United States v. Branch

Opinion

25-1679 United States v. Branch

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of September, two thousand twenty-six.

Present:

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

STEVEN J. MENASHI,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,

v. 25-1679 TIANTE BRANCH, AKA Devil,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________

For Appellee: Alexander P. Wentworth-Ping, Assistant United States Attorney, John A. Sarcone III, First Assistant U.S.

Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of New York, Albany, NY, for Todd Blanche, Attorney General.

For Defendant-Appellant: Melissa A. Tuohey, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Syracuse, NY.

2

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Nardacci, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Tiante Branch (“Branch”) appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Nardacci, J.), entered on June 30, 2025, revoking his supervised release and sentencing him, following six admitted violations of supervised release, to two years in prison and one year of supervised release. Branch was on supervised release for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On appeal, Branch argues that his prison sentence was substantively unreasonable. Branch also contends that the district court erred by imposing 13 standard conditions of supervised release without pronouncing them at sentencing. We affirm the below-Guidelines sentence as substantively reasonable and conclude the district court did not err in its imposition of the 13 standard conditions “because the court specifically incorporated the conditions by reference to General Order #23, a standing order in place in the Northern District at the time of sentencing.” United States v. Matos, No. 22-1561, 2026 WL 2339567, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 2026). We assume familiarity with the remaining facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

I. Substantive Reasonableness We review the substantive reasonableness of a criminal sentence for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). This is a highly deferential standard, and we vacate a sentence as substantively unreasonable only when it “would . . . damage

3

the administration of justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). While we do not presume that a sentence within the Guidelines range is substantively reasonable, “[i]t is . . . difficult to find that a below-Guidelines sentence,” when challenged by a defendant, “is unreasonable” under our precedent. United States v. Perez-Frias, 636 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 2011).

Branch’s sentence, on its face, is not “shockingly high.” Rigas, 583 F.3d at 123. Nor do we discern any basis on which to conclude that it is unsupportable as a matter of law. The sentence is less than half the minimum recommended amount of 51 months under the Sentencing Guidelines, and Branch fails to support his claim that this below-Guidelines sentence disregards rehabilitative considerations. See Perez-Frias, 636 F.3d at 43.

The district court weighed the various sentencing factors and determined that “the seriousness of the violation conduct” and Branch’s “ongoing criminal behavior and substance use, which appears to mirror his first term of supervised release” supported an immediate prison term. App’x at 105. Given Branch’s failure to fully comply with his existing treatment program, it was not unreasonable for the district court to conclude that sentencing Branch to a meaningful prison term before a residential drug treatment program was necessary to serve the multiple purposes of sentencing, including deterrence and protection of the public. See United States v. Albarran, 943 F.3d 106, 116 (2d Cir. 2019) (“In assessing the sentence imposed by a district court, we do not reweigh the relevant factors . . . .”). Accordingly, we reject Branch’s claim that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

4

II. Conditions of Supervised Release As for the supervised release conditions, the district court imposed the conditions pursuant to General Order #23, the Northern District of New York’s standing order. The court stated that Branch “shall comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this Court.” App’x at 106. “A defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” United States v. Maiorana, 153 F.4th 306, 313 (2d Cir. 2025) (alteration omitted). “The right to presence generally requires that the terms of a defendant’s sentence be orally pronounced by the court in the defendant’s presence at the sentencing proceeding.” Id. at 310. In Maiorana, the en banc Court held “that a sentencing court intending to impose non-mandatory conditions of supervised release . . . must notify the defendant during the sentencing proceeding; if the conditions are not pronounced, they may not later be added to the written judgment.” Id. at 314. We have recently clarified that “[a] reference to a written list of conditions is enough to afford a defendant the opportunity to challenge the conditions of supervised release, which is all that due process requires.” Matos, 2026 WL 2339567, at *8 (quoting United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832, 838 (11th Cir. 2024)). Accordingly, “the district court did not violate [Branch’s] right to oral pronouncement because its reference to ‘the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court,’ specifically incorporated by reference particular conditions that had been set forth in writing and made available to the defendant in . . . a notice adopted by the court.” Id. (citation modified).

The Government suggests that remand is required because “the record does not show that the district court conducted the required ‘individualized assessment’ of the standard conditions in this case.” Appellee’s Br. at 16 (quoting United States v. McAdam, 165 F.4th 688, 695 (2d Cir.

5

2026)). We disagree. As a threshold matter, Branch’s brief argues only that “the district court failed to orally pronounce the thirteen standard conditions at sentencing.” Appellant’s Br. at 19 (emphasis added). Moreover, our decision in McAdam addressed challenges to special conditions that were incorrectly labeled as “standard conditions,” which is not the situation here. McAdam, 165 F.4th at 695. To the extent McAdam could also be read as requiring an individualized assessment for actual standard conditions, that conclusion would be dicta. “Our case law continues to hold that the standard conditions are ‘necessary to the administration of supervised release’ and ‘presumed suitable in all cases.’” United States v. Cuello, No. 22-1606, 2026 WL 2253626, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 5, 2026) (summary order) (quoting United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115, 119 n.1 (2d Cir. 2024)). “As long as ‘the record indicates that the sentencing judge considered the factors required by statute,’ he need ‘not explicitly discuss the connection between these factors and each imposed condition.’” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 757, 764 (2d Cir. 1992)). And even assuming arguendo that Branch did not forfeit this challenge and that the district court erred, any such error would be harmless. The district court’s “reasons [for imposing the conditions] are ‘self-evident in the record,’ and … [the] conditions are reasonably related to the pertinent sentencing factors.” United States v. Arguedas, 134 F.4th 54, 70 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018)). Specifically, Branch was sentenced for repeated serious violations of the conditions of his previously imposed term of supervised release. Under the circumstances, the thirteen standard conditions are evidently “necessary for ensuring the effectiveness of supervision.” United States v. Robinson, 134 F.4th 104, 112 (2d Cir. 2025).

* * *

6

We have considered Branch’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk