United States v. Baxter

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided June 16, 2026·No. 25-1056·Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 25-1056 UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

PATRICK BAXTER,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Allison D. Burroughs, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Thompson, and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

Michael Pabian for appellant.

Alexia R. De Vincentis, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Leah B. Foley, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

June 8, 2026

GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Patrick Baxter ("Baxter") appeals from his jury convictions for receipt, possession, and production of child pornography. He challenges the denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for production of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), the constitutionality of that same statute as applied to him, the admission of certain testimonial evidence, and the enhancements applied to his sentence. For the reasons that follow, we reject his claims and affirm his conviction and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

"With respect to suppression, our account gives credence to the facts supportably found by the district court." United States v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2020). Regarding the sufficiency challenge, we recite "the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict." United States v. Buoi, 84 F.4th 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Paz-Alvarez, 799 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2015)). Lastly, when reviewing the challenges of sentencing error, "we take the facts from the trial record, the undisputed portions of the presentence investigation report, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing." United States v. Brown, 26 F.4th 48, 53 n.1 (1st Cir. 2022). We begin by summarizing the

relevant facts, adding more detail as needed throughout our discussion.

On October 29, 2021, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) applied for a warrant to search Baxter's residence in Melrose, Massachusetts, for evidence of illegal possession and receipt of child pornography. The FBI attached an affidavit from Special Agent Bryce Montoya ("S.A. Montoya") that described the basis for probable cause.

In the affidavit, S.A. Montoya explained that the FBI monitored "Freenet," which is "an Internet-based peer-to-peer (P2P) network that allows users to anonymously share files," and gathered information revealing that a user sent requests for child pornography from an IP address that was later identified as Baxter's. Because the showing of probable cause relied on information derived from Freenet, he described the network's mechanics and the investigative techniques used by the FBI. We reiterate that explication here.

Freenet users agree to provide the network with a portion of storage space on their hard drives. When a user uploads a file onto Freenet, the software breaks it into pieces and encrypts each piece. These pieces are then randomly distributed and stored throughout the network of peers. The software generates an index listing all the file's pieces as well as a unique key -- consisting of letters, numbers, and special characters -- that can be used to

download the file. Freenet users share these keys on online platforms, such as message boards or websites.

Once a user obtains a key, to download a file, a user must input the key into Freenet. If the correct key is entered, Freenet requests the individual pieces of the file from that user's peers. If one of those peers does not have those pieces in its storage, that peer will "divide up and ask its peers for the pieces, and so on." This means, for example, that:

if User "A" has 10 peers and requests 1000 pieces of a file, roughly 100 pieces are requested from each one of User A's peers[. . . .]If Peer "B" receives User A's request for 100 pieces of the file, but does not have any of those pieces in its storage, Peer B forwards on the request for those pieces to Peer B's peers. If Peer B has 10 peers of its own, roughly 10 pieces are requested from each one of Peer B's peers.

For its investigative purposes, law enforcement uses a modified version of Freenet that allows it, once it has inserted itself in the Freenet universe, to view information about requests for file pieces, including the number of peers those peers report to have, and the remaining number of times a request for a piece may be forwarded. And although the Freenet software "attempts to hide the identity of [a file] requestor," a Freenet user's IP address is visible to other users when they request a file or relay another's request. Thus, regardless of whether a law enforcement officer employs its modified version of Freenet or uses the normal,

publicly-available version, the officer can view a requestor's IP address.

Law enforcement investigates Freenet users who request file pieces that it suspects to be associated with child pornography files. When a peer sends a request to a law enforcement computer, officers apply a mathematical formula that allows them to "determine the probability of whether the number of requests received for pieces of a file is significantly more than one would expect if the peer were merely forwarding the request of another" user. The methodology relies on the following premise: "Because a peer that is merely routing another peer's request would ask its peers for a significantly smaller portion of the pieces of a file than an original requester," the request recipient can determine whether a request "is significantly more likely than not from an original requestor."

After explaining Freenet's mechanics and the FBI's investigative techniques, S.A. Montoya stated that he reviewed information gathered from a Freenet user's requests for pieces of child pornography files from a law enforcement computer. S.A. Montoya analyzed the number of requested file pieces, the total number of file pieces required to assemble the files, and the number of peers the user had. He then concluded that the Freenet user was the original requestor of three child pornography files.

To reveal the subscriber information for the IP address attached to the request, law enforcement subpoenaed its servicer. The subpoenaed information revealed that the IP address was associated with Baxter's home address.

The warrant to search Baxter's home issued on October 29, 2021. Investigators executed the search warrant on November 2, 2021, and seized eight electronic devices, including an Apple MacBook laptop computer and a Samsung solid state drive ("SSD"). Agents conducted an on-site search of the MacBook and found no child pornography on that device. The SSD, however, was encrypted and required the expertise of a specialized FBI unit to determine the password. After gaining access, the agents found two profiles on the SSD: "Baxter" and "Backup" (the "Backup account"). The email associated with the Backup account was "pwbaxter@gmail.com," which matched the Apple ID on Baxter's cell phone.

The Backup account contained internet search history related to Freenet and the AliExpress Flying Train Store ("AliExpress"), listed Freenet as a favorited bookmark within Safari, and contained hundreds of messages from Freenet's messaging board system, where users can share the keys needed to download child pornography files. It also included a "Freenet" folder and, within that, a "downloads" subfolder with over ninety child pornography files. An additional 420 child pornography

videos were stored in folders with titles such as "PTHC" (a known acronym for "preteen hardcore"); "PTSC" (a known acronym for "preteen softcore"); and "spy cams."

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