United States v. Bankins

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: June 27, 2025
• Docket: Criminal No. 2018-0213
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, v. No. 18-cr-213-CKK/ZMF FRANCIS BANKINS,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. BACKGROUND

On April 11, 2025, the Probation Officed filed a petition requesting that Judge Kollar-

Kotelly schedule a status hearing because the Defendant tested positive for THC in May 2024 and

February 2025. On April 14, 2025, Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted that Petition and referred the case

to the undersigned to conduct the hearing and prepare a Report and Recommendation.

On May 16, 2025, defense counsel filed a motion to remove the supervision condition

which required THC testing. Defendant explained that he has a prescription for marijuana usage

to treat his documented epilepsy condition.

On May 21, 2025, the parties appeared for a status hearing. Neither the government nor the

Probation Office objected to the Defendant’s motion. The Probation Office highlighted the

Defendant’s exemplary behavior while on supervision, including that he has: no other violations;

stable housing; and steady employment. The government concurred, noting that the Defendant is

“doing an excellent job” and “on the right track.”

Given that a year has elapsed since the Defendant began supervision, the parties discussed

an alternative request for successful early termination of supervision. Subsequently, defense

1 counsel orally moved to terminate supervision. Neither the government nor the Probation Office

objected to this modified request.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Defendant’s Progress from Incarceration to Reintegration

While incarcerated, the Defendant earned a GED, as well as certifications in horticulture,

agriculture, and forklift operation.

Since the Defendant’s release, he has maintained steady employment with a restaurant

group which operates at seven locations. The Defendant explained that he often works seven days

a week, with shifts totaling up to thirteen hours at a time. He further explained that he is currently

picking up extra shifts so that he can afford private health insurance, as he felt D.C. Medicaid

coverage was inadequate to address his epilepsy diagnosis. The Defendant currently resides with

his aunt but is actively working towards securing independent housing.

B. Medical Marijuana: It’s a Trap

The Defendant’s doctor has prescribed marijuana to treat his epilepsy. And there is

evidence that epilepsy may be treated by marijuana. See Epilepsy Found., Medical Marijuana,

https://www.epilepsy.com/treatment/alternative-therapies/medical-marijuana (last visited June 27,

2025). The Defendant’s use of this prescribed medication triggered the instant violation.

“As for whether Defendant’s use of medical marijuana is a violation of federal law, the

answer is clear[]: it is.” United States v. Johnson, 228 F. Supp. 3d 57, 62 (D.D.C. 2017). “Indeed,

this Court recently joined the chorus of others recognizing that a defendant under federal

supervision may not use medical marijuana in compliance with District of Columbia law.” Id.

(citing United States v. Parker, 219 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D.D.C. 2016)).

2 But simply violating defendants for medical marijuana use ignores reality: defendants are

understandably confused by the technical distinction between conflicting state and federal laws.

See id. at 63 (“Defendant believed that he was lawfully using medical marijuana to cope with [a

medical issue]”). And violating defendants on a technicality flies in the face of “the primary

purpose of supervised release”: “to facilitate the integration of offenders back into the community

rather than to punish them.” U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised

Release (2010) (“Supervised Release Report”) 9. Recognizing this, courts have found that the “use

of the medical marijuana . . . was not the result of a willful violation.” Johnson, 228 F. Supp. 3d

at 63. Courts that have come to this conclusion either terminate supervision early, see infra Part

II.C., or remove marijuana testing as a condition of supervised release, see, e.g., United States v.

Tolliver, No. 20-cr-109, 2023 WL 3738052, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. May 31, 2023) (granting motion

after examining 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors).1

C. Early Termination of Supervised Release

“The Court may terminate a term of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e) after one year of supervision.” Parker, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §

3583(e)(1)).

To make such a determination, the Court first “should consider, but need not make express

findings,” based on seven factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a):

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence, to protect the public from further crimes of the

1 Should the District Judge not adopt this Report and Recommendation, the undersigned recommends in the alternative to grant defense’s motion to modify the conditions of release to remove marijuana testing.

3 defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed education or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the Guidelines; (5) any pertinent policy statement; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

Id. at 189–90 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(1), 3553(a)); see also United States v. Gammarano,

321 F.3d 311, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that “‘a statement that [the district court] has

considered the statutory factors is sufficient’” (quoting United States v. Gelb, 944 F.2d 52, 56–57

(2d Cir. 1991))). In considering the factors, “the Court is cognizant that supervised release ‘serves

an entirely different purpose than the sentence imposed under § 3553(a).’” United States v.

Mauldin, No. 18-cr-371, 2020 WL 2840055, at *2 (D.D.C. June 1, 2020) (quoting Pepper v. United

States, 562 U.S. 476, 502 n.15 (2011)). “Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct

from those served by incarceration.” United States v. Johnson (Johnson I), 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000).

Indeed, the “congressional policy in providing for a term of supervised release . . . is to improve

the odds of a successful transition from the prison to liberty.” Johnson v. United States (Johnson

II), 529 U.S. 694, 708–09 (2000). In addition, the Supreme Court has noted the congressional

“aim[] . . . to use the district courts’ discretionary judgment to allocate supervision to those

release[d] who need[] it most.” Id. at 709. “‘The relevant factors under § 3553(a) are, consequently,

evaluated mindful of the Supreme Court’s clear articulation of the purpose of supervised release

and the district court’s discretion to limit terms of supervised release to those who need it.’”

