United States v. Bondurant

Fifth Circuit

United States v. Bondurant

555 F.2d 1328

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedJuly 18, 1977

DocketNo. 76-4424

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 555 F.2d 1328 (United States v. Bondurant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Bondurant, 555 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1977).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Bondurant was convicted by a jury of kidnapping a four-year-old girl in Dallas, Texas, and of transporting her interstate on a thirteen-day journey before releasing her in New Orleans,- Louisiana. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201. The sole issue on appeal is whether imposition of the statutory maximum sentence in the circumstances of this ease constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court or amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of the Eighth Amendment.

Ordinarily, the severity of a sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be reviewed. Herron v. United States, 5 Cir., 1977, 551 F.2d 62; United States v. Cavazos, 5 Cir., 1976, 530 F.2d 4. Appellant argues, however, that at sentencing the court failed to consider mitigating factors, to wit, the manner in which he alleges that [1329]*1329the child came into his van, the fact that the girl was released physically uninjured, and appellant’s confused mental state at the time of the crime. Thus, appellant contends that the sentence imposed was excessive and disproportionate to the crime charged. We have examined the record and find no merit to this assertion.

The district court considered at sentencing defendant’s personal history, psychiatric reports, and the nature and circumstances of his crime herein. The court was also sensitive to (though skeptical about) the possibility of appellant’s eventual rehabilitation, and recommended that the Bureau of Prisons determine whether the prisoner would benefit from treatment and that the Bureau act accordingly in its discretion. Such sentencing was not “ ‘arbitrary or capricious action amounting to a gross abuse of discretion’”, which is the standard for review of a sentencing court’s discretion. United States v. Gamboa, 5 Cir., 1976, 543 F.2d 545, 546. Nor can we say that the sentence herein was “ ‘so greatly disproportionate to the offense committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice’ ”, and thus to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Capuchino v. Estelle, 5 Cir., 1975, 506 F.2d 440, 442; see Gamboa, supra, 543 F.2d at 548. Accordingly, the judgment below is

AFFIRMED.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Bondurant was convicted by a jury of kidnapping a four-year-old girl in Dallas, Texas, and of transporting her interstate on a thirteen-day journey before releasing her in New Orleans,- Louisiana. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201. The sole issue on appeal is whether imposition of the statutory maximum sentence in the circumstances of this ease constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court or amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of the Eighth Amendment.

Ordinarily, the severity of a sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be reviewed. Herron v. United States, 5 Cir., 1977, 551 F.2d 62; United States v. Cavazos, 5 Cir., 1976, 530 F.2d 4. Appellant argues, however, that at sentencing the court failed to consider mitigating factors, to wit, the manner in which he alleges that [1329]*1329the child came into his van, the fact that the girl was released physically uninjured, and appellant’s confused mental state at the time of the crime. Thus, appellant contends that the sentence imposed was excessive and disproportionate to the crime charged. We have examined the record and find no merit to this assertion.

The district court considered at sentencing defendant’s personal history, psychiatric reports, and the nature and circumstances of his crime herein. The court was also sensitive to (though skeptical about) the possibility of appellant’s eventual rehabilitation, and recommended that the Bureau of Prisons determine whether the prisoner would benefit from treatment and that the Bureau act accordingly in its discretion. Such sentencing was not “ ‘arbitrary or capricious action amounting to a gross abuse of discretion’”, which is the standard for review of a sentencing court’s discretion. United States v. Gamboa, 5 Cir., 1976, 543 F.2d 545, 546. Nor can we say that the sentence herein was “ ‘so greatly disproportionate to the offense committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice’ ”, and thus to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Capuchino v. Estelle, 5 Cir., 1975, 506 F.2d 440, 442; see Gamboa, supra, 543 F.2d at 548. Accordingly, the judgment below is

AFFIRMED.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

555 F.2d 1328, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-bondurant-ca5-1977.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack