NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0090n.06
Case No. 25-3107
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Feb 19, 2026 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF BRIAN KING, ) OHIO Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: BOGGS, NALBANDIAN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Brian King completed a prison sentence for federal drug-
trafficking offenses. Less than four months later, King was arrested on state drug-trafficking
charges, violating the terms of his supervised release. The district court revoked his supervised
release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, King challenges the
procedural reasonableness of his revocation sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
In 2018, a grand jury indicted King on two counts of distributing cocaine base and one
count of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute. King pleaded guilty, and the district
court sentenced him to 67 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release.
King began his term of supervised release in February 2024. In May 2024, King was
arrested on several state felony charges, including drug trafficking. By committing new law
violations, King had violated the conditions of his supervised release. King waived his right to a
revocation hearing and admitted to the violations. No. 25-3107, United States v. King
At sentencing, the district court determined that King’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range for the violations was 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment. After considering the pertinent
sentencing factors and the Guidelines’ policy statements, the court imposed a sentence of 24
months’ imprisonment. In doing so, the district court explained that this sentence would “reflect
the seriousness of the violations, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the
violations[,] and afford adequate deterrence.” R. 65, PageID 327. After King objected to the
district court’s consideration of “the need to punish [and] reflect the seriousness of the
violation[s],” the district court responded that “even if [it] didn’t consider the need to punish and
even if [it] just considered all the other applicable factors,” it would “still impose the 24-month
sentence.” Id. at 329–30. The court added that King’s “complete breach of the court’s trust in
returning to this criminal activity within months of beginning supervision” was “another
independent basis for the sentence.” Id. at 330. King timely appealed.
II.
We review challenges to a sentence’s reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 2007). Like other criminal sentences,
a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release must be procedurally reasonable.
United States v. Price, 901 F.3d 746, 749 (6th Cir. 2018). A district court imposes a procedurally
unreasonable sentence by “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [applicable] factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Procedural reasonableness also requires district
-2- No. 25-3107, United States v. King
courts to “refrain from considering impermissible factors.” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436,
440 (6th Cir. 2018).
III.
King argues that his revocation sentence was procedurally unreasonable.1 Specifically, he
contends that the district court based its sentence on impermissible factors, including the
seriousness of King’s state drug offenses and his breach of the court’s trust. We disagree.
Typically, district courts must consider all applicable factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
when imposing a sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Trejo-Martinez, 481 F.3d
409, 412–13 (6th Cir. 2007). But revocation sentences are different. When imposing a sentence
upon revocation of supervised release, district courts must consider all applicable § 3553(a) factors
except § 3553(a)(2)(A) and § 3553(a)(3). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Relevant here, § 3553(a)(2)(A)
accounts for the “retributive purposes of sentencing” by requiring district courts to consider the
need for the sentences they impose to “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S.
185, 192 (2025) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)).
In Esteras, the Supreme Court held that when a district court revokes supervised release, it
cannot consider retribution for “the underlying crime of conviction”—that is, the original offense
for which the defendant was sentenced. Id. at 193–94. The Court, however, took “no position”
on the issue before us: whether § 3583(e)(3) precludes a district court from considering the
seriousness of the conduct underlying the supervised-release violation. Id. at 194 n.5. But we
have. Both before and after Esteras, we have concluded that district courts may consider the
1 King purports to challenge his sentence on both procedural and substantive grounds. But he disputes only whether the court considered permissible factors, without addressing how the district court weighed them. Thus, King’s challenge sounds in procedural reasonableness.
-3- No. 25-3107, United States v. King
seriousness of the violation for the limited purpose of sanctioning the defendant’s breach of the
court’s trust. United States v. Patterson, 158 F.4th 700, 702–03 (6th Cir. 2025); United States v.
Morris, 71 F.4th 475, 482 (6th Cir. 2023).
In sum, district courts may not use revocation sentences to punish defendants a second time
for the original offense. Esteras, 606 U.S. at 193–94. But district courts are permitted to sanction
defendants for the breach of the court’s trust that comes with violating supervised release.
Patterson, 158 F.4th at 702.
The district court did not err in considering retributive factors for King’s violation conduct.
It did so only to sanction King’s breach of trust. Throughout the sentencing hearing, the district
court understood that its role was to sanction King’s supervised-release violations, not his original
offense. The court explained that King’s sentence would “reflect the seriousness of the violations,
promote respect for the law, [and] provide just punishment for the violations.” R. 65, PageID 327
(emphasis added). In addressing King’s new drug offenses, the district court emphasized King’s
total disregard for the terms of his supervised release. For example, the court found it particularly
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0090n.06
Case No. 25-3107
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Feb 19, 2026 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF BRIAN KING, ) OHIO Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: BOGGS, NALBANDIAN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Brian King completed a prison sentence for federal drug-
trafficking offenses. Less than four months later, King was arrested on state drug-trafficking
charges, violating the terms of his supervised release. The district court revoked his supervised
release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, King challenges the
procedural reasonableness of his revocation sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
In 2018, a grand jury indicted King on two counts of distributing cocaine base and one
count of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute. King pleaded guilty, and the district
court sentenced him to 67 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release.
