United States v. Barringer

188 U.S. 577, 23 S. Ct. 405, 47 L. Ed. 602, 1903 U.S. LEXIS 1302
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedFebruary 23, 1903
Docket252
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 188 U.S. 577 (United States v. Barringer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Barringer, 188 U.S. 577, 23 S. Ct. 405, 47 L. Ed. 602, 1903 U.S. LEXIS 1302 (1903).

Opinion

Me. Justice White,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

Although the court below found that among the rules for the government ■ of the' Printing Office adopted by the Public Printer, in pursuance of power conferred by law, there was a rule forbidding, the allowance of leaves of absence to temporary employes, the court in effect treated the rule in question as void, since it assumed that, by the acts of Congress governing the Printing Office, temporary employes of the office were entitled to leave of absence with pay. The court deemed that the duration of such leave of absence was such proportion of the yearly annual leave allowed to permanent employes as the period of service of the temporary employé in each year bore to a year’s employment. From the premise of law thus assumed the court held that- where a temporary employé had not been allowed his leave of absence because, of the enforcement by the Public-Printer of the rule denying the right to such leave, the temporary employé was entitled to be paid an extra amount equal to the sum of his regular wages for the period which would have been embraced by the leave had it been granted. In effect, therefore, the conclusion of the court was that because the statutes were held to allow to a temporary employé leave of absence with, regular pay, they must be construed as allowing to such person extra pay without leave, and this upon the theory that the employé who had a right to leave with pay, who had not received it under the circumstances stated, was entitled, so to speak, to a commutation in money at his regular rate of wages for the period of leave of which he had been deprived.

*580 The conclusion thus reached was stated by the court to be exceptional and anomalous, but was deemed to be required by what was conceived to be the unambiguous purport of a provision, held to be mandatory, found in the act of June 11, 1896, making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1897. 29 Stat. 413. The provision in question was said to be entirely new in the legislation of Congress with respect to leaves of absence to the employés of the Government Printing Office. Whilst the anomalous result of the conclusion, as observed by the court below, is, we think, apparent, it would seem to us that a yet greater anomaly is involved in the • premise which was taken for' granted, that is, that the statutes contemplate the enjoyment by mere temporary employés of the provisions of law relating to an annual leave of absence. We think this is so, because singular as may be the conclusion that since employés enjoy the right to leave with pay, they are therefore entitled to extra pay without leave, we think it is far more singular to conceive that one' who is engaged for a temporary employment, say for a day or a week or a month or so, comes within the purview of the statutes providing for annual leaves of absence.'

If, however, the acts of Congress compel the adoption of the premise assumed or the conclusion drawn from it by the court, however anomalous they may be, our duty is to enforce the result. Whether the acts of Congress do either cannot be ascertained by a mere reference to the particular proviso in the appropriation act which constrained the judgment of the court below, but must be determined by an examination of the acts of Congress concerning leaves of absence to employés in the Government Printing Office from the beginning. The review of the statutes for the purpose of determining whether leave with regular pay involves the right to extra pay without leave, will also necessarily require us to examine the same statutes upon which the right, if it exists at all, of temporary employés in the. Printing Office to leave of absence must rest. In pro'posing to first investigate such question we are not unmindful' of the fact that the government at bar did not at all dispute the assumption indulged in by the lower court, but rested its *581 claim to reversal on other grounds. In view of the fact, however, that we must correctly administer the statutes, and that the question as to the right of a temporary employé to leave of absence has been fully presented by the appellees, we shall examine and decide it. The problems, then, for solution in the order stated are, First. Do the acts of Congress which provide for leave of absence to the employés of the Government Printing Office. embrace mere temporary employés of such office? and, Second. If such employés are so embraced, do the statutes, whilst providing for leave in favor of the temporary employés with pay during the term of the leave, provide also. for extra pay without leave where the leave has not been enjoyed because of a rule of the Printing Office forbidding its allowance ?

The original grant of authority to allow leaves .of absence, with pay, to employés of the Printing Office was the act of June 30, 1886.. 24 Stat. 91. The statute consisted of two sections, in the-second of which it was provided that the act should take effect on and after the first day of July, 1886. The first, section is as follows :

“That the employés of the. Government Printing Office,whether emploj'ed by the piece or otherwise, be allowed a leave of absence, with pa,y, not exceeding fifteen days in any one fiscal year, after the service of one year and under such regulations and at such time as the Public Printer may designate. Such employés as are engaged on piece work shall receive the same rate of pay for the said fifteen days’ leave as will be paid to day hands : Provided, That those regularly employed on the Congressional Record shall receive leave, with pay, at the close of each session, pro rata, for the time of such employment.”

We think the employés embraced within this statute were permanent employés and not those, who might be called in for temporary or emergency purposes, since the object of the statute was to provide for annual leave during each fiscal year, and the leave was allowed only after the service of one year. Any doubt as to this construction is. removed by the proviso which allows a pro rata leave to regular employés of the Congressional Record. As the duration of the work which this class of em-ployés performed was necessarily limited by the sessions of *582 Congress, it is obvious that they were considered as excluded by the general language in the prior portions of the act, and hence an exceptional provision giving them its advantages was inserted. And the proviso itself adds emphasis to the significance arising from its enactment, since it conferred-the benefits only on such employés as were regulwrVy employed for such work, and therefore excluded those merely called in to^eet an emergency in the employment in question.

It is also obvious thht the Public Printer in administering this act did not interpret it as embracing temporary employés, since the rules of his office excluded employés of that character from the giant of leaves of absence. And the appropriations ■made by Congress to execute the act of 1886, one of the acts being enacted by the very Congress which passed the act of 1886, serve to enforce the meaning arising on the face of the act itself.

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Bluebook (online)
188 U.S. 577, 23 S. Ct. 405, 47 L. Ed. 602, 1903 U.S. LEXIS 1302, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-barringer-scotus-1903.