United States v. Brenden Vermilyea

Ninth Circuit

United States v. Brenden Vermilyea

667 F. App'x 624

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJune 28, 2016

Docket14-10495

StatusUnpublished

This text of 667 F. App'x 624 (United States v. Brenden Vermilyea) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. Brenden Vermilyea, 667 F. App'x 624 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Appellant Brenden Vermilyea appeals from his conviction by a jury for one count of Possession of Firearm by a Prohibited Person and one count of Possession of Ammunition by a Prohibited Person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

Vermilyea contends that the district court’s jury instruction regarding prohibited possession of a firearm violated due process by relieving the government of the obligation to prove all elements of the offense where the instruction stated that (1) “a general court martial conviction is a crime that satisfies section 922(g)(1) if the crime for which a defendant is court-mart-ialed was punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” and (2) “imprisonment includes a term of confinement in a military institution.” We conclude that under United States v. MacDonald, 992 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1998), the issue of whether a court-martial conviction is a crime under § 922(g)(1) is a matter of law. The jury instructions were an accurate statement of the law under MacDonald, see 992 F.2d at 970, and did not relieve the government of the obligation to prove that Vermilyea was convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Vermilyea also contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutionally vague by failing to provide reasonable notice to Vermilyea, and others similarly situated, that his military conviction made him a prohibited possessor. We conclude that § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague because ordinary people can understand that an offense in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice may qualify as a “crime” and that military confinement may qualify as “imprisonment” for purposes of § 922(g)(1). See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM ***

Appellant Brenden Vermilyea appeals from his conviction by a jury for one count of Possession of Firearm by a Prohibited Person and one count of Possession of Ammunition by a Prohibited Person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

Vermilyea contends that the district court’s jury instruction regarding prohibited possession of a firearm violated due process by relieving the government of the obligation to prove all elements of the offense where the instruction stated that (1) “a general court martial conviction is a crime that satisfies section 922(g)(1) if the crime for which a defendant is court-mart-ialed was punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” and (2) “imprisonment includes a term of confinement in a military institution.” We conclude that under United States v. MacDonald, 992 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1998), the issue of whether a court-martial conviction is a crime under § 922(g)(1) is a matter of law. The jury instructions were an accurate statement of the law under MacDonald, see 992 F.2d at 970, and did not relieve the government of the obligation to prove that Vermilyea was convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Vermilyea also contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutionally vague by failing to provide reasonable notice to Vermilyea, and others similarly situated, that his military conviction made him a prohibited possessor. We conclude that § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague because ordinary people can understand that an offense in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice may qualify as a “crime” and that military confinement may qualify as “imprisonment” for purposes of § 922(g)(1). See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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667 F. App'x 624, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-brenden-vermilyea-ca9-2016.

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