United States v. Batt

59 F. Supp. 619, 33 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1086, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2415
CourtDistrict Court, D. Idaho
DecidedMarch 15, 1945
DocketNo. 2266
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 59 F. Supp. 619 (United States v. Batt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Batt, 59 F. Supp. 619, 33 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1086, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2415 (D. Idaho 1945).

Opinion

CAVANAH, District Judge.

The nature of the suit is one wherein the United States seeks to recover the sum of $571.33 as an excise tax for the calendar year 1938, with respect to individuals in the defendant’s employ, under Title 9 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1109 as then existed.

The defendant answers and alleges that the employment and services, for which wages were paid, were exempt under the Act from the tax imposed, in that the services were “Agricultural Labor”.

The facts are stipulated, and the crucial question to be considered is: Does the Act and the facts recognize the interpretation that the services rendered come under the exempt provisions of the Act, and in determining this issue the particular facts of each case must be considered, in order to ascertain what was the intention of Congress in exempting from the operation of the Act “Agricultural Labor”.

The plaintiff contends that the services rendered were of a commercial character, [620]*620in the field of industry, and not true “Agricultural Labor”, while the defendant asserts that the term “Agricultural Labor” must be given a meaning wide enough to include agricultural labor of any kind, as generally understood throughout the United States, in connection with the cultivation of the soil, raising and harvesting crops, including to a variable extent the preparation of the products for consumption, which “processing” is necessary for disposal, by marketing or otherwise.

What then is a fair analysis of the facts here? It requires a consideration of the nature of the activities of defendant, who was a farmer owning, or operating as a tenant, between eight and nine hundred acres of farm land, near Homedale, and Wilder, Idaho, upon which he raised potatoes, onions, lettuce, carrots, peas, and other farm products. He also operated, seasonally, two “processing” sheds, one at Homedale and one at Wilder, located at trackage thereat, and off his farm land. At such sheds he employed labor, during seasons, in “processing” potatoes, onions, lettuce, carrots and peas, raised upon his farms, and other farm producers of similar produce employed him; and his crew, to “process”, grade, pack and prepare for market, their produce, and paid for that service.

The individuals, upon whose wages the excise tax is claimed, the contributions made, were employed in processing, grading, packing and preparing for market operations. Approximately 25% of the produce so “processed”, graded, packed and prepared for market, was raised and owned by the defendant, and 75% thereof was raised and owned by various farmers, who employed defendant and such labor.

It appears necessary, by reason of Federal and State statutes, and the requirements of the purchasers of produce, to make such produce salable, that each thereof be processed, graded, packed and prepared for market in the manner herein referred to. None of the produce, so handled and processed by the defendant, was sold directly to the ultimate consumer, as he sold all marketable processed produce to track buyers, F. O. B. cars at the packing sheds, who thereupon shipped the same out of the state. Some were sold to jobbers, usually on wire orders received through brokers, and shipped to all parts of the United States, where such jobbers broke up carload lots into smaller lots, and resold to •wholesale or retail distributors, and through them to the ultimate consumers; the remainder was sold to what is known as car-lot distributors or jobbers, who did not sell to the ultimate consumers. Such produce was not salable, and there was no market for it, without having been so processed, graded, packed and prepared for market, and was not salable in bulk to the ultimate consumers in the condition in which it was in the field, and the United States Government would not purchase the produce, for distribution on relief, unless it was processed.

The equipment employed in the operations was not specialized, but was available generally to farmers, and used on the farms where the produce was produced, and many farmers conducted the operation of processing, packing and grading, etc., on their own premises, in which event the farmers were not charged, and did not pay, contributions on account of the employees engaged therein.

In the section of Idaho, from Twin Falls east to the vicinity of Idaho Falls, Idaho, in respect to potatoes, it was the common practice for the farmers of large acreage to have potato cellars, either on their own premises or elsewhere, and to employ crews of men, who made it their business to go from farm to farm, or cellar to cellar, and use their own equipment, conduct the operations, and receive their compensation from the farmers, upon which compensation no contribution was or need be paid.

In respect to peas, the largest dealers in Idaho grew their own peas, on owned or leased land, and processed their own produce, the processing taking place off such land, in warehouses or sheds available to the tracks, performing the same operation as the defendant, but were not required to and did not pay any contribution with respect to employees engaged in such operations.

Aside from the produce raised by the defendant, the balance of such produce processed was that which the defendant purchased from the farmer-grower and found to be marketable after sorting and grading. The farmers delivered the produce at defendant’s sheds, or warehouses, in half bags, as taken by them directly from the field, to enable the defendant and the farmers to determine the part to be purchased and prepared for market. As to potatoes, after they were processed, graded, packed and prepared for market, on consignment, and after the sale, the defendant, in case the farmer delivered the potatoes [621]*621from the field, deducted the expenses from the sale price, including the charge for processing, grading, packing, and preparing for market, and a brokerage charge, and the balance was paid to the farmer. As to all the produce, the culls or other non-marketable portions thereof, went back to the farmer producer, or was disposed of as he directed, but did not go into the market.

In the case of peas, lettuce, and carrots, the defendant processed and sold that grown by him, and that which was not grown by him, he handled on consignment for the farmer-owner.

As to each of the products the processing operation was seasonal, at the time of harvesting the crops. In the district where the defendant operated, the harvest began about July 15th and was completed by September 15th. The processing, etc., season as to onions began about August 15th, and continued until freezing, about November 1st, when the operation ended. To a small extent some onions were stored, either as purchased by the defendant or stored by the farmers, in the defendant’s storage or elsewhere, and when ready to ship were processed and prepared for shipment. The -storage period for onions ended in March. Processing operations on stored onions were not continuous or regular, taking place from time to time as market conditions justified and shipments were demanded, and crews of employees were picked up at the particular time as needed and then discharged.

All operations as to the harvesting, processing, packing, grading and shipping of lettuce are highly seasonal; beginning about October 1st and ending with severe frost about November 1st,- and then they ceased.

In the case of carrots, the season’s operations run for about one month, from September 15th to October 15th, and as to peas last one month, in June.

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Related

Batt v. United States
151 F.2d 949 (Ninth Circuit, 1945)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
59 F. Supp. 619, 33 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1086, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2415, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-batt-idd-1945.