USCA4 Appeal: 23-4562 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/11/2025 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4562
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BENJAMIN LAWTON, a/k/a Rico,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, Senior District Judge. (1:22-cr-00097-RDB-1)
Submitted: March 21, 2025 Decided: April 11, 2025
Before AGEE, WYNN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part, vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Gerald C. Ruter, LAW OFFICES OF GERALD C. RUTER, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Colleen Elizabeth McGuinn, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4562 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/11/2025 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Benjamin Lawton seeks to appeal the district court’s judgment after pleading guilty
to sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1),
(b)(1). On appeal, Lawton’s attorney has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), concluding that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether Lawton knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his
conviction and sentence. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal as barred by
Lawton’s appeal waiver. Lawton was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief but has not done so. We grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in part, deny the
motion in part, vacate the district court’s judgment, and remand for resentencing.
“We have consistently held that appellate waivers in valid plea agreements are
enforceable.” United States v. Soloff, 993 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2021). “Plea agreements
are grounded in contract law, and as with any contract, each party is entitled to receive the
benefit of his bargain.” United States v. Edgell, 914 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted). But, there is “a ‘narrow class of claims that we have allowed a
defendant to raise on direct appeal despite a general waiver of appellate rights.’” United
States v. Moran, 70 F.4th 797, 802 n.3 (4th Cir. 2023).
“For example, [n]o appeal waiver . . . can bar a defendant’s right to challenge his
sentence as outside a statutorily prescribed maximum or based on a constitutionally
impermissible factor such as race.” United States v. Toebbe, 85 F.4th 190, 202 (4th Cir.
2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In such circumstances, we have explained, ‘the
errors allegedly committed by the district courts were errors that the defendants could not
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4562 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/11/2025 Pg: 3 of 5
have reasonably contemplated when the plea agreements were executed.’” Id. Moreover,
“the existence of such a waiver does not bar our review of the validity of the guilty plea
and plea waiver.” United States v. Taylor-Sanders, 88 F.4th 516, 522 (4th Cir. 2023).
We review the validity and effect of an appeal waiver de novo. United States v.
Lubkin, 122 F.4th 522, 526 (4th Cir. 2024). “Where ‘there is no claim that the United
States breached its obligations under the plea agreement,’ we enforce an appeal waiver if
the record shows (1) ‘that the waiver is valid’ and (2) ‘that the issue being appealed is
within the scope of the waiver.’” Id. “An appeal waiver is valid ‘if the defendant’s
agreement to the waiver was knowing and intelligent.’” Id. “We look at the ‘totality of
the circumstances,’ including the clarity of the waiver’s text and ‘whether the district court
sufficiently explained the waiver’ at the defendant’s ‘plea colloquy.’” Id.
While the district court’s explanation is an important factor, its “failure to strictly
abide by Rule 11 will not alone render an appellate waiver unenforceable,” United States
v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 637 (4th Cir. 2010), “because the question must be evaluated
by reference to the totality of the circumstances, including the ‘experience and conduct of
the accused,’ as well as the accused’s educational background and familiarity with the
terms of the plea agreement,” United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002).
“We use traditional principles of contract law to determine whether an issue falls within
the scope of a valid waiver.” United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2023).
Upon our review of the record, we conclude that Lawton’s appeal waiver is valid
under the totality of the circumstances. In his plea agreement, Lawton waived the right to
appeal his “conviction on any ground whatsoever” and “whatever sentence is imposed.”
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4562 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/11/2025 Pg: 4 of 5
The district court confirmed that Lawton, who had attended three years of college, had read
the plea agreement and discussed it with counsel; and the court also ensured he understood
that he was waiving his right to appeal. Moreover, although the waiver does not bar our
review of its validity, we conclude that this appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, to
the extent Lawton seeks to challenge his conviction or the sentence that was imposed.
But, pursuant to Anders, we have also reviewed the record for any meritorious issues
falling outside of the waiver, and we have found one such issue. “In Rogers, we held that
district courts must announce all discretionary conditions of supervised release at a
defendant’s sentencing hearing.” United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185, 191 (4th Cir. 2022)
(citing United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2020)). “Discretionary
conditions that appear for the first time in a subsequent written judgment, we held, are
nullities; the defendant has not been sentenced to those conditions, and a remand for
resentencing is required.” United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2021).
“‘[A] district court may satisfy its obligation to orally pronounce discretionary
conditions through incorporation’ by ‘expressly incorporating a written list of proposed
conditions.’” United States v. Bullis, 122 F.4th 107, 118 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Rogers,
961 F.3d at 299). But, “an adoption of proposed conditions of supervised release by a
sentencing court—such as recommendations of such conditions set forth in the defendant’s
PSR—requires those conditions to be expressly incorporated.” United States v.
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USCA4 Appeal: 23-4562 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/11/2025 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4562
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BENJAMIN LAWTON, a/k/a Rico,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, Senior District Judge. (1:22-cr-00097-RDB-1)
Submitted: March 21, 2025 Decided: April 11, 2025
Before AGEE, WYNN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part, vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Gerald C. Ruter, LAW OFFICES OF GERALD C. RUTER, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Colleen Elizabeth McGuinn, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4562 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/11/2025 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Benjamin Lawton seeks to appeal the district court’s judgment after pleading guilty
to sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1),
(b)(1). On appeal, Lawton’s attorney has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), concluding that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether Lawton knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his
conviction and sentence. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal as barred by
Lawton’s appeal waiver. Lawton was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief but has not done so. We grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in part, deny the
motion in part, vacate the district court’s judgment, and remand for resentencing.