Mauldin, 2020 WL 2840055, at *2 (quoting United States v. Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d 137, 145

(D.D.C. 2017)). Put another way, “the length of [] supervision is dependent solely upon the

4 defendant’s need for supervision after release from jail.” United States v. Montenegro–Rojo, 908

F.2d 425, 432 (9th Cir. 1990).

The factors here favor early termination. The first factor weighs in favor of termination.

The Defendant illegally possessed a firearm. While this is troubling, the Defendant neither

brandished nor used the firearm. Indeed, there was no indication he was engaged in other criminal

activity. “[T]he general focus of supervised release is forward looking, as captured by the second,

third, and fourth factors of general deterrence of criminal conduct and specific deterrence of the

defendant, as well as the need for continuing supervision to provide the defendant with educational

or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.” Mauldin, 2020 WL 2840055,

at *3 (citing Johnson I, 529 U.S. at 59). Thus, these three factors are of critical import. See id.

“The defendant’s maintenance of an unblemished record of compliance with his conditions of

release for over [half his period of supervised release] is, perhaps, the best indicator of his ability

to continue as a law-abiding member of his community.” Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 146–47. Thus,

“[f]actors two and three thus support early termination of supervised release.” Mauldin, 2020 WL

2840055, at *3. As for factor four, “the Probation Office does not indicate that the defendant has

continuing, specific rehabilitative needs. . . . This factor thus also weighs in favor of early

termination of supervised released.” Id. “Finally, as to the fifth factor . . . , the Court has weighed

the relevant factors, and they favor early termination of supervised release. Indeed, even the

Probation Office concedes that ‘this case meets the criteria for early termination.’” Id.2

2 “Here, the sixth and seventh factors have limited relevance to the defendant because the ‘factor of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities . . . would generally undermine the case specific inquiry required in evaluating a motion for early termination of supervised release,’ and because this defendant has no restitution obligations.” Mauldin, 2020 WL 2840055, at *2 (quoting Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 145).

5 “Accordingly, the § 3553(a) factors, taken as a whole, warrant grant of the defendant’s motion.”

Id.

After considering the “factors under § 3553(a), the Court must be ‘satisfied’ that early

termination of supervised release ‘is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and [in]

the interest of justice.’” Mauldin, 2020 WL 2840055, at *3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)). “The

‘interest of justice’” standard gives “‘the district court latitude to consider a broad range of factors

in addition to an individual’s behavior in considering whether to terminate the supervised release

period.’” United States v. Rader, No. 22-cr-57, 2024 WL 474535, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2024)

(quoting United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d. 279, 283 (4th Cir. 1999)). Generally, “[n]o

‘extraordinary or unusual conduct’ during supervision is required to meet this standard.” Mauldin,

2020 WL 2840055, at *3.

Judge Lamberth twice adopted the recommendation of Judge Harvey that the lack of a

willful violation from medical marijuana usage in conjunction with affirmative steps towards

meaningful rehabilitation satisfied the two requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) for early

termination of supervised release:3

- In Parker, Judge Lamberth found that “defendant’s use [of medical marijuana] was not a

willful violation of his supervised release.” 219 F. Supp. 3d at 184. Thus, revocation was

not appropriate. See id. at 189 (citing United States v. Vaughn, 265 Fed. App’x. 761, 762

(11th Cir. 2008) (finding revocation appropriate because defendant’s “violations [of

supervised release conditions] were not inadvertent or accidental, but instead were

intentional and deliberate”)). The court next looked to the “affirmative steps [the defendant

3 In both cases, Judge Harvey also considered sentencing disparities from subsequent changes to the Sentencing Guidelines. See Parker, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 185–86; Johnson, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 59–60.

6 took] to become a well-integrated member of the community.” Id. at 190. Specifically, the

court credited the defendant for earning his GED while incarcerated, maintaining

employment, and complying with all other conditions of supervision. See id.

- In Johnson, the defendant tested positive four times for marijuana use. 228 F. Supp. 3d at

60. Judge Lamberth again adopted Judge Harvey’s finding that this “use of the medical

marijuana . . . was not the result of a willful violation.” Id. at 63. The defendant “believed

that he was lawfully using [it].” Id. The court next credited the defendant for maintaining

full-time employment and securing stable housing. Id. at 63.

Like the defendants in Parker and Johnson, the Defendant here has “otherwise complied

with all other terms of his supervised release.” Parker, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 190. The Defendant’s

use of marijuana does not constitute a willful violation. He—like his doctor—believed it was

necessary and lawful to use to treat his epilepsy. Moreover, the Defendant has also taken

remarkable steps towards his successful reintegration: earning a GED and numerous certifications

while incarcerated; and maintaining steady employment and stable housing post-incarceration.

Considering his achievements while incarcerated, otherwise full compliance with supervised

release conditions, and management of a “chronic medical condition[,] . . . the Court concludes

that early termination of supervised release is in the ‘interest of justice.’” Mauldin, 2020 WL

2840055, at *4; see also United States v. Moore, No. 01-cr-238, 2020 WL 435296, at *4 (D.D.C.

Jan. 28, 2020) (terminating supervision early where defendant complied with conditions,

completed vocational training, and maintained long-term employment).

7 III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, upon consideration of the Defendant’s motion, the government’s lack of

opposition to the defendant’s motion, the entire record in this case, and the relevant statutory

purposes of supervised release, the Court recommends that the Defendant’s remaining term of

supervision—which is less than one year—be terminated early, effective on adoption of this

Report and Recommendation.

Zia Digitally signed by Zia M.Faruqui

M.Faruqui Date: 2025.06.27 17:27:25 -04'00'

Date: June 27, 2025 ___________________________________ ZIA M. FARUQUI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE