United States v. Boese

46 F. 917, 1891 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedApril 1, 1891
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 46 F. 917 (United States v. Boese) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Boese, 46 F. 917, 1891 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97 (N.D. Cal. 1891).

Opinion

Hoffman, J.

Whether the depositing of an obscene letter in the post-office with no address to it at all would constitute an offense under that act of June 18, 1888, amending section 8893, Rev. St. U. S., it is not necessary now to decide I do not contend or suppose that the sole object of the act was to protect the feelings of parties to w.hom the obscene letter might be addressed. I do not think it was to protect the post-office clerks, either, from being contaminated by reading such objectionable communications. I suppose, though, that, should it appear that a man had a mistress or other person, and that they indulged in such letters and corresponded with each other, and each were sending the letters without objection, and in fact pleasure, 1 think they could be both indicted and punished for using the mails and carrying on the correspondence. It is not necessary that the feelings of the party to whom it is addressed be lacerated; nor would the fact that it was a pleasure and gratification to the person to receive it, — that would not absolve the prisoner from punishment for sending it on through the mail. But all the cases seem to show that further proof must be exacted in addition to the confession, and there must be corroborative circumstances, not amounting by themselves to absolute proof, but taken -with the confession, and be sufficient to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a. crime has been committed, and that the prisoner is the guilty person; because, if full proofs of the commission of crime were exacted, they might not be sufficient of themselves, wholly irrespective of the confession, to establish beyond a doubt that the crime has been committed; but in some way the jury has got to be satisfied, either by con[918]*918fession and corroborative proof or by corroborative proof alone, — some way, — of the guilt of the defendant. It is wholly unreasonable to suppose that a jury could convict a person of crime unless they reached the conclusion that a crime had been committed, and that the defendant is the guilty person. I do not think it necessary to delay the decision of this case, but some light might have been thrown upon it, as to the degree and sufficiency of the corroborative proof, by referring to those cases where an accomplice has been put upon the stand, and wdiere the law directs — sometimes the statute, and always the instructions of the court — that it is not safe to convict a person of crime upon the unsupported testimony of an accomplice. The degree of corroboration that the accomplice must receive must be treated of in many of those cases, and if the question were to arise as to what the jury should accept as the statutory corroboration, or the corroboration required by law, those cases would have to be explored. But here I see no proof whatever. The body of the offense is the putting of this letter in the mail. Of course a person may write as many such letters as he pleases, and send them by hand. Providing he does not use the mail for the purpose, the offense has not been committed that we have jurisdiction to punish. It is no corroboration to admit that he did write the letter, and that it is in his handwriting, which could be proved irrespective of his confession, I apprehend, by a comparison of the handwriting, — the writing which he made and comparing that with the letter, the handwriting of the obscene letter, — and bj' the fact that he knew the contents— must have known the contents — of the obscene letter, because he applies to the boy and gets the decoy letter in reply, which is found in his possession. Those facts can be proved independently of relating a single word that fell from his lips by the witnesses. But that does not go to the proof of the corpus delicti. Did he use the mail? On that there is not a particle of evidence. The party to whom the letter is addressed is not here to testify. The officer can only tell that the person who gave him the letter had stripped off the envelope, and that would be hearsay, and his testimony -would be refused admission if offered. All the young man who appears to be affianced to this young lady can tell is what the mother of the young lady told him. He does not know that it was received through the mails; nothing tending to show that he could testify on that point at all. Nobody can testify to it, that I can see, excepting the person who took it from the box, or to whom it was delivered, — the father of the young lady. The mother, even her testimony would probably be hearsay. She did not know anything excepting what her daughter told her, — that that letter had just arrived. So that-the whole testimony appears to be barren of any positive proof that this letter was ever sent through the mail. That constitutes the essence of the crime, and we must not be led away by our abhorrence of this gross and senseless outrage that has been perpetrated, and we must not punish a man for sending a libelous communication or making obscene or improper proposals unless he uses the mail for the purpose. The rest the state law will take care of. We have nothing to do with [919]*919it, except, as I have said, to prevent the mails being used as a medium for carrying on such correspondence.

Supposing all you say you can prove were proved, and I were to charge the jury, as I certainly would, that they must be satisfied that this letter was mailed, what proof would they have, what solitary fact tends to show that, in this case, independently of this confession? The corpus delicti, therefore, rests entirely upon his confession. There is no proof that this letter went through the mail; not a particle. It was answered through the mail, by whom we do not know; and it was taken out of the mail, (the decoy letter was, by him,) but the original letter, which led to the writing of the decoy, was not proved by a scintilla of proof to have been mailed. It is not necessary that there should be some proof, or half proof; but that there must be some corroborative circumstances, when the existence of the crime itself depends on a confession, is a fundamental proposition; and, unless the jury was satisfied of that fact by competent proof, a verdict of acquittal must follow. You cannot punish a person unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed, and also that he is the only one who committed it. I do not know that there is anything more to be said about it. Considering all the proofs that you have presented or are in your power to produce, I do not see a particle of proof as to how the letter reached that young lady’s hand, and her mother’s, etc., and found its way into the policeman’s possession; nothing, I say, except his confession.

A good many of the decisions turned upon the general idea of the caution with which confessions should be received. The rule does not stand upon the ground merely that the testimony is unreliable, and liable to mistake, or that it is given under circumstances of duress, or something approaching duress. The slightest thing, say, “You had better confess;” “Make a clean breast of it,” — causes a confession to be rejected. Why? Not because it affords a reasonable ground that an innocent person at such invitation confesses himself guilty of a crime which he never committed, because a rational person can see that no innocent person would be induced to say that he was guilty of a crime of which he was innocent, but the law will not allow a confession, to be extracted from a person unless under the fullest guaranty that it is spontaneous and free, and without any influence brought to bear upon him; not that it raises a presumption that perhaps a person has confessed a crime of which he is innocent, but because the law won’t allow it.

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Bluebook (online)
46 F. 917, 1891 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-boese-cand-1891.