United States v. Brittany Hudson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: March 2, 2026
• Docket: 25-14097
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-14097 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 03/02/2026 Page: 1 of 3

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-14097 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

BRITTANY HUDSON, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00362-MLB-RDC-1 ____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, GRANT and LUCK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Brittany Hudson, a criminal defendant proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s November 5, 2025, order dismiss- ing the information without prejudice under the Speedy Trial Act. USCA11 Case: 25-14097 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 03/02/2026 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 25-14097

We lack jurisdiction over Hudson’s appeal because the dis- trict court’s dismissal order is not final or otherwise appealable. See Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 516-20 (1956) (holding that an or- der dismissing an indictment was not final or otherwise appeala- ble); United States v. Kelley, 849 F.2d 1395, 1397 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1988) (dismissing defendant’s appeal from order granting her mo- tion to dismiss indictment based on Speedy Trial Act violation that government conceded, where defendant contended that dismissal should have been “with prejudice” instead of without prejudice, as the government had argued). First, the order is not final because Hudson has not been convicted of or sentenced for the dismissed count. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; United States v. Gulledge, 739 F.2d 572, 584 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the final judgment rule applies in criminal cases); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1984) (explaining that appellate review is generally prohibited in a criminal case until the defendant has been convicted and sen- tenced); Parr, 351 U.S. at 518; Kelley, 849 F.2d at 1397. Second, the order is not appealable under the collateral or- der doctrine, as Hudson may effectively challenge the order on ap- peal from a subsequent conviction. See United States v. Shalhoub, 855 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2017); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985) (explaining that the doctrine ap- plies to district court orders “affecting rights that will be irretrieva- bly lost in the absence of an immediate appeal”); Parr, 351 U.S. at 518-20 (explaining that the dismissal order was a step toward a final disposition of the merits of the case and would merge with— and, thus, be reviewable with—the final judgment). In short, “a USCA11 Case: 25-14097 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 03/02/2026 Page: 3 of 3

25-14097 Opinion of the Court 3

criminal defendant may not immediately appeal when an indict- ment is dismissed without prejudice for a Speedy Trial Act viola- tion,” and an appeal “must await the defendant’s subsequent con- viction.” Kelley, 849 F.2d at 1397 & n.2. Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.