King began his term of supervised release in February 2024. In May 2024, King was
arrested on several state felony charges, including drug trafficking. By committing new law
violations, King had violated the conditions of his supervised release. King waived his right to a
revocation hearing and admitted to the violations. No. 25-3107, United States v. King
At sentencing, the district court determined that King’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range for the violations was 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment. After considering the pertinent
sentencing factors and the Guidelines’ policy statements, the court imposed a sentence of 24
months’ imprisonment. In doing so, the district court explained that this sentence would “reflect
the seriousness of the violations, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the
violations[,] and afford adequate deterrence.” R. 65, PageID 327. After King objected to the
district court’s consideration of “the need to punish [and] reflect the seriousness of the
violation[s],” the district court responded that “even if [it] didn’t consider the need to punish and
even if [it] just considered all the other applicable factors,” it would “still impose the 24-month
sentence.” Id. at 329–30. The court added that King’s “complete breach of the court’s trust in
returning to this criminal activity within months of beginning supervision” was “another
independent basis for the sentence.” Id. at 330. King timely appealed.
II.
We review challenges to a sentence’s reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 2007). Like other criminal sentences,
a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release must be procedurally reasonable.
United States v. Price, 901 F.3d 746, 749 (6th Cir. 2018). A district court imposes a procedurally
unreasonable sentence by “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [applicable] factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Procedural reasonableness also requires district
-2- No. 25-3107, United States v. King
courts to “refrain from considering impermissible factors.” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436,
440 (6th Cir. 2018).
III.
King argues that his revocation sentence was procedurally unreasonable.1 Specifically, he
contends that the district court based its sentence on impermissible factors, including the
seriousness of King’s state drug offenses and his breach of the court’s trust. We disagree.
Typically, district courts must consider all applicable factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
when imposing a sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Trejo-Martinez, 481 F.3d
409, 412–13 (6th Cir. 2007). But revocation sentences are different. When imposing a sentence
upon revocation of supervised release, district courts must consider all applicable § 3553(a) factors
except § 3553(a)(2)(A) and § 3553(a)(3). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Relevant here, § 3553(a)(2)(A)
accounts for the “retributive purposes of sentencing” by requiring district courts to consider the
need for the sentences they impose to “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S.
185, 192 (2025) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)).
In Esteras, the Supreme Court held that when a district court revokes supervised release, it
cannot consider retribution for “the underlying crime of conviction”—that is, the original offense
for which the defendant was sentenced. Id. at 193–94. The Court, however, took “no position”
on the issue before us: whether § 3583(e)(3) precludes a district court from considering the
seriousness of the conduct underlying the supervised-release violation. Id. at 194 n.5. But we
have. Both before and after Esteras, we have concluded that district courts may consider the
1 King purports to challenge his sentence on both procedural and substantive grounds. But he disputes only whether the court considered permissible factors, without addressing how the district court weighed them. Thus, King’s challenge sounds in procedural reasonableness.
-3- No. 25-3107, United States v. King
seriousness of the violation for the limited purpose of sanctioning the defendant’s breach of the
court’s trust. United States v. Patterson, 158 F.4th 700, 702–03 (6th Cir. 2025); United States v.
Morris, 71 F.4th 475, 482 (6th Cir. 2023).
In sum, district courts may not use revocation sentences to punish defendants a second time
for the original offense. Esteras, 606 U.S. at 193–94. But district courts are permitted to sanction
defendants for the breach of the court’s trust that comes with violating supervised release.
Patterson, 158 F.4th at 702.
The district court did not err in considering retributive factors for King’s violation conduct.
It did so only to sanction King’s breach of trust. Throughout the sentencing hearing, the district
court understood that its role was to sanction King’s supervised-release violations, not his original
offense. The court explained that King’s sentence would “reflect the seriousness of the violations,
promote respect for the law, [and] provide just punishment for the violations.” R. 65, PageID 327
(emphasis added). In addressing King’s new drug offenses, the district court emphasized King’s
total disregard for the terms of his supervised release. For example, the court found it particularly
troubling that King, mere months into his supervised-release term, engaged in drug trafficking.
True, the district court also emphasized the danger that drug trafficking poses to the public. But
public safety is a permissible factor to consider in revocation proceedings. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) (incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) by reference). Finally, the district court
clarified that King’s “complete breach of the court’s trust,” along with the other § 3553(a) factors
that it could properly consider, justified King’s 24-month sentence. R. 65, PageID 330.
King pushes back. He reads Esteras as a blanket prohibition on any consideration of
retribution for anything in revocation proceedings. But Esteras “address[ed] only whether
§ 3583(e) precludes [district courts] from considering retribution for the underlying criminal
-4- No. 25-3107, United States v. King
conviction.” 606 U.S. at 194 n.5. The Court took “no position on whether” retribution for the
violation conduct is a “permissible consideration.” Id.
King also claims that the district court erred in considering his breach of the court’s trust
when imposing the revocation sentence. He contends that breach of trust is an impermissible factor
because it is not mentioned in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). But again, our precedent permits district courts
to consider a defendant’s breach of trust when imposing revocation sentences. Patterson, 158
F.4th at 702–03; Morris, 71 F.4th at 482.
IV.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
-5-