United States v. Booker Henley

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: July 2, 2026
• Docket: 24-4618
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-4618 Doc: 44 Filed: 07/02/2026 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4618

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

BOOKER TYRELL HENLEY,

Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior District Judge. (3:23-cr-00563-CMC-1)

Submitted: April 29, 2026 Decided: July 2, 2026

Before HARRIS, QUATTLEBAUM, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Bingzi Hu, Murdoch Walker, II, LOWTHER | WALKER LLC, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellant. Bryan P. Stirling, United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, Leesa Washington, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4618 Doc: 44 Filed: 07/02/2026 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Booker Henley of three crimes—possessing a firearm as a

convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (“Count One”), possessing marijuana

with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (“Count Two”) and using and

carrying a firearm in relation to, or possessing a firearm in furtherance of, a drug trafficking

crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (“Count Three”). Henley appeals his

convictions on all three counts and the district court’s sentence. Because we find no

reversible error, we affirm.

First, Henley claims the district court improperly instructed the jury on Count One—

specifically, that one of the instructions was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding

in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019). But the challenged instruction is consistent

with Rehaif, so we find no error.

Next, Henley argues that his conviction on Count Three should be vacated for

duplicity because § 924(c)(1)(A) creates two separate offenses. Henley didn’t raise this

challenge below, meaning that to prevail, he must make “a showing of good cause or plain

error.” United States v. Robinson, 855 F.3d 265, 270 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

Henley has shown neither. See United States v. Banks, 29 F.4th 168, 181 (4th Cir. 2022)

(finding no plain error when defendant made identical argument because “[t]here is a real

question about whether [the count] was duplicitous at all”).

Further, Henley challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a judgment

of acquittal, arguing that insufficient evidence supported his convictions on all three

counts. Having reviewed the record, we disagree. “We will sustain the jury verdict if ‘any

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rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt’” and “remain cognizant that it is the jury’s province to weigh the

credibility of the witnesses, and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” United States v.

Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 387 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d

566, 571–72 (4th Cir. 2011)). That standard is met here.

Henley additionally argues that the district court should have granted him a new

trial because it erroneously admitted various pieces of social media evidence in violation

of Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, 404 and 901. We conclude the district court

did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.

Finally, Henley claims his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The district

court sentenced Henley within his Guidelines range and we treat such a sentence as

presumptively reasonable. United States v. Smith, 919 F.3d 825, 841 n.12 (4th Cir. 2019).

We find no reason to think the district court abused its discretion in imposing Henley’s

sentence.

For these reasons, we affirm Henley’s conviction and sentence in full. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED