United States v. Brian K. Schultz

970 F.2d 960, 1992 WL 168344
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedAugust 24, 1992
Docket92-1152
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 970 F.2d 960 (United States v. Brian K. Schultz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Brian K. Schultz, 970 F.2d 960, 1992 WL 168344 (1st Cir. 1992).

Opinion

CYR, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Brian Schultz pled guilty to one count of distributing child pornography, see 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and one count of conspiring to (1) transport child pornography in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)), (2) transport obscene matter in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. § 1465), (3) use a common carrier to transport obscene matter (18 U.S.C. § 1462(a)), and (4) receive and possess obscene matter while engaged in the business of transferring obscene matter (18 U.S.C. § 1466(a)), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Schultz challenges the offense level enhancements imposed on account of his involvement with obscene material depicting adult sadomasochism, see U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3), and for his aggravating role in the conspiracy offense, see id. § 3B1.1(c). We affirm.

I

BACKGROUND

Following an investigation which began in November 1990, Schultz and two cocon-spirators were charged with various violations of federal law relating to the possession, transportation, and distribution of child pornography and of obscene matter depicting adult sadomasochism. Count I charged that Schultz conspired to sell (and sold) a videotape entitled “CESC,” depicting adult sadomasochism and violence. Count IX charged Schultz with the substantive offense of distributing a videotape entitled “JUDO,” portraying a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct involving neither violence nor sadomasochism. 1

II

DISCUSSION

The parties agree that the district court properly “grouped” the conspiracy and substantive counts under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b). The “common scheme or plan” that warranted the grouping of all counts of conviction, see id., included conduct involving not only child pornography (counts I and IX), see id. § 2G2.2, 2 but obscene matter portraying sadomasochism (count I), see id. § 2G3.1. 3 Although the precise *962 manner in which the district court grouped the offenses is not entirely clear, the particulars are unimportant to the issues raised on appeal, as Schultz remains “otherwise accountable,” see id. § 1B1.3(a)(1), for all “relevant conduct” in furtherance of the common scheme. Id.

The cross reference in U.S.S.G. § 2G3.1(c)(1) directs the application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 where “the offense involved ... material [depicting] the sexual exploitation of a minor,” id. § 2G3.1(c)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 — the child pornography guideline — controlled the sentencing guideline determination as to the “acts ... for which [Schultz] would be otherwise accountable” as provided in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(ii), (iii), (I)- 4

The dispute relates to the proper' application of the enhancement authorized under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3): “If the offense involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence, increase by four levels.” The district court imposed the four-level enhancement on the theory that three of the objectives of the criminal conspiracy charged in count I involved “obscene matter” depicting adult sadomasochism and constituted “relevant conduct” for which Schultz was “otherwise accountable” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment, (n. 1). Schultz contends that the word “offense” in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3) encompasses only the child pornography offense and that the district court erred in considering adult obscene matter depicting sadomasochism. Schultz cites to no authority, but urges that the Commission’s placement of the sadomasochism “specific offense characteristic” within § 2G2.2(b)(3) (child pornography guideline) indicates that obscene, matter involving adult sadomasochism only was not within the contemplation of the Commission. 5

The legal determination as to the proper interplay among related guidelines is subject to plenary review. United States v. Phillips, 952 F.2d 591, 594 (1st Cir.), petition for cert. filed, U.S.App.LEXIS 30, 120 (May 12, 1992); United States v. Veilleux, 949 F.2d 522, 528 (1st Cir.1991). We start with U.S.S.G. § 2G3.1 (adult obscene matter), which expressly requires reference to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 (child pornography). Thus, materials which contain both adult obscene matter and child pornography are controlled by U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. Section 2G2.2 neither states nor intimates that sentencing courts are to exclude from consideration the specific offense characteristics relating to adult obscene matter made, subject to § 2G2.2(b)(3) through the cross reference in § 2G3.1. Moreover, § 2G3.1(b)(2) authorizes the identical four-level enhancement set forth in § 2G2.2(b)(3), suggesting that the Commission intended that the specific offense *963 characteristics of sadomasochism and violence be dealt with in identical fashion whether depicted in adult obscene matter or child pornography. Under the interpretation urged by Schultz, each time a criminal offense involves adult obscene matter depicting sadomasochism or other violence, as well as nonviolent child pornography, the violence in the adult materials would be ignored as a specific offense characteristic under § 2G2.2. We believe the more sensible interpretation requires the court to consider violence or sadomasochism as a specific offense characteristic warranting a four-level enhancement under either U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 or U.S.S.G. § 2G3.1.

The Sentencing Guidelines expressly prescribe the factors to be utilized in determining specific offense characteristics. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, entitled “Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range),” provides in relevant part:

(a) Chapter[] Two (Offense Conduct).... Unless otherwise specified, ... specific offense characteristics ... shall be determined on the basis of the following:
(1) all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction ... or that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense....

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) (emphasis in subsection (1) added).

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Bluebook (online)
970 F.2d 960, 1992 WL 168344, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-brian-k-schultz-ca1-1992.