United States v. Brandon Devante Oliver

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-11859 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/09/2026 Page: 1 of 3

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-11859 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

BRANDON DEVANTE OLIVER, Defendant- Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 7:23-cr-00264-LSC-GMB-1 ____________________

Before JORDAN, KIDD, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Brandon Oliver appeals his conviction of possession of a fire- arm by a convicted felon, challenging the district court’s order USCA11 Case: 24-11859 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/09/2026 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 24-11859

denying his motion to dismiss the indictment against him. He con- tends 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. As we recently explained in United States v. Hicks, 166 F.4th 933, 938-99 (11th Cir. 2026), we rejected this constitutional challenge in United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010), and later in United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) (Dubois II). In Rozier, we held “statutory restrictions of firearm posses- sion, such as § 922(g)(1), are a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people,” such as fel- ons. 598 F.3d at 771. We relied in part on the following statement in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008), “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohi- bitions on the possession of firearms by felons . . . .” As we ex- plained, this statement “suggests that statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.” Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771. In Rozier, we also rejected the defendant's argument the statement from Hel- ler was merely dicta and should not be afforded authoritative weight. Id. at 771 n.6. Additionally, Dubois II rejected the argument that Rozier is no longer good law after the Supreme Court's decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). In Dubois II we explained—interpret- ing Rahimi—that the Supreme Court emphasized it was “not sug- gest[ing] that the Second Amendment prohibits the enactment of USCA11 Case: 24-11859 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/09/2026 Page: 3 of 3

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laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse.” Du- bois II, 139 F.4th at 892 (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698). We fur- ther noted Rahimi reiterated that “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill . . . are presumptively law- ful.” Id. (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698). These statements “con- firm[ed] that Rozier remains good law.” Id. at 893. Thus, Rozier continued to bind us in Dubois II and foreclosed Dubois' constitu- tional challenge to § 922(g)(1) as a violation of the Second Amend- ment. Id. at 894. As we explained, “clearer instruction from the Supreme Court” is necessary “before we may reconsider the con- stitutionality of section 922(g)(1).” Id. Although Oliver acknowledges the binding nature of Dubois II, he contends it was wrongly decided. However, “under the prior panel precedent rule, a prior panel's holding is binding on all sub- sequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by us sitting en banc.” Hicks, 166 F.4th at 939 (quotation marks and alteration omitted). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Oliver’s motion to dismiss the indictment because this Court’s precedent forecloses his argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitu- tional. See United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 707 (11th Cir. 1998) (reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment for an abuse of discretion). AFFIRMED.