United States v. Bianca L. Tilly

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedJanuary 5, 2021
Docket19-13919
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Bianca L. Tilly (United States v. Bianca L. Tilly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Bianca L. Tilly, (11th Cir. 2021).

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 19-13919 Date Filed: 01/05/2021 Page: 1 of 9

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________

No. 19-13919 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________

D.C. Docket No. 6:18-cr-00091-CEM-DCI-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BIANCA L. TILLY,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________

(January 5, 2021)

Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. USCA11 Case: 19-13919 Date Filed: 01/05/2021 Page: 2 of 9

PER CURIAM:

Bianca Tilly appeals her 63–month sentence for conspiracy to possess a

controlled substance with intent to distribute. Tilly argues that the government

breached the plea agreement by failing to recommend to the district court that she

be granted safety-valve relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.

After careful review, we find that the government did not breach the plea agreement

and affirm.

On April 18, 2018, Tilly was charged by indictment with one count of

conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Tilly was granted pre-trial release, and

the terms of her release required GPS monitoring, home incarceration and ordered

her to not have any contact with the witnesses in her case. Later, a magistrate judge

modified the order and replaced her home-incarceration requirement with a curfew.

On June 25, 2018, Tilly pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement. That

plea agreement made clear that the government would “recommend to the Court that

it impose a sentence in accordance with the applicable guidelines without regard to

any statutory minimum sentence, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, if the Court finds

that the defendant meets the criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).” The plea

agreement also required Tilly to cooperate fully with the government in its

investigation and prosecution of other persons, in part by “voluntarily and

2 USCA11 Case: 19-13919 Date Filed: 01/05/2021 Page: 3 of 9

unreservedly disclos[ing] and provid[ing] full, complete, truthful, and honest

knowledge, information and cooperation regarding any of the matters herein.” The

agreement also explicitly prohibited her from “knowingly provid[ing] incomplete or

untruthful testimony, statements, or information.” In the event of a breach of these

requirements, the plea agreement made clear that the government reserved the right

to prosecute Tilly for perjury or obstruction of justice, and/or to seek the invalidation

of the plea agreement. And nothing in the plea agreement prohibited the government

from introducing relevant factual information about the charge at the sentencing

hearing.

On July 18, 2018, at her change-of-plea hearing, Tilly asked the district court

to allow her to remain at home pending sentencing due to complications she was

experiencing with her pregnancy. The government did not oppose the request. And

the district court, after formally adjudicating Tilly guilty, granted the request and

permitted her to remain on release pending sentencing.

On July 31, 2018, thirteen days after her change-of-plea hearing, the

government learned that Tilly had violated a condition her release by having contact

with Jose Quijada—her boyfriend at the time and one of her alleged co-conspirators

in the drug trafficking scheme. Specifically, on July 31, 2018, when agents went to

arrest Quijada at the house of an acquaintance where it was believed he was located,

Tilly was found in his presence. At the time, Tilly knew she was not permitted to

3 USCA11 Case: 19-13919 Date Filed: 01/05/2021 Page: 4 of 9

have any contact with Quijada as the terms of her supervised release prohibited her

from doing so. She had also been advised by the government that it was “actively

looking” for Quijada. On August 1, 2018, a warrant was issued for Tilly’s arrest.

But when agents went to arrest her, her GPS monitoring bracelet was found in the

street as Tilly had fled.

After about a year at large, on July 12, 2019, Tilly was recaptured. After her

arrest, the district court scheduled a sentencing hearing and ordered Tilly detained

prior to that hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the government opposed Tilly’s

request for safety-valve release. After hearing argument and testimony from

witnesses, the district court denied the request for safety-valve relief and sentenced

Tilly to sixty-three months in prison, followed by four years of supervised release.

Tilly timely filed this appeal.

On appeal, Tilly argues that the government breached the terms of her plea

agreement when it opposed her request for safety-valve relief at her sentencing

hearing because the government promised in the plea agreement not to oppose any

such request. “Whether the government has breached a plea agreement is a question

of law that this court reviews de novo.” United States v. Mahique, 150 F.3d 1330,

1332 (11th Cir. 1998).

The government is bound by the promises it makes in a plea agreement. See,

e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Horsfall,

4 USCA11 Case: 19-13919 Date Filed: 01/05/2021 Page: 5 of 9

552 F.3d 1275, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The government is bound by any material

promises it makes to a defendant as part of a plea agreement that induces the

defendant to plead guilty.”). In construing the scope of the government’s promises,

we look to the plain meaning of the plea agreement’s terms. See United States v.

Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1105–06 (11th Cir. 2004). We reject “hyper-technical

reading[s] of the written agreement” and “rigidly literal approach[es] in the

construction of the language.” United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th

Cir. 1990).

The only clause of Tilly’s plea agreement at issue in this case is the provision

calling for safety-valve relief. That paragraph reads as follows:

9. Safety Valve Provision

The United States will recommend to the Court that it impose a sentence in accordance with the applicable guidelines without regard to any statutory minimum sentence, pursuant to [U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2], if the Court finds that the defendant meets the criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The defendant understands that this recommendation or request is not binding on the Court, and if not accepted by the Court, the defendant will not be allowed to withdraw from the plea.

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Related

United States v. Cruz
106 F.3d 1553 (Eleventh Circuit, 1997)
United States v. Mahique
150 F.3d 1330 (Eleventh Circuit, 1998)
United States v. Figueroa
199 F.3d 1281 (Eleventh Circuit, 2000)
United States v. Jerome Wayne Johnson
375 F.3d 1300 (Eleventh Circuit, 2004)
United States v. William Copeland
381 F.3d 1101 (Eleventh Circuit, 2004)
United States v. Horsfall
552 F.3d 1275 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
Santobello v. New York
404 U.S. 257 (Supreme Court, 1971)
United States v. Lawrence J. Block
660 F.2d 1086 (Fifth Circuit, 1981)
Murray Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc.
667 F.2d 33 (Eleventh Circuit, 1982)
United States v. Jimmy Lee Jefferies, Betty J. Jefferies
908 F.2d 1520 (Eleventh Circuit, 1990)

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United States v. Bianca L. Tilly, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-bianca-l-tilly-ca11-2021.