REVISED, June 12, 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 97-10520 _______________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL DEE BLEVINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas _________________________________________________________________ May 20, 1998
Before REAVLEY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred
in dismissing appellant Michael Dee Blevins’s case without
prejudice for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161
et. seq. We hold that the court did not abuse his discretion and,
accordingly, AFFIRM. However, we take this opportunity to remind
the district courts that in order for this court to conduct a
meaningful review, district courts are required to articulate their reasons pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act for dismissal of an
indictment either with or without prejudice.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 2, 1995, a Texas state trooper observed a car
weaving across the center line into oncoming traffic and heading
toward his patrol car. To avoid being hit, the trooper was forced
to veer off the highway. After avoiding the collision, he turned
his patrol car around to pursue the out-of-control car. At that
point, the car again crossed the center line and collided head on
with a pick up truck. After the accident, the driver, appellant
Michael Dee Blevins, was arrested and taken to jail. While being
escorted to jail, hundreds of loose pills, capsules, and tablets
began to fall from Blevins’s pockets. The authorities discovered
him to be in possession of many prescription medications for which
he did not have a prescription. Further testing indicated that at
the time of the accident, Blevins’s blood contained many of the
prescription drugs in his possession. At the time of his arrest,
Blevins, a pharmacist, was on probation for knowingly failing to
keep pharmaceutical records, an offense to which he pleaded guilty
in February 1995.
Blevins was indicted on May 16, 1995 on four counts of
possession of controlled substances. He made an initial appearance
on June 1, 1995, and the case was set for trial on July 3, 1995.
The Government moved to dismiss the indictment on November 3, 1995
2 for noncompliance with the Speedy Trial Act; the court granted the
motion to dismiss without prejudice.
The Government reindicted Blevins on July 9, 1996.
Blevins made an initial appearance on July 11, 1996, and his trial
was set for October 7, 1996. There were no motions filed in the
case after Blevins’s initial appearance until, on October 1, 1996,
Blevins filed a motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice for
noncompliance with the Speedy Trial Act. The district court
granted Blevins’s motion to dismiss without prejudice on October
18, 1996.
On November 19, 1996, Blevins was again indicted on four
counts of possession of controlled substances; trial was scheduled
for January 6, 1997. On December 18, 1996, Blevins again filed a
motion to dismiss the indictment for noncompliance with the Speedy
Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment and also requested the district
court to reconsider its prior dismissal of the indictment without
prejudice on October 18, 1996. The district court denied Blevins’s
motion to dismiss as well as the motion for reconsideration.
After entering into a plea arrangement with the
Government, Blevins pleaded guilty to one possession count on
January 23, 1997. He timely appealed the issue of whether the
district court erred in dismissing the indictment without prejudice
in October 1996.
3 DISCUSSION
4 Both paries agree that the district court properly
dismissed the indictment on October 18, 1996 for noncompliance with
the Speedy Trial Act. What they dispute is whether the district
court erred in dismissing the indictment without prejudice rather
than barring reprosecution by the Government.
We review a district court’s decision to dismiss an
indictment without prejudice for noncompliance with the Speedy
Trial Act for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Taylor,
487 U.S. 326, 342-43 (1988). In determining whether a dismissal of
an indictment for noncompliance with the Speedy Trial Act should be
with or without prejudice, the district court at least must
consider (1) the seriousness of the offense, (2) the facts and
circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and (3) the
impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial
Act and on the administration of justice. See 18 U.S.C. §
3161(a)(2); Taylor, 487 U.S. at 332-33. The defendant has the
burden of proving that dismissal of his case pursuant to these
factors is appropriate. See United States v. Melguizo, 824 F.2d
370, 372 & n.11 (5th Cir. 1987) (relying on 18 U.S.C. §
3162(a)(2)), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
A district court is not required to dismiss an indictment
with prejudice for every violation of the Speedy Trial Act. See
Taylor, 487 U.S. at 342. “[T]he decision whether to dismiss a
complaint under the Speedy Trial Act with or without prejudice is
entrusted to the sound discretion of the district judge and . . .
5 no preference is accorded to either kind of dismissal.” Melguizo,
824 F.2d at 371 (internal quotations omitted). Although not as
harsh a sanction as dismissal with prejudice, dismissal without
prejudice is meaningful because it, inter alia, forces the
Government to obtain a new indictment if it decides to reprosecute
as well as exposes the prosection to dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds. See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 342.
Although the district court failed to articulate its
reasons pursuant to the statute for dismissing Blevins’s indictment
without prejudice, neither party has commented on this point in its
brief. Without question, the district court should have
articulated its reasons for doing so:
Where, as here, Congress has declared that a decision will be governed by consideration of particular factors, a district court must carefully consider those factors as applied to the particular case and, whatever its decision, clearly articulate their effect in order to permit meaningful appellate review. Only then can an appellate court ascertain whether a district court has ignored or slighted a factor that Congress has deemed pertinent to the choice of remedy, thereby failing to act within the limits prescribed by Congress.
Taylor, 487 U.S. at 336-37. However, the fact that the district
court neglected to articulate its reasons for dismissal without
prejudice does not mandate that we remand to the district court
for it to do so. See United States v. Jones, 887 F.2d 492, 495
(4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081 (1990). Where, as
here, the record is sufficient for us to make a determination of
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
REVISED, June 12, 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 97-10520 _______________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL DEE BLEVINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas _________________________________________________________________ May 20, 1998
Before REAVLEY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred
in dismissing appellant Michael Dee Blevins’s case without
prejudice for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161
et. seq. We hold that the court did not abuse his discretion and,
accordingly, AFFIRM. However, we take this opportunity to remind
the district courts that in order for this court to conduct a
meaningful review, district courts are required to articulate their reasons pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act for dismissal of an
indictment either with or without prejudice.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 2, 1995, a Texas state trooper observed a car
weaving across the center line into oncoming traffic and heading
toward his patrol car. To avoid being hit, the trooper was forced
to veer off the highway. After avoiding the collision, he turned
his patrol car around to pursue the out-of-control car. At that
point, the car again crossed the center line and collided head on
with a pick up truck. After the accident, the driver, appellant
Michael Dee Blevins, was arrested and taken to jail. While being
escorted to jail, hundreds of loose pills, capsules, and tablets
began to fall from Blevins’s pockets. The authorities discovered
him to be in possession of many prescription medications for which
he did not have a prescription. Further testing indicated that at
the time of the accident, Blevins’s blood contained many of the
prescription drugs in his possession. At the time of his arrest,
Blevins, a pharmacist, was on probation for knowingly failing to
keep pharmaceutical records, an offense to which he pleaded guilty
in February 1995.
Blevins was indicted on May 16, 1995 on four counts of
possession of controlled substances. He made an initial appearance
on June 1, 1995, and the case was set for trial on July 3, 1995.
The Government moved to dismiss the indictment on November 3, 1995
2 for noncompliance with the Speedy Trial Act; the court granted the
motion to dismiss without prejudice.
The Government reindicted Blevins on July 9, 1996.
Blevins made an initial appearance on July 11, 1996, and his trial
was set for October 7, 1996. There were no motions filed in the
case after Blevins’s initial appearance until, on October 1, 1996,
Blevins filed a motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice for
noncompliance with the Speedy Trial Act. The district court
granted Blevins’s motion to dismiss without prejudice on October
18, 1996.
On November 19, 1996, Blevins was again indicted on four
counts of possession of controlled substances; trial was scheduled
for January 6, 1997. On December 18, 1996, Blevins again filed a
motion to dismiss the indictment for noncompliance with the Speedy
Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment and also requested the district
court to reconsider its prior dismissal of the indictment without
prejudice on October 18, 1996. The district court denied Blevins’s
motion to dismiss as well as the motion for reconsideration.
After entering into a plea arrangement with the
Government, Blevins pleaded guilty to one possession count on
January 23, 1997. He timely appealed the issue of whether the
district court erred in dismissing the indictment without prejudice
in October 1996.
3 DISCUSSION
4 Both paries agree that the district court properly
dismissed the indictment on October 18, 1996 for noncompliance with
the Speedy Trial Act. What they dispute is whether the district
court erred in dismissing the indictment without prejudice rather
than barring reprosecution by the Government.
We review a district court’s decision to dismiss an
indictment without prejudice for noncompliance with the Speedy
Trial Act for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Taylor,
487 U.S. 326, 342-43 (1988). In determining whether a dismissal of
an indictment for noncompliance with the Speedy Trial Act should be
with or without prejudice, the district court at least must
consider (1) the seriousness of the offense, (2) the facts and
circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and (3) the
impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial
Act and on the administration of justice. See 18 U.S.C. §
3161(a)(2); Taylor, 487 U.S. at 332-33. The defendant has the
burden of proving that dismissal of his case pursuant to these
factors is appropriate. See United States v. Melguizo, 824 F.2d
370, 372 & n.11 (5th Cir. 1987) (relying on 18 U.S.C. §
3162(a)(2)), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
A district court is not required to dismiss an indictment
with prejudice for every violation of the Speedy Trial Act. See
Taylor, 487 U.S. at 342. “[T]he decision whether to dismiss a
complaint under the Speedy Trial Act with or without prejudice is
entrusted to the sound discretion of the district judge and . . .
5 no preference is accorded to either kind of dismissal.” Melguizo,
824 F.2d at 371 (internal quotations omitted). Although not as
harsh a sanction as dismissal with prejudice, dismissal without
prejudice is meaningful because it, inter alia, forces the
Government to obtain a new indictment if it decides to reprosecute
as well as exposes the prosection to dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds. See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 342.
Although the district court failed to articulate its
reasons pursuant to the statute for dismissing Blevins’s indictment
without prejudice, neither party has commented on this point in its
brief. Without question, the district court should have
articulated its reasons for doing so:
Where, as here, Congress has declared that a decision will be governed by consideration of particular factors, a district court must carefully consider those factors as applied to the particular case and, whatever its decision, clearly articulate their effect in order to permit meaningful appellate review. Only then can an appellate court ascertain whether a district court has ignored or slighted a factor that Congress has deemed pertinent to the choice of remedy, thereby failing to act within the limits prescribed by Congress.
Taylor, 487 U.S. at 336-37. However, the fact that the district
court neglected to articulate its reasons for dismissal without
prejudice does not mandate that we remand to the district court
for it to do so. See United States v. Jones, 887 F.2d 492, 495
(4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081 (1990). Where, as
here, the record is sufficient for us to make a determination of
whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing
Blevins’s case without prejudice, we will “undertake more sub-
6 stantive scrutiny to ensure that the judgment is supported in terms
of the factors identified in the statute.” Taylor, 487 U.S. at
337; Jones, 887 F.2d at 495.
From this perspective, it is clear from the record that
the court properly opted to permit reprosecution in this case. The
offense for which Blevins was charged was a serious offense. After
using his position as a pharmacist illegally to obtain controlled
substances, he endangered the public by driving under the
influence. Moreover, he engaged in this criminal behavior while on
probation for another drug-related offense. The serious nature of
his offense coupled with his recidivism weighs in favor of
dismissal without prejudice. See United States v. Johnson, 29 F.3d
940, 946 (5th Cir. 1994).
Regarding the facts and circumstances leading to the
dismissal, we look to whether the Government sought the resultant
delays for ulterior purposes as well as whether the Government’s
failure to meet deadlines was repetitive, regular, and frequent
with respect to this defendant. See Melguizo, 824 F.2d at 371-72.
With respect to the delay between Blevins’s appearance in July 1996
and his filing the motion to dismiss on October 1, 1996, Blevins
has not disputed the Government’s contention that the case was
assigned the earliest trial date that the district court had
available. He has provided this court with no factual support for
his assertion that the delay was sought for ulterior purposes or
that the Government regularly or frequently failed to meet
7 deadlines in his case. He has failed to show that the
circumstances in his case weigh in favor of dismissal with
prejudice.
In evaluating the impact of a reprosecution on the
administration of the Speedy Trial Act and on the administration of
justice, we consider the defendant’s right to a timely trial; the
deterrent effect of a prejudicial dismissal on the Government’s
repeated violations of speedy trial requirements; and the public’s
interest in bringing Blevins to trial. See Johnson, 29 F.3d at
946. During the delay about which Blevins complains -- the period
between his second indictment on July 9, 1996 and the dismissal of
his case on October 18, 1996 -- Blevins filed nothing with the
district court until he sought dismissal of his indictment on
October 1, 1996. There is nothing in the record to indicate that
Blevins did anything to press his right to a speedy trial. See id.
(approving of a dismissal without prejudice for a defendant who,
although doing nothing actively to cause the delay, did not press
his right to a speedy trial). The record does not reflect that the
Government intentionally delayed the proceedings at any time; a
dismissal with prejudice for deterrent value would, therefore, be
inappropriate. The public has a great interest in bringing Blevins
to trial particularly in light of his illegal possession of
controlled substances despite his previous conviction.
CONCLUSION
8 The district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Blevins’s indictment without prejudice. We AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.