United States v. Berman

75 F. Supp. 789, 36 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1314, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1816
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedNovember 26, 1947
DocketCrim. A. No. 17417
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 75 F. Supp. 789 (United States v. Berman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Berman, 75 F. Supp. 789, 36 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1314, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1816 (N.D. Ga. 1947).

Opinion

UNDERWOOD, District Judge.

The above case came on for hearing upon the renewed motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial, was heard, and briefs subsequently submitted. -

The indictment charges fraudulent evasion of income taxes for three years, 1938, 1939 and 1940.

The deficiency alleged in the first count for the year 1938 was $1128.09; that in the second count for the year 1939, $6176.-50; and that in the third count for the year 1940, $1558.57.

In each instance the deficiency for the most part appears in items shown upon the Government’s computation as dividends and rents, and these items in turn were made up from what the Government alleges are the personal accounts of Mr. Berman, but which, as a matter of fact, are accounts appearing on the books of the Georgia Motor Express, Inc., under the headings: “Jack Berman, President and General Manager”, and “Service Stages for Jack Berman”.

These accounts were not solely personal accounts, but seem to have been mere dumping grounds inexpertly used by the bookkeeper to place both items which were personal to defendant and also those which should properly have been entered as corporate items. Record, Vol. 7, pp. 39, 40.

The Government took the position that all 'items on these accounts were properly charged to income where defendant could not give a satisfactory explanation. In other words, placing the burden upon the' defendant of proving that they were not income although in a criminal case the Government is required to prove beyond a reásonable doubt that they constituted taxable income and that the failure to return same was willful.

These accounts are made up of a great number of items ranging from a few cents to several thousand dollars.

The items charged against defendant as income by the Government are taken from these accounts, but defendant was never furnished with any breakdown of the accounts showing the particular items which the Government claimed constituted personal items, but merely alleged total sums as deficiencies in the indictment.

Defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars but this was unhappily denied by the Court, resulting in a situation where defendant was called into court without opportunity of knowing in advance what particular items he would have to challenge as being personal income.

These accounts, however, were gone into item by item at the trial, many of which defendant satisfactorily explained, others admitted, and still others as to which he could only answer that he could not remember and explain because the transactions took place many years ago.

The Government Examiner, who made the audit upon which the indictment is founded, testified that this was the method he used and that he based his computations,, not on personal knowledge, but only upon inspection of the books, checks, and information received orally from employees in the nature of hearsay and not traced back to the original source.

He testified further that he relied upon his own personal judgment in determining-whether to charge an item to income of' defendant or to corporate expense (Record,. Vol. 9, pp. 11, 17; Vol. 10, p. 74), and that he would charge an item to income if it was credited on the account to defendant whether rightly or wrongly and whether actually received by him or not (Record, Vol. 8, pp. 15, 16, 35, 58, 59), and this, without proof that the financial condition, of the corporation made the amount available to defendant.

The evidence showed that the two corporations were in continuous financial difficulty and that defendant had made large-loans, still unpaid, .to them, and had never received even the amounts of salary he-returned as income, unless the mere bookkeeping entries of credits be correct and. properly chargeable as income.

Books of account “are no more-than evidential, being neither indispensable-nor conclusive. The decision must rest upon the actual facts.” Doyle v. Mitchell, Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 187, 38 S.Ct. 467, 470, 62 L.Ed. 1054. “The taxpayer therefore, is under no obligation to pay a tax. [791]*791on income he might never receive. North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 52 S.Ct. 613, 76 L.Ed. 1197. A strained construction in administrative efforts to accrue income should be avoided.” Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Edwards Drilling Co., 5 Cir., 95 F.2d 719, 720. See also, Farrell v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 134 F.2d 193, 194. North

The several counts of the indictment will be considered separately in the light of the facts and the authorities quoted above.

Count One.

With respect to Count One, the account as set up in the indictment and as stated in defendant’s tax return, is as follows:

Indictment:

Salaries $ 6,700.00

Dividends 10,141.97

Partnership 362.79

Rents 1,481.54

Short Term Capital Gain 851.66

Long Term Capital Loss (878.51)

$18,659.44

Less: Contributions $360.00

Interest 56.74 416.74

$18,242.70

Tax: $1,255.75.

Tax Return:

Salaries $ 7,062.79

Rents 495.00

$ 7,557.79

Less: Contributions 360.00

$7,197.79

tax: $127.66 =

It will be seen that, if the items of Salaries and Partnership in the indictment statement be compared with defendant’s return of salary, there is no difference. The credit for contributions is the same in both. Defendant failed to return short-term capital gain and short-term capital loss, claiming, as the evidence seems to establish, that they were Company transactions, but even if his, these items can-celled each other out except to the extent that the loss was greater than the gain in the sum of $26.86. It also appears that defendant failed to return an item of $56.-74, but it is a question as to whether or not this is a corporate expense, and this fact alone would hardly show criminal intent.

This leaves only two items of importance. Defendant returned rents of $495.00, as received, while the Government charges that this item should have been $1481.54. Defendant’s return did not show any dividends received, while the Government charges an item of this nature in the sum of $10,141.97. The merits of the case on Count One hinge on these two items.

Defendant contends that his return of $495.00 rent was correct and that the difference between his return and the indictment statement is due to the improper charge to him of $986.54 which represented rent due to his wife for rental of her property in Anniston, Alabama, which was used by the Georgia Motor Express, Inc., as a terminal. No competent evidence was adduced to show this to be untrue or that the difference should be properly charged against defendant as income.

This leaves for consideration only the item of dividends.

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Bluebook (online)
75 F. Supp. 789, 36 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1314, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1816, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-berman-gand-1947.