“We have consistently held that appellate waivers in valid plea agreements are
enforceable.” United States v. Soloff, 993 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2021). “Plea agreements
are grounded in contract law, and as with any contract, each party is entitled to receive the
benefit of his bargain.” United States v. Edgell, 914 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted). But, there is “a ‘narrow class of claims that we have allowed a
defendant to raise on direct appeal despite a general waiver of appellate rights.’” United
States v. Moran, 70 F.4th 797, 802 n.3 (4th Cir. 2023).
“For example, [n]o appeal waiver . . . can bar a defendant’s right to challenge his
sentence as outside a statutorily prescribed maximum or based on a constitutionally
impermissible factor such as race.” United States v. Toebbe, 85 F.4th 190, 202 (4th Cir.
2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In such circumstances, we have explained, ‘the
errors allegedly committed by the district courts were errors that the defendants could not
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4562 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/11/2025 Pg: 3 of 5
have reasonably contemplated when the plea agreements were executed.’” Id. Moreover,
“the existence of such a waiver does not bar our review of the validity of the guilty plea
and plea waiver.” United States v. Taylor-Sanders, 88 F.4th 516, 522 (4th Cir. 2023).
We review the validity and effect of an appeal waiver de novo. United States v.
Lubkin, 122 F.4th 522, 526 (4th Cir. 2024). “Where ‘there is no claim that the United
States breached its obligations under the plea agreement,’ we enforce an appeal waiver if
the record shows (1) ‘that the waiver is valid’ and (2) ‘that the issue being appealed is
within the scope of the waiver.’” Id. “An appeal waiver is valid ‘if the defendant’s
agreement to the waiver was knowing and intelligent.’” Id. “We look at the ‘totality of
the circumstances,’ including the clarity of the waiver’s text and ‘whether the district court
sufficiently explained the waiver’ at the defendant’s ‘plea colloquy.’” Id.
While the district court’s explanation is an important factor, its “failure to strictly
abide by Rule 11 will not alone render an appellate waiver unenforceable,” United States
v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 637 (4th Cir. 2010), “because the question must be evaluated
by reference to the totality of the circumstances, including the ‘experience and conduct of
the accused,’ as well as the accused’s educational background and familiarity with the
terms of the plea agreement,” United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002).
“We use traditional principles of contract law to determine whether an issue falls within
the scope of a valid waiver.” United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2023).
Upon our review of the record, we conclude that Lawton’s appeal waiver is valid
under the totality of the circumstances. In his plea agreement, Lawton waived the right to
appeal his “conviction on any ground whatsoever” and “whatever sentence is imposed.”
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4562 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/11/2025 Pg: 4 of 5
The district court confirmed that Lawton, who had attended three years of college, had read
the plea agreement and discussed it with counsel; and the court also ensured he understood
that he was waiving his right to appeal. Moreover, although the waiver does not bar our
review of its validity, we conclude that this appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, to
the extent Lawton seeks to challenge his conviction or the sentence that was imposed.
But, pursuant to Anders, we have also reviewed the record for any meritorious issues
falling outside of the waiver, and we have found one such issue. “In Rogers, we held that
district courts must announce all discretionary conditions of supervised release at a
defendant’s sentencing hearing.” United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185, 191 (4th Cir. 2022)
(citing United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2020)). “Discretionary
conditions that appear for the first time in a subsequent written judgment, we held, are
nullities; the defendant has not been sentenced to those conditions, and a remand for
resentencing is required.” United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2021).
“‘[A] district court may satisfy its obligation to orally pronounce discretionary
conditions through incorporation’ by ‘expressly incorporating a written list of proposed
conditions.’” United States v. Bullis, 122 F.4th 107, 118 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Rogers,
961 F.3d at 299). But, “an adoption of proposed conditions of supervised release by a
sentencing court—such as recommendations of such conditions set forth in the defendant’s
PSR—requires those conditions to be expressly incorporated.” United States v. Smith, 117
F.4th 584, 606 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Alcorn v. United States, No. 24-6466,
__ S. Ct. __, 2025 WL 746366 (Mar. 10, 2025). This “Court in Cisson rejected the
proposition that a probation officer’s foreshadowing of a defendant’s sentence can relieve
4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4562 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/11/2025 Pg: 5 of 5
the sentencing court of its obligation to pronounce in open court all discretionary terms of
supervised release.” Id. (citing Cisson, 33 F.4th at 193). When we determine that the
district court erred under Rogers, “we have only one option—vacate and remand for a full
resentencing.” United States v. Mathis, 103 F.4th 193, 200 (4th Cir. 2024).
Here, we conclude that the district court erred under Rogers by including in the
written judgment a special condition of supervised release requiring Lawton’s participation
in a mental health treatment program without orally announcing the condition at sentencing
or expressly incorporating the special conditions proposed by the probation officer in the
presentence report. Because this issue falls outside the scope of Lawton’s appeal waiver,
see Singletary, 984 F.3d at 345, we must vacate and remand for resentencing.
Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal in part, deny
the motion in part, vacate the district court’s judgment, and remand for resentencing. This
court requires that counsel inform Lawton, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Lawton requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
thereof was served on Lawton. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART