United States v. Bernard

18 C.C.P.A. 68, 1930 CCPA LEXIS 55
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedApril 29, 1930
DocketNo. 3271
StatusPublished

This text of 18 C.C.P.A. 68 (United States v. Bernard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Bernard, 18 C.C.P.A. 68, 1930 CCPA LEXIS 55 (ccpa 1930).

Opinion

Lenroot, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal by the United States from the judgment of the United States Customs Court holding certain merchandise dutiable as claimed by the importer, and overruling the classification and assessment made by the United States collector of customs under the Tariff Act of 1922.

The merchandise involved appears to be commonly known as straw plateaux. It is so referred to by the collector in his report, and by the witnesses and attorneys in the court below. It consists of circular forms, almost flat, measuring 22 inches in diameter and composed of straw, not bleached, dyed, colored, or stained.

The collector in his report stated:

The merchandise is straw plateaux, assessed for duty at 35 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 1406, tariff act of 1922, as partly manufactured straw hats, not blocked or trimmed.

The importer, appellee herein, in its protest claimed the merchandise to be dutiable at 15 per centum or 20 per centum under the first part of paragraph 1406.

The court -below held the merchandise dutiable as claimed at 15 per centum ad valorem under the provision in said paragraph 1406 for “braids, plaits, laces, and willow sheets or squares, composed wholly or in chief value of straw * * * suitable for making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, or hoods, not bleached, dyed, colored, or stained * *

Said paragraph 1406 reads as follows, the pertinent portions involved being italicized:

Par. 1406. Braids, plaits, laces, and willow sheets or squares, composed wholly or in chief value of straw, chip, grass, palm leaf, willow, osier, rattan, real horsehair, cuba bark, or manila hemp, suitable for making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, or hoods, not bleached, dyed, colored, or stained, 15 per centum ad valorem; bleached, dyed, colored, or stained, 20 per centum ad valorem; hats, bonnets, and hoods composed wholly or in chief value of any of the foregoing materials, whether wholly or partly manufactured, but not blocked or trimmed, SB per centum ad valorem; blocked or trimmed, 50 per centum ad valorem; straw hats known as harvest hats, valued at less than $3 per dozen, 25 per centum ad valorem; [70]*70all other hats, composed wholly or in chief value of any of the foregoing materials, whether wholly or partly manufactured, not blocked or blocked, not trimmed or trimmed, if sewed, 60 per centum ad valorem. But the terms “grass” and “straw” shall be understood to mean these substances in their natural form and structure, and not the separated fiber thereof.

The case was first submitted to the lower court upon testimony-introduced by appellee, the Government offering no evidence, and the court rendered a decision in favor of appellee. A motion for rehearing was granted, and the Government then introduced the testimony of four witnesses. The final decision of the court affirmed its prior decision in the case.

The lower court held that the merchandise in question is not suitable to be blocked into hats, and the first question to be determined is whether such finding is clearly against the weight of the evidence.

J. 0. Beckman, Max A. Whitman, and Floyd Pfautch, witnesses for appellee, testified that the merchandise in question could not be blocked into hats, and gave reasons why it could not, in their opinion, be so blocked.

Henry T. Whitton, Winfield J. MacKallor, and George Miller, witnesses for the Government, testified that the merchandise could be blocked into hats, and that they had seen it done. John J. Moran, a witness for the Government, testified as follows upon direct examination :

Q. Did your concern manufacture anything from merchandise like illustrative Exhibit C? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. You say you have manufactured? — A. Very few.
Q. That is jusl the point, how extensively? — A. Not very extensively, because it was not practical from a fine hat standpoint. [Italics not quoted.]

Upon cross-examination the witness explained the foregoing answer as follows:

You see, on the block hat we had to use one plateau for a crown and there was .considerable waste from that crown. We also had to use one plateau for a brim and had to cut out the center of the crown and had to cut off the edge. We had to use the edge, iron it out and use it up as an extension on felt hats or other body materials.

Judging the matter from the testimony of the witnesses alone, we would be inclined to hold that the finding of the lower court that the merchandise was not suitable to be blocked into hats was not contrary to the evidence, but in coming to the conclusion that it did we think the court must have overlooked the sample of the merchandise introduced in evidence by the appellee.

We have that sample before us, and from its inspection we think it sustains the testimony of the witnesses for the Government that the merchandise is suitable to be blocked into hats.

[71]*71The oral testimony is to the effect that the plateaux, as imported, are flat; but the sample discloses that in fact they are somewhat convex in form, and evidently designed by the manufacturers to be blocked into hats. Appellant in its brief contends that the sample before us has become warped and creased from packing during its five and a half years as an exhibit, and urges that the testimony of the importer stands uncontradicted that the merchandise when imported was absolutely flat. While it is true that the sample has to a large degree evidently lost its original shape, it is also a fact that it discloses that it is so constructed that it never could lie absolutely flat, but was in its manufacture so made as to give it a convex form, at least two inches higher in the center than at its outer edge.

In the case of United States v. May Department Stores Co., 16 Ct. Cust. Appls. 353, T. D. 43090, this court, speaking through Judge Bland, said:

In classification eases like the one at bar the sample is ofttimes a very potent witness.

This observation is applicable to the case at bar, and properly weighed and considered leads to the conclusion that the lower court was in error in holding that the merchandise herein involved was not suitable to be blocked into hats.

The lower court in its opinion, referring to the testimony of the Government’s witnesses, said:

Part of the testimony of these witnesses tended to show that the merchandise in question could be used for making or blocking entire hats, but that in fact the general use to which the merchandise was put was as material for making hats. One of the Government witnesses testified that his firm had manufactured a very jew hats from merchandise like that in this case, but not very extensively, because it was not practical from a fine-hat standpoint,” * * *.

This finding of the lower court from the testimony of the Government’s witnesses was clearly not warranted.

Henry T. Whitton, a witness for the Government, testified as follows:

Q. Have you ever seen this commodity, this article illustrative Exhibit C, used for any purpose? — A. Part for making hats. They have made hats of it, I know that.
Q.

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Related

Schiff v. United States
2 Ct. Cust. 89 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1911)
United States v. May Department Stores Co.
16 Ct. Cust. 353 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1928)

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Bluebook (online)
18 C.C.P.A. 68, 1930 CCPA LEXIS 55, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-bernard-ccpa-1930.