United States v. Blumberg

207 F. Supp. 28, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4254
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania·Decided June 29, 1962·No. Crim. No. 17963·Published

Opinion

KRAFT, District Judge.

Defendant was convicted by the verdict of a jury under the so-called membership clause of the Smith Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2385. That Act, among other things, makes a felony the acquisition or holding of membership in any organization which advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence with knowledge of its purposes.1 The indictment charged that from July 26, 1945, to the date of its filing (October 6, 1954) the Communist Party of the United States was such an organization, and that defendant throughout that period was a member thereof, with knowledge of the Party’s illegal purpose and a specific intent to accomplish overthrow “as speedily as circumstances would permit.”

The case is before us on defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. We need only consider defendant’s attack on the sufficiency of the evidence and his allegations of trial and procedural errors, since his statutory and constitutional challenges to the conviction are now disposed of by the decision in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961).

In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we start from the premise that Smith Act offenses, involving as they do subtler elements than are present in most other crimes, require rigorous standards of proof. Scales, p. 232, 81 S.Ct. 1469; Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 291, 81 S.Ct. 1517, 6 L.Ed,2d 836 (1961). It will contribute to a better understanding and evaluation of the evidence if we refer in some detail to the standards of proof laid down in Scales and Noto, supra, the Supreme Court’s first review of convictions under the membership clause of the Smith Act. In Scales, the Court noted with approval the premises upon which that case was submitted to the jury (367 U.S. p. 220 81 S.Ct. p. 1481): ,

“The jury was instructed that in order to convict it must find that', within the three-year limitations-period (1) the Communist Party advocated the violent overthrow of the Government, in the sense of present ‘advocacy of action’ to accomplish that end as soon as circumstances were propitious; and (2) petitioner was an ‘active’ member of the Party, and not merely ‘a nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical’ member, with knowledge of the Party’s illegal advocacy and a specific intent to bring about violent overthrow ‘as speedily as circumstances would permit.’ ”

The Court pointed out in Scales that the evidentiary question there was controlled in large part by Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), which was a conspiracy prosecution under the Smith Act, Yates makes abundantly clear the distinction between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action, pp. 318-322, 77 S.Ct. 1064. “The essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in something,” pp. 324-325, 77 S.Ct. p. 1080. In Yates, it was [30]*30further said, pp. 320-322, 77 S.Ct. p. 1078:

“ * * * The essence of the Dennis [v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137] holding was that indoctrination of a group in preparation for future violent action, as well as exhortation to immediate action, by advocacy found to be directed to ‘action for the accomplishment’ of forcible overthrow, to violence as ‘a rule or principle of action,’ and employing ‘language of incitement,’ * * * is not constitutionally protected * * *. This is quite a different thing from the view of the District Court here that mere doctrinal justification of forcible overthrow, if engaged in with the intent to accomplish overthrow, is punishable per se under the Smith Act. That sort of advocacy, even though uttered with the hope that it may ultimately lead to violent revolution, is too remote from concrete action to be regarded as the kind of indoctrination preparatory to action which was condemned in Dennis. As one of the concurring opinions in Dennis put it: ‘Throughout our decisions there has recurred a distinction between the statement of an idea which may prompt its hearers to take unlawful action, and advocacy that such action be taken.’ ”

In Scales, the Court referring to the Yates opinion, indicates what type of evidence is needed to permit a jury to find that (a) there was “advocacy of action” and (b) the Party was responsible for such advocacy, 367 U.S. pp. 232-235, 81 S.Ct. p. 1488:

“First Yates makes clear what type of evidence is not in itself sufficient to show illegal advocacy. This category includes evidence of the following: the teaching of Marxism-Leninism and the connected use of Marxist ‘classics’ as textbooks; the official general resolutions and pronouncements of the Party at past conventions; dissemination of the Party’s general literature, including the standard outlines on Marxism; the Party’s history and organizational structure; the secrecy of meetings and the clandestine nature of the Party generally; statements by officials evidencing sympathy for and alliance with the U. S. S. R. * * * However, this kind of evidence, while insufficient in itself to sustain a conviction, is not irrelevant. Such evidence, in the context of other evidence, may be of value in showing illegal advocacy.
“Second, the Yates opinion also indicates what kind of evidence is sufficient. There the Court pointed to two series of events which justified the denial of directed acquittals as to nine of the Yates defendants. The Court noted that with respect to seven of the defendants, meetings in San Francisco which were described by the witness Foard might be considered to be ‘the systematic teaching and advocacy of illegal action which is condemned by the statute.’ 354 U.S. at 331, [77 S.Ct. at 1083.] In those meetings, a small group of members were not only taught that violent revolution was inevitable, but they were also taught techniques for achieving that end. For example, the Yates record reveals that members were directed to be prepared to convert a general strike into a revolution and to deal with Negroes so as to prepare them specifically for revolution. In addition to the San Francisco meetings, the Court referred to certain activities in the Los Angeles area ‘which might be considered to amount to “advocacy of action” ’ and with which two Yates defendants were linked. Id., 331-332 [77 S.Ct. 1083]. Here again, the participants did not stop with teaching of the inevitability of eventual revolution, but went on to explain techniques, both legal and illegal, to be employed in preparation for or in connection with the revolution. [31]*31Thus, one member was ‘surreptiously indoctrinated in methods * * * of moving “masses of people in time of crisis” ’; others were told to adopt such Russian prerevolutionary techniques as the development of a special communication system through a newspaper similar to Pravda. Id., 332 [77 S.Ct. 1083].

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United States v. Blumberg, 207 F. Supp. 28, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4254 (E.D. Pa. 1962).

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Related

Dennis v. United States
341 U.S. 494 (Supreme Court, 1951)
Gordon v. United States
344 U.S. 414 (Supreme Court, 1953)
Jencks v. United States
353 U.S. 657 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Yates v. United States
354 U.S. 298 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Scales v. United States
367 U.S. 203 (Supreme Court, 1961)
Noto v. United States
367 U.S. 290 (Supreme Court, 1961)
Junius Irving Scales v. United States
227 F.2d 581 (Fourth Circuit, 1955)