United States v. Brandon Hayward

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: January 9, 2026
• Docket: 24-4368
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4368

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BRANDON HAYWARD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Robert S. Ballou, District Judge. (7:24-cr-00001-RSB-1)

Submitted: December 10, 2025 Decided: January 9, 2026

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Mary Maguire, Federal Public Defender, Erin Trodden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Zachary T. Lee, Acting United States Attorney, Jonathan Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Brandon Hayward appeals his conviction following a jury trial for two counts of

knowingly transmitting in interstate commerce a threat to injure the person of another, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), in connection with threatening phone calls he made to

employees of his credit union. On appeal, Hayward argues that the district court erred in

excluding his testimony regarding his mental illness and in declining to give his requested

jury instruction on unconscious bias. We affirm.

Hayward first argues that the district court erred in preventing him from testifying

about his mental health, contending that his proffered testimony—that he could not fully

recall making the threatening statements because he was severely mentally ill at the time—

was relevant to both his mens rea and his credibility. The Government argued before the

district court that because Hayward did not pursue an insanity defense, his testimony

regarding his mental health was inadmissible under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of

1984 (“IDRA”), see 18 U.S.C. § 17(a), and that, even if relevant, his testimony should be

excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because any probative value would be

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The district court granted the Government’s

motion in limine and issued an order excluding any testimony, evidence, or argument

regarding Hayward’s mental health history, treatment, or diagnoses.

We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion and “will

overturn an evidentiary ruling only if it is arbitrary and irrational.” Burgess v. Goldstein,

997 F.3d 541, 559 (4th Cir. 2021). Further, when a district court excludes evidence under

Rule 403, we will not overturn the court’s decision “except under the most extraordinary

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of circumstances,” where the district court has “plainly abused” its discretion. United

States v. Hart, 91 F.4th 732, 743 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation modified).

Under the IDRA, evidence of a defendant’s mental impairment may only be

admitted when a defendant (1) raises an insanity defense or (2) is attempting to negate the

mens rea of a specific intent crime. United States v. Worrell, 313 F.3d 867, 872-75 (4th

Cir. 2002). The “IDRA expressly prohibits the use of any ‘[m]ental disease or defect’ as a

defense unless it demonstrates that the defendant ‘was unable to appreciate the nature and

quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.” Id. at 872 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §17(a)). It “leaves

no room for a defense that raises any form of legal excuse based upon one’s lack of

volitional control including a diminished ability or failure to reflect adequately upon the

consequences or nature of one’s actions.” Id. (citation modified). However, the IDRA

“does not prohibit psychiatric evidence of a mental condition short of insanity when such

evidence is offered purely to rebut the government’s evidence of specific intent, although

such cases will be rare.” Id. at 874.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to exclude

Hayward’s testimony regarding his mental health. Hayward did not pursue an insanity

defense, and he conceded before the district court that his testimony was not intended to

show that he lacked the intent to commit the offenses. See id. Hayward nevertheless argues

that he should have been permitted to testify that he could not recall making the threatening

statements because he was severely mentally ill and unmedicated at the time, and that such

testimony would have been relevant to his credibility and whether he possessed the

requisite mens rea to threaten anyone. However, we conclude that the district court did not

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abuse its discretion in finding that any discussion by Hayward of his mental illness or his

mental state at the time of the offenses would potentially provide a diminished capacity

justification for his actions, which is improper. And although Hayward argues that the

district court’s ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to testify, the court’s ruling

did not prevent him testifying; it simply precluded his testimony that he could not

remember making the threatening statements due to his mental illness. Accordingly, we

conclude that the district court’s ruling granting the Government’s motion in limine and

excluding any evidence of Hayward’s mental health was not an abuse of the court’s broad

discretion.

Hayward next argues that the district court erred in denying his requested jury

instruction regarding unconscious bias. We similarly review the district court’s decision

to decline to give a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. United States v.

Ravenell, 66 F.4th 472, 480-81 (4th Cir. 2023). “[A] district court commits reversible error

in declining to provide a proffered jury instruction only when the instruction (1) was

correct; (2) was not substantially covered by the court’s charge to the jury; and (3) dealt

with some point in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested instruction

seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct his defense.” Id. at 481 (citation

modified).

We likewise discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to give

Hayward’s requested jury instruction. Although the court did not mention unconscious

bias, the court’s charge to the jury discussed bias, stating: “You must decide the case solely

on the evidence and the law before you and must not be influenced by any personal likes

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or dislikes, opinions, prejudices, sympathy, or biases.” The charge explicitly instructed

jurors not to rely on their biases and prejudices, and further instructed them to instead rely

only on the evidence and the law before them in making their decision.

More importantly, Hayward has made no showing that the district court’s failure to

give his requested unconscious bias instruction seriously impaired his ability to conduct

his defense. Although the court declined to give Hayward’s requested instruction on

unconscious bias, it stated that it would allow counsel to make the argument to the jury.

Thus, the absence of a jury instruction on unconscious bias did not impair Hayward’s

ability to argue about unconscious bias or present that defense to the jury. We conclude

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the requested jury

instruction.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED