United States v. Bennett

Third Circuit

United States v. Bennett

65 F. App'x 396

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit

DecidedApril 16, 2003

Docket01-1625

StatusUnpublished

This text of 65 F. App'x 396 (United States v. Bennett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Bennett, 65 F. App'x 396 (3d Cir. 2003).

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Opinion

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge.

The defendant below, Wali Bennett, was indicted for possession with the intent to distribute some 16 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The cocaine had been seized from Bennett by Drug Enforcement Agents (DEA) after Bennett traveled to Philadelphia from New York by train. Bennett moved to suppress the seized cocaine; the District Court judge denied the motion. Bennett pled guilty to the single count in the indictment and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment.

Bennett appealed, and his counsel filed an appellate brief pursuant to Anders v. *397 California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). His counsel was unable to identify any non-frivolous issues to support Bennett’s appeal and moved to withdraw. As required by Anders, counsel pointed out the issues and portions of the record that might arguably support an appeal. Bennett was given notice of his attorney’s desire to withdraw, as required by Anders, so that Bennett could raise any issues for appeal in a pro se brief. Bennett failed to do so. We have reviewed the record and agree that there are no non-frivolous issues to appeal.

Bennett’s counsel addressed whether Bennett could base an appeal on the District Court’s denial of Bennett’s motion to suppress physical evidence, and counsel determined that this claim would be frivolous. We agree. Bennett did not preserve his right to challenge the pretrial suppression ruling and has waived the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Bentz, 21 F.3d 37, 38 (3d Cir.1994) (only a defendant entering into a conditional plea may appeal preserved issues). Additionally, we agree with the District Court that, in view of the totality of the circumstances, Bennett was not subject to a Fourth Amendment seizure. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). Further, the District Court found that the agents had reasonable suspicion to seize Bennett for the purposes of a Terry investigative stop based on their observations of Bennett’s behavior. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Finally, the record demonstrates that Bennett voluntarily consented to the agents’ search of his bags.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court and grant counsel’s request to withdraw.

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OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge.

The defendant below, Wali Bennett, was indicted for possession with the intent to distribute some 16 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The cocaine had been seized from Bennett by Drug Enforcement Agents (DEA) after Bennett traveled to Philadelphia from New York by train. Bennett moved to suppress the seized cocaine; the District Court judge denied the motion. Bennett pled guilty to the single count in the indictment and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment.

Bennett appealed, and his counsel filed an appellate brief pursuant to Anders v. *397 California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). His counsel was unable to identify any non-frivolous issues to support Bennett’s appeal and moved to withdraw. As required by Anders, counsel pointed out the issues and portions of the record that might arguably support an appeal. Bennett was given notice of his attorney’s desire to withdraw, as required by Anders, so that Bennett could raise any issues for appeal in a pro se brief. Bennett failed to do so. We have reviewed the record and agree that there are no non-frivolous issues to appeal.

Bennett’s counsel addressed whether Bennett could base an appeal on the District Court’s denial of Bennett’s motion to suppress physical evidence, and counsel determined that this claim would be frivolous. We agree. Bennett did not preserve his right to challenge the pretrial suppression ruling and has waived the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Bentz, 21 F.3d 37, 38 (3d Cir.1994) (only a defendant entering into a conditional plea may appeal preserved issues). Additionally, we agree with the District Court that, in view of the totality of the circumstances, Bennett was not subject to a Fourth Amendment seizure. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). Further, the District Court found that the agents had reasonable suspicion to seize Bennett for the purposes of a Terry investigative stop based on their observations of Bennett’s behavior. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Finally, the record demonstrates that Bennett voluntarily consented to the agents’ search of his bags.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court and grant counsel’s request to withdraw.

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65 F. App'x 396, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-bennett-ca3-2003.

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