United States v. Brennan

183 F.3d 139, 1999 WL 459368
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJuly 7, 1999
DocketDocket No. 97-1440
StatusPublished
Cited by41 cases

This text of 183 F.3d 139 (United States v. Brennan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Brennan, 183 F.3d 139, 1999 WL 459368 (2d Cir. 1999).

Opinion

LEVAL, Circuit Judge:

Defendants John Brennan and United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. (“USAU”) appeal from judgments of conviction entered July 25, 1997 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Sifton, C.J.). Following a seven-week jury trial, defendants were found guilty of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The charges stemmed from USAU’s role in managing the insurance arrangements, claims, and litigation on behalf of its insured, an airline, in the aftermath of a December 1987 airplane crash. The government alleged that USAU and Brennan, USAU’s President and Chief Executive Officer, committed fraud against USAU’s insured, its coinsurers, and its reinsurers by failing to disclose information regarding a possible conflict of interest and regarding certain facts pertinent to the airline’s liability in derogation of asserted fiduciary duties and by making affirmative misrepresentations.

On appeal, defendants contend, inter alia, that the prosecution violated principles of lenity and due process insofar as it was based on the existence of fiduciary duties; that the jury charge defining fiduciary duties was improper; that there was insufficient evidence of affirmative misrepresentations to sustain the convictions; and that venue was improperly laid. Each of these contentions raises serious concerns. We reverse on the ground that venue was improper in the Eastern District of New York.

BACKGROUND

USAU, of which Brennan was at all relevant times President and Chief Executive Officer, acts as manager for an unincorporated consortium of some 15 insur-anee companies, known as United States Aircraft Insurance Group (“USAIG”). The consortium’s members pool their resources to insure aviation-related risks. USAU does not directly provide insurance or bear insurance risk, but instead writes liability and casualty insurance policies, collects policy premiums, investigates losses and claims, and manages claims litigation, all on behalf of USAIG.

During the period at issue in this case, USAIG was the lead insurer for the airline USAir. As is common in the airline industry, USAir’s liability insurance was divided between several — in. this instance, seven— insurers. Each of these “coinsurers” bore a specified share of any covered liabilities incurred by USAir. USAIG bore 29 percent of the USAir risk. USAIG/USAU was designated “lead” insurer of this group of coinsurers. Accordingly, pursuant to contract, the airline and the other coinsurers agreed that USAU would have primary responsibility for managing the claims process for the USAir policies; in the event of a covered accident, these responsibilities included retaining counsel to represent the airline in connection with any lawsuits and directing and controlling the airline’s defense. In addition, USAU was required to estimate the airline’s likely total liability arising from the accident and the amount of the financial reserve that should be established by the coinsurers against these potential liabilities; each coinsurer would then contribute an amount to the reserve based on the portion of the USAir liability coverage they held. USAU was also primarily responsible for determining appropriate settlement amounts for claims against the airline, notifying the coinsurers of these settlements, and making settlement payments from either the reserve fund or, if necessary, from additional proportional contributions from the coinsurers.

[142]*142For their part, the coinsurers retained certain contractual rights regarding claims handling. For example, with respect to all claims with a gross reserve in excess of $100,000, they retained the right to “full and complete access by attorneys or investigators of their own choosing, but at their own costs, to all files, materials and information developed by USAIG” and the right “to participate in the ... handling and supervision of such claim or claims.” USAIG/USAU received a fee from the coinsurers for its claims-handling duties.

With respect to the 29 percent of the USAir insurance coverage written by USAU on behalf of USAIG, USAIG did not actually retain insurance risk. Instead, acting on USAIG’s behalf USAU purchased “reinsurance” from other insurance companies to cover USAIG’s share of the USAir risk. It is undisputed that all of USAIG’s risk for passenger liability claims under the USAir policy was rein-sured. Like coinsurance arrangements, reinsurance is common in USAU’s industry, and, like USAIG, the other insurers of USAir reinsured most of their risk. USAIG’s reinsurers relied in large part upon USAU to perform claims-handling duties, such as managing the investigation, litigation, and settlement of claims. USAU received a claims-handling fee for this service.

On December 7, 1987, a Pacific Southwestern Airlines (“PSA”) airplane en route from Los Angeles to San Francisco (“Flight 1771”) crashed, killing all 43 people on board. It was quickly determined that the crash was caused by a disgruntled former employee of USAir, David Burke, who had boarded Flight 1771 with a handgun and used it to shoot his former supervisor (a passenger on the plane), the pilot and the co-pilot. PSA, which was in the process of being acquired by USAir, was covered by USAir’s insurance.

USAU’s role as lead insurer for USAir required it to take steps to assess and prepare for the expected litigation arising out of the crash. However, USAU had a similar responsibility regarding another potentially liable party, Ogden-Allied Corporation (“Ogden”), an aviation ground services company that operated the passenger security screening checkpoint for PSA at Los Angeles International Airport (“LAX”). USAIG, acting through USAU, was Ogden’s sole primary insurer; unlike with the USAir policy, there were no coin-surers. In addition, while USAU had arranged for reinsurance of some of the Ogden risk, part of USAIG’s risk under the Ogden policy was not covered by reinsurance. Because there was a possibility that Burke had smuggled the handgun past the Ogden checkpoint, and that Ogden had failed to follow applicable Federal Aviation Administration regulations in screening him, it faced potential liability.

USAU undertook to act in its capacity as lead insurer for both USAir and Ogden. It hired separate counsel for USAir and for Ogden, and monitored their investigation of likely liability exposure. Soon after the crash, Brennan expressed the view that it was a “USAir accident.” USAU thus set a provisional $55 million reserve to cover USAir’s anticipated liability while setting only a $1 million reserve for Ogden’s legal and related expenses.

As expected, some 44 wrongful death suits were brought against, among others, USAir/PSA, Ogden, and LAX by survivors of the passengers and crew of Flight 1771. Under USAU’s direction, all but nine of these suits were settled by May 1989. A consolidated jury trial of the remaining cases began in California state court on June 1, 1989 (“the civil case”). USAir/ PSA, Ogden, and LAX litigated pursuant to a common strategy of placing sole blame for the crash on Burke — against whose estate they brought a third-party claim. They argued that Burke was an “unstoppable force,” determined and able to circumvent all security measures. During the week of June 19, four of the nine cases settled. On June 22, Brennan instructed John Papageorge, a USAU employee, to settle the remaining cases. This [143]*143was accomplished within five days. As-a result, no jury verdict was returned against USAir or Ogden or any other defendant.

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Bluebook (online)
183 F.3d 139, 1999 WL 459368, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-brennan-ca2-1999.