McCREE, District Judge.
Defendant was tried by the court, sitting without a jury, upon an indictment charging:
“That on or about April 12, 1960, in the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, Henry B. Bonga, Jr., after having been duly and regularly ordered to report for induction by Local Board No. 102, Plymouth, Michigan, did report for induction at the Fort Wayne Induction Station, 6301 West Jefferson Avenue, Detroit, Michigan, but wilfully and knowingly refused to submit to induction in accordance with Section 1632.14(b) of Selective Service Rules and Regulations of 1948; in violation of Section 462(a), Title 50, USC, Appendix.”
The government’s proofs consisted of defendant’s Selective Service file, which was received in evidence by stipulation of counsel. Defendant rested without introducing evidence, and moved for a judgment of acquittal.
The Selective Service file discloses the following sequence of events.
January 28,1958: Classification questionnaire mailed to defendant.
February 8, 1958: Defendant’s completed questionnaire received by local board.
September 10, 1958: Defendant classified I-A.
January 13,1959: Order to report for physical examination mailed to defendant.
January 26, 1959: Defendant given physical examination and found to be acceptable.
March 28, 1960: Order to report for induction on April 12, 1960, mailed to defendant.
April 12, 1960: Defendant reported for induction at the appointed time and place, but refused to submit to induction by taking the required step forward.
April 13, I960:- Induction officer’s report on defendant’s refusal to be inducted sent to United States Attorney.
May 18, I960:- Letter from state selective service headquarters to local board recommending that defendant be directed to appear before the board for questioning regarding the basis for his refusal to be inducted, and that he be invited to submit a written statement of the reasons for his actions.
June 2, 1960: Letter from local board to defendant requesting his appearance [910] on June 8, 1960; notation that he failed to appear on that date.
June 21¡., 1960: Letter from local board to state headquarters advising that defendant had failed to report for the interview on June 8th, but had informed the board on June 10th that because of a change of address he had just received the letter notifying him of the interview.
July 7, I960: Letter from local board to defendant requesting his appearance on July 13th.
July 13, 1960: Defendant’s interview with board, the minutes of which are set forth in the margin.1
July 22, 1960: Defendant’s written statement received by board.2
[911] November 21,1960: Letter from state headquarters to local board recommending that board “officially consider all of the new and additional information which this individual has submitted and make a determination as to whether or not this [912] new and additional information would justify a change in his Selective Service classification.”
December 28, 1960: Letter from local board to defendant: “At the board meeting of December 14, 1960 the contents of your Selective Service file were reviewed and considered by the board to determine if you were eligible for a lower classification and it was the opinion of the board [913] that it did not warrant the reopening of your classification.”
Indictment and prosecution next followed :
In support of his motion for acquittal, defendant relies upon the last part of the Selective Service regulation dealing with opening of classifications, 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2. This regulation, with the pertinent portion italicized, provides as follows:
“The local board may reopen and consider anew the classification of a registrant (a) upon the written request of the registrant, the government appeal agent, any person who claims to be a dependent of the registrant, or any person who has on file a written request for the current deferment of the registrant in a case involving occupational deferment, if such request is accompanied by written information presenting facts not considered when the registrant was classified, which, if true, would justify a change in the registrant’s classification; or (b) upon its own motion if such action is based upon facts not considered when the registrant was classified which, if true, would justify a change in the registrant’s classification; provided, in either event, the classification of a registrant shall not be reopened after the local board has mailed to such registrant an Order to Report for Induction (SSS Form No. 252) or an Order to Report for Civilian Work and Statement of Employer (SSS Form No. 153) unless the local board first specifically finds there has been a change in the registrant’s status re-suiting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control.”
Defendant contends that after the Order to Report for Induction had been mailed, there occurred a change in his. status resulting from circumstances over which he had no control — viz., the maturation of conscientious opposition to anv form of service in the armed forces. He further argues that the local board acted capriciously and arbitrarily in declining to reopen his I-A classification, inasmuch, as the information which he furnished at his interview on July 13, 1960, and in his written statement of July 22,1960, on its face warranted a reclassification of I-O,3 and not being traversed, required such reclassification. And if defendant’s classification had been reopened — whatever the ultimate reclassification — the induction order upon which this prosecution is founded would have been cancelled.4
For reasons hereinafter stated, the court cannot accept these contentions.
It is well established that exemption from military service is a matter of legislative grace. Being a privilege and. not an inherent right, it has been held that a claim for exemption “may be abandoned by the holder like any other personal privilege.” United States v. Schoebel, 201 F.2d 31, 32 (7th Cir. 1953). Accord: Boyd v. United States, 269 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1959); Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1959).
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McCREE, District Judge.
Defendant was tried by the court, sitting without a jury, upon an indictment charging:
“That on or about April 12, 1960, in the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, Henry B. Bonga, Jr., after having been duly and regularly ordered to report for induction by Local Board No. 102, Plymouth, Michigan, did report for induction at the Fort Wayne Induction Station, 6301 West Jefferson Avenue, Detroit, Michigan, but wilfully and knowingly refused to submit to induction in accordance with Section 1632.14(b) of Selective Service Rules and Regulations of 1948; in violation of Section 462(a), Title 50, USC, Appendix.”
The government’s proofs consisted of defendant’s Selective Service file, which was received in evidence by stipulation of counsel. Defendant rested without introducing evidence, and moved for a judgment of acquittal.
The Selective Service file discloses the following sequence of events.
January 28,1958: Classification questionnaire mailed to defendant.
February 8, 1958: Defendant’s completed questionnaire received by local board.
September 10, 1958: Defendant classified I-A.
January 13,1959: Order to report for physical examination mailed to defendant.
January 26, 1959: Defendant given physical examination and found to be acceptable.
March 28, 1960: Order to report for induction on April 12, 1960, mailed to defendant.
April 12, 1960: Defendant reported for induction at the appointed time and place, but refused to submit to induction by taking the required step forward.
April 13, I960:- Induction officer’s report on defendant’s refusal to be inducted sent to United States Attorney.
May 18, I960:- Letter from state selective service headquarters to local board recommending that defendant be directed to appear before the board for questioning regarding the basis for his refusal to be inducted, and that he be invited to submit a written statement of the reasons for his actions.
June 2, 1960: Letter from local board to defendant requesting his appearance [910] on June 8, 1960; notation that he failed to appear on that date.
June 21¡., 1960: Letter from local board to state headquarters advising that defendant had failed to report for the interview on June 8th, but had informed the board on June 10th that because of a change of address he had just received the letter notifying him of the interview.
July 7, I960: Letter from local board to defendant requesting his appearance on July 13th.
July 13, 1960: Defendant’s interview with board, the minutes of which are set forth in the margin.1
July 22, 1960: Defendant’s written statement received by board.2
[911] November 21,1960: Letter from state headquarters to local board recommending that board “officially consider all of the new and additional information which this individual has submitted and make a determination as to whether or not this [912] new and additional information would justify a change in his Selective Service classification.”
December 28, 1960: Letter from local board to defendant: “At the board meeting of December 14, 1960 the contents of your Selective Service file were reviewed and considered by the board to determine if you were eligible for a lower classification and it was the opinion of the board [913] that it did not warrant the reopening of your classification.”
Indictment and prosecution next followed :
In support of his motion for acquittal, defendant relies upon the last part of the Selective Service regulation dealing with opening of classifications, 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2. This regulation, with the pertinent portion italicized, provides as follows:
“The local board may reopen and consider anew the classification of a registrant (a) upon the written request of the registrant, the government appeal agent, any person who claims to be a dependent of the registrant, or any person who has on file a written request for the current deferment of the registrant in a case involving occupational deferment, if such request is accompanied by written information presenting facts not considered when the registrant was classified, which, if true, would justify a change in the registrant’s classification; or (b) upon its own motion if such action is based upon facts not considered when the registrant was classified which, if true, would justify a change in the registrant’s classification; provided, in either event, the classification of a registrant shall not be reopened after the local board has mailed to such registrant an Order to Report for Induction (SSS Form No. 252) or an Order to Report for Civilian Work and Statement of Employer (SSS Form No. 153) unless the local board first specifically finds there has been a change in the registrant’s status re-suiting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control.”
Defendant contends that after the Order to Report for Induction had been mailed, there occurred a change in his. status resulting from circumstances over which he had no control — viz., the maturation of conscientious opposition to anv form of service in the armed forces. He further argues that the local board acted capriciously and arbitrarily in declining to reopen his I-A classification, inasmuch, as the information which he furnished at his interview on July 13, 1960, and in his written statement of July 22,1960, on its face warranted a reclassification of I-O,3 and not being traversed, required such reclassification. And if defendant’s classification had been reopened — whatever the ultimate reclassification — the induction order upon which this prosecution is founded would have been cancelled.4
For reasons hereinafter stated, the court cannot accept these contentions.
It is well established that exemption from military service is a matter of legislative grace. Being a privilege and. not an inherent right, it has been held that a claim for exemption “may be abandoned by the holder like any other personal privilege.” United States v. Schoebel, 201 F.2d 31, 32 (7th Cir. 1953). Accord: Boyd v. United States, 269 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1959); Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1959).
The privilege of exemption is not' self-asserting. It is the obligation of the registrant to apprise his local board in timely fashion of his claim and of the facts in support thereof. While 32 C.F.R. § 1625.1 expressly recognizes that “[n]o> [914] classification is permanent”, it requires a registrant to report, within ten days of its occurrence, any fact which might alter his classification.
Regulation 1625.2, quoted above, prescribes a reasonable and orderly procedure for re-evaluating classifications in light of new or additional information. It specifically forbids a reopening of classification after an induction order has been mailed, except where an involuntary change of status has occurred.
Defendant would have the court construe this regulation to mean that a local board must consider a change-of-status claim interposed weeks after the registrant has refused induction. Such an interpretation could plunge the system of induction into chaos.
Assuming, without deciding, that a bona fide change of conscience could constitute an involuntary change of status within the meaning of Regulation 1625.2,5 the regulation certainly contemplates prompt notification to the board as a necessary condition for reopening and reclassification. Just as a board is justified in refusing to reopen a classification when the request comes after notice of induction and is based upon a change of status antedating the notice, Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1959), so the board is justified in declining to reopen a classification upon a request made after the registrant has refused to submit to induction. United States v. Monroe, 150 F.Supp. 785 (S.D.Cal.1957).6
The record in the instant case shows that at no time prior to his refusal to be inducted did defendant claim to be a conscientious objector or advise the local board of any change in his status. There is no indication that at the time he refused induction defendant attempted to explain his action. Nor did he thereafter make any effort to contact his board. On July 13, 1960, three months after he had refused to submit to induction, and in response to the board’s invitation, defendant appeared and for the first time stated that his religious convictions precluded any form of military service.
In addition, there is nothing in the record which indicates that defendant ever requested reclassification to I-O. In fact, when the chairman of the local board asked “Will you accept work in an institution?” defendant replied “No.” Even the written statement which defendant submitted to the board does not contain a request for reclassification.
Thus it appears that the board was acting on its own initiative in considering whether to reopen defendant’s classification following his refusal to be inducted. Moreover, on the basis of defendant’s own information, it cannot be said with assurance that his change of conscience took place in the interval between the mailing of the induction notice (March 28, 1960) and the day set for induction (April 12, 1960). Therefore, even if defendant had presented his information to the board before the day for induction, it does not appear that he made out a prima facie case for reclassification based upon a change of status developing after March 28,1960. Cf. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 74 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed.2d 132 (1953); United States v. Brown, 129 F.Supp. 237 (D.N.J.1955); United States v. Williams, D.Conn.1954, Crim. No. 8917 (unreported opinion).
I therefore reach the following conclusions :
1. Defendant was lawfully classified I-A and ordered to report for induction.
2. Defendant committed the offense charged by refusing to submit to induction under a valid order on April 12,1960.
[915]*9153. Any claim for exemption by reason of defendant’s religious scruples was waived by his failure to assert the same in the time and manner prescribed by the Selective Service regulations.
4. The local Selective Service board was not required to entertain a claim for exemption first advanced after defendant refused induction.
5. The local board, in any event, did not act arbitrarily in declining to reopen defendant’s classification on the basis of the information adduced by him, since such information did not prima facie establish a change in status resulting from circumstances beyond defendant’s control occurring between the mailing of the order to report for induction and the time scheduled for induction.
I find the defendant guilty as charged, and the matter is referred to the probation department for pre-sentence investigation and report.