoused the view that the Collins principles had been overruled by Booker.
The thrust of the Government’s post-argument contention appears to be that “Booker supercedes Collins because Collins was decided prior to Booker and did not contemplate the advisory sentencing guidelines regime set forth in Booker in which the district court judge is tasked with determining the amount of drugs attributable to each defendant in a drug conspiracy for sentencing purposes.” [560] Supp. Br. of Appellee 2.19 The Government’s post-argument position, however, ignores the fact that Collins addressed and explained how a jury is to determine the threshold quantity of drugs attributable to an individual drug conspiracy defendant for the purpose of establishing the applicable statutory sentencing range under § 841(b). Booker, on the other hand, is solely a Sentencing Guidelines case. The Collins decision does not relate in any manner or way to the calculation or consideration of a defendant’s Guidelines range, but instead explains and instructs how the applicable penalty subsection of § 841(b) is to be determined for an individual conspiracy defendant.
In Booker, the Court held that the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines contravened the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee. See 543 U.S. at 232-36, 125 S.Ct. 738. In so ruling, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738. In order to remedy the Sixth Amendment defect of the Guidelines, the Booker Court excised the two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the Guidelines mandatory. Id. at 258-63, 125 S.Ct. 738 (severing and excising two provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) & 3742(e), that made Guidelines mandatory).
It is clear from Booker's express reaffirmance of Apprendi that for statutory penalty purposes the threshold quantity of drugs continues to be a fact that a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt as to each individual defendant. As a result, a jury is still obligated, post-Booker, to apply Pinkerton principles to determine the threshold drug quantity attributable to each individual defendant convicted under § 846, for the purpose of establishing the applicable statutory range under § 841(b).20
D.
Because it was not properly instructed, this jury did not determine the statutory threshold quantities of crack at[561] tributable to each of the Defendants.21 In the absence of a jury determination of this threshold quantity, or an admission by Mathis as to the drug quantity attributable to him, his sentence must fall within the default penalty subsection of § 841(b)(1)(C) — that is, a maximum of 20 years. See Promise, 255 F.3d at 156, 157 n. 7. Mathis’s sentence of 360 months (30 years), exceeds the 20 year maximum established by § 841(b)(1)(C). Because he was sentenced in excess of the applicable statutory range, the Collins error affected Mathis’s substantial rights and was not harmless. See Fed. Rule Crim. Pro. 52(a) (providing that “[a]ny error ... that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded”); see also Foster, 507 F.3d at 251-52 (concluding that defendant’s substantial rights were affected by Collins error where sentence exceeded 20 year statutory maximum, but declining to exercise discretion to notice error under plain error review); Promise, 255 F.3d 160-61 (holding that sentence in excess of authorized statutory maximum to which defendant would not otherwise be subject affects his substantial rights). Accordingly, we vacate Mathis’s sentence and remand for resen-tencing under § 841(b)(1)(C).22
In so concluding, we reject the Government’s contention that any Collins error as to Mathis is harmless because his sentence in this case, imposed to run consecutive to five concurrent state terms of life imprisonment, will never be served. Under harmless error review, the Government “bears the burden of establishing that error was harmless.” United States v. Robinson, 460 F.3d 550, 557 (4th Cir.2006). In imposing Mathis’s consecutive sentence, the district court opined that “[i]t is my understanding they normally parole state inmates who are serving life sentences reasonably soon or as soon as possible if they know that they are going to go on and serve a lengthy sentence in the federal system.” J.A. 704. The Government has not presented any evidence to demonstrate that Mathis will never serve his federal sentence. Accordingly, it has failed to meet its burden in this regard, and we are thus unable to. conclude that the Collins error is harmless as to Mathis.
III.
A.
Turning to the other issues pursued in these appeals, the Defendants contend that the sentencing court’s factfinding with respect to certain aspects of their sentences denied them their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Witherspoon, Mathis, V. Sparks, and Brooks specifically assert that the court committed constitutional error when it attributed drug quantities to them by a preponderance of the evidence. V. Sparks, W. Sparks, and Brooks additionally contend that the court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for possession of a firearm to the calculation of their advisory Guidelines ranges. As explained below, we reject both contentions.
1.
As explained above, the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. [562]*562738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). In so ruling, Booker explicitly rejected an approach to sentencing that requires a jury to find every fact relevant to a particular sentence. As also explained heretofore, a sentencing court is entitled to find individualized drug quantities by a preponderance of the evidence, as part of its calculation of an advisory Guidelines range, see supra note 20, so long as its resulting sentence is within the relevant statutory range.
Consistent with the post-Booker sentencing scheme, the district court found that Brooks was individually responsible for 2001 grams of crack; Mathis for 3249 grams; Witherspoon for 2200 grams; and V. Sparks for 1714 grams. In addition, the court found that each defendant, save Witherspoon, had possessed a firearm in connection with the Count 1 crack conspiracy. After properly calculating the advisory Guidelines ranges of the Defendants on the basis of the foregoing facts, and after considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court imposed sentences that fell within the applicable statutory ranges for Brooks, Witherspoon, V. Sparks, and W. Sparks.23 As it turned out, the court also imposed sentences within the Defendants’ advisory Guidelines ranges — 188 to 235 months for W. Sparks, 324 to 405 months for Witherspoon, and 360 months to life for the other defendants. In these circumstances, we reject the contention of these four defendants that the court violated their Sixth Amendment rights by finding drug quantities by a preponderance of the evidence during the calculation of their advisory Guidelines ranges.
2.
Brooks, W. Sparks, and V. Sparks also contend on appeal that the district court improperly enhanced by two levels their advisory Guidelines ranges for their possession of a firearm during the Count 1 crack conspiracy. See USSG § 201.1(b)(1).24 These defendants assert that, because the court granted judgment of acquittal on the Count 2 firearms conspiracy, it was foreclosed from finding as a sentencing fact that they had possessed a firearm in connection with the Count 1 crack conspiracy.
Due to the different standards of proof applicable to trials and sentencing proceedings, an acquittal “does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997). The fact that the trial court, rather than the jury, acquitted Brooks, W. Sparks, and V. Sparks on the Count 2 firearms conspiracy is also of no moment. At sentencing, the court was plainly entitled to consider evidence relating to firearms possession, and at that stage the prosecution was required to prove any such possession only by a preponderance of the evidence, a less for[563] midable standard than that required for conviction. The evidence presented at trial and at the sentencing hearings of these defendants clearly supported the application of this enhancement to the calculation of their advisory Guidelines ranges. Accordingly, we also reject this contention of sentencing error.
B.
In an appellate contention pursued by W. Sparks, he contends that the district court erred in denying his post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal on the Count 1 crack conspiracy, and on the Counts 4 and 10 substantive offenses as well. We must sustain a guilty verdict that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is supported by “substantial evidence.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)). We have defined “substantial evidence” as “evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Further, a reviewing court is not entitled to assess the credibility of witnesses, but rather “must assume that the jury resolved all contradictions ... in favor of the Government.” United States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1402 (4th Cir.1993).
W. Sparks contends that several of the prosecution witnesses acknowledged that they had never engaged in any drug trafficking activity with him, nor did they ever observe him buying or selling drugs. Although W. Sparks may be correct as to the witnesses he specifies, he ignores the other compelling inculpatory evidence against him in the trial record, including evidence of the drugs and firearm recovered diming the 1998 stop of a car he was driving, and the drugs and firearms found during the August 2000 search of The Circle. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was substantial evidence to support the three convictions of W. Sparks, and the court did not err in declining to award him a judgment of acquittal.
C.
Next, Witherspoon contends, in an issue he alone pursues, that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider evidence regarding events that occurred prior to January 1994, the time specified in the Indictment as the beginning of the Count 1 crack conspiracy. He asserts that, because the Indictment makes an explicit reference to January 1994, he was not on notice that evidence from the late 1980s and early 1990s might be used against him. We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Fulks, 454 F.3d 410, 434 (4th Cir.2006).
Under the applicable principles, the prosecution was required to prove the existence of the Count 1 crack conspiracy and Witherspoon’s joinder in that conspiracy during the time frame alleged in the Indictment — and the evidence did so. Thus, this is not a case where the Government’s evidence allowed a defendant to be convicted of a different conspiracy or offense than that alleged in the indictment, nor a situation where the indictment failed to put the defendant sufficiently on notice of the offense with which he was charged. Cf. United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 998-99 (4th Cir.1997). Put simply, the evidence relating to conspiratorial activities prior to 1994 was admissible and properly considered by the jury, and Wither-spoon was sufficiently on notice that it [564] could be used to establish the existence of the conspiracy alleged.
Thus, it is apparent that the primary flaw in Witherspoon’s contention on this point is that he misreads the Indictment. It is alleged therein that the Count 1 crack conspiracy began “at a time unknown to the Grand Jury, but beginning at least in January 1994.” J.A. 12 (emphasis added). When, as here, the date alleged in an indictment is not a substantive element of an offense, see United States v. Kimberlin, 18 F.3d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir.1994), and because this Indictment alleges that the conspiracy may have begun prior to January 1994, there is no basis for us to conclude that the court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. This contention is thus also rejected.
D.
Next, V. Sparks contends that the district court erred in allowing a prosecution witness to testify at his sentencing hearing to clarify an ambiguity in the witness’s trial testimony relating to drug quantities. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to admit this evidence for sentencing purposes. See USSG § 6A1.3(a); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 133 (4th Cir.1991) (“[O]nce issues in the sentencing report are brought into dispute, both sides are then free to bring any relevant evidence to resolve the dispute at the sentencing hearing.”).
E.
1.
Finally, Witherspoon and V. Sparks contend that the district court incorrectly calculated their criminal histories. First, Witherspoon asserts that he should not have received an additional criminal history point, placing him in criminal history category IV, for a 1991 conviction for malicious injury to property, because that conviction was for a “minor offense or local ordinance violation” that should have been excluded from the criminal history calculation. Br. of Appellants 42. Section 4A1.2(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for the exclusion of “local ordinance violations” from a criminal history calculation, but only if those violations are not also criminal offenses under state law. Witherspoon has failed to make such a showing. Moreover, the malicious injury to property offense is not excludable as an offense similar to the other excluda-ble offenses listed in section 4A1.2(c). See USSG § 4A1.2(c) (excluding, under specific circumstances, certain listed misdemeanor offenses and “offenses similar to them”). Even though Witherspoon was not sentenced to custody on his 1991 state conviction, that offense could nonetheless be properly considered as a sentencing factor for a subsequent federal offense. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 663-66, 122 S.Ct. 1764, 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746-49, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745- (1994). We are thus unable to conclude that the court improperly attributed a criminal history point to Witherspoon for his 1991 conviction.25
2.
V. Sparks contends that the district court improperly assigned two criminal history points to him for engaging in relevant offense conduct while on probation for another conviction. In 1994, V. Sparks was convicted in state court on charges of resisting arrest and unlawfully [565] carrying a pistol. His sentence included a term of probation that expired on September 25, 1995. On September 6, 1995, before his probation expired, V. Sparks distributed crack, for which he was convicted in 1996 in state court. The district court concluded that the conduct of V. Sparks giving rise to his 1996 crack conviction in state court was relevant offense conduct to his Count 1 crack conspiracy conviction, and thus that two additional criminal history points were warranted under section 4Al.l(d) of the Guidelines.
V. Sparks asserts that the district court had no factual basis for its finding that the conduct underlying his 1996 crack conviction was relevant offense conduct, because the prosecution did not sufficiently connect the conviction conduct to the Count 1 crack conspiracy on which he was being sentenced. The court, however, heard the evidence at both trial and sentencing, and we are unable to say that it clearly erred in making the contested finding. See United States v. Allen, 446 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir.2006) (recognizing that we review for clear error trial court’s factual findings on sentencing enhancement). Accordingly, we find no grounds for disturbing V. Sparks’s sentence.26
IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we affirm the convictions and sentences of Brooks, With-erspoon, V. Sparks, and W. Sparks. We vacate Mathis’s sentence and remand for such resentencing proceedings as may be appropriate.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART