United States v. Baltimore & O. R.

176 F. 114, 1910 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 382
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 18, 1910
DocketNo. 85
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 176 F. 114 (United States v. Baltimore & O. R.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Baltimore & O. R., 176 F. 114, 1910 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 382 (W.D. Pa. 1910).

Opinion

ORR, District Judge.

This is an action to recover penalties for violations of the provisions of what is commonly called the “Safety Appliance Act.” Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174). The plaintiff's' statement sets forth 37 causes of action, and demands $2,200 aggregate penalties. At the trial the plaintiff elected to proceed on 22 causes only. These causes of action are the second, third, fifth, seventh, eighth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fifteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-second, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, twenty-seventh, twenty-ninth, thirty-first, thirty-second, thirty-third, thirty-fifth, and thirty-sixth. Of these 21 are alike and 1 only, being the second cause of action, is in a class by itself. The 21 alleged violations of the first section of the act, which provides that it shall be unlawful to run any train in interstate traffic “that has not a sufficient number of cars in it so equipped with power or train brakes that the engineer on the locomotive drawing such train can control its speed without requiring brakemen to use the common hand brake for that purpose.” The second cause alleges a violation of the second section of the act amending said act, passed March 2, 1903 (Act March 2, 1903, c. 916, 33 Stat. 943 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1114]), and the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission relating thereto, which provide that “when any train is operated with power or train brakes, not less than 75% of the cars in such train shall have their brakes used'and operated by the engineer of the locomotive drawing such train, and all power braked cars in such train, which are associated together with said 75% shall have their brakes so used and operated.” After plaintiff had closed its testimony the defendant moved the court for judgment of nonsuit for the reason that there was not evidence sufficient to show a violation of the pro[116]*116visions of the statute by the company. The court sustained the motion. And now upon the motion to take off the nonsuit, it must be determined whether the trial judge erred. This necessarily involves construction of the acts of Congress as well as consideration of the allegations and proofs. The purpose of the act as stated in its title is “to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads,” etc. The mischiefs it was intended to remedy are well known and need not be dwelt upon. It has received, as it should, süch liberal construction as to best promote the ends desired. This court is now asked to rule that it forbids the use of a hand brake on trains except in “emergencies arising from unforeseen or wholly exceptional causes.” It is urged that the habitual use of hand brakes on Sand Patch grade in accordance with written orders which were offered in evidence is evidence that the trains have not a sufficient number of cars so equipped with power or train brakes that the engineers can control the speed, and that the use of hand brakes on such grade is a violation of the act. This contention disregards the purpose of thé railroad as disclosed by the orders which is not to control the'speed, but to insure the safe movement of the trains.

The act of 1893 by its terms was not to take effect until January 1, 1898. By section 7 of that act the Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized to extend the period within which railroads should comply with the act. This was due doubtless to the inability of all the railroads immediately to equip all their rolling stock in.the manner prescribed. The act of 1893 was amended by the act of 1903. By the latter the number of cars in any train to have their brakes used and operated by the engineer is fixed at a minimum of 50 per cent. In this respect section 1 of the act of 1893 was amended. In that act the minimum was expressed by “sufficient,” a w'ord than which no clearer could be chosen from our language to indicate a minimum quantity, and yet a word indicating- various requirements to various men operating railroads under various conditions. It is therefore apparent that one of the purposes of the amendment was to render certain that which was uncertain. If, however, this were not so, yet the power given to the Commission to extend the time for compliance with the original act was not taken away by the later act, but rather affirmed therein by the provision that the Commission could from time to time increase the minimum of 50 per cent. In the exercise of that power the minimum was increased and is now 75 per cent. It seems, therefore, that if a train now has 75 per cent, of its cars used and operated by the engineer, and if there is no other infraction of the law, a jury should not be permitted to find that the train has.not a “sufficient” number of cars equipped as required. But whether the train is improperly equipped is a, question of fact, and must be proven by the party who asserts the affirmative. This action is a civil action, although for penalties, and there is no greater burden of proof imposed upon the United States than upon the plaintiff in any other civil action. In none of the 21 causes of action was any evidence offered that the train was not equipped as provided by law, as the court understands it! As to the great majority, the witnesses on the part of the plaintiff .testified to facts- showing proper equipment. As to the few, the evi[117]*117dence (given with respect to all) that hand brakes were operated on the long Sand Patch grade, was the only parol evidence offered.

Plaintiff contends that evidence of the use of hand brakes is all that need be shown to justify the submission to the jury of the question whether the train was properly equipped. It was not shown that the hand brakes were used to control the speed of the train. The burden was upon the plaintiff to show this. Plaintiff’s evidence tended to show the contrary. That the act of 1893 and its amendments did not prohibit the use of hand brakes is clear. There is no such prohibition in them. The first, section of the act of 1893 intends that the engineer should control the speed of the train without requiring- brakemen to use the common hand brake for that purpose. The power to the Interstate Commerce Commission to extend the time for compliance with the act and to enlarge the minimum requirement, and the indefinite extension as indicated by fixing the minimum at 75 per cent., all support the same view.

Plaintiff offered in evidence two orders issued by the defendant to its locomotive engineers and trainmen and which were in effect upon the defendant’s railroad at the time at which the alleged violations of the act occurred. The material portions of these orders are as follows:

“Trains must have the air brakes operative on not less than 75% of the ears in the train, which must be tested as follows:
“ ‘As soon as the locomotive is coupled to the train and the pressure is equalized throughout the train, the engineer npon request of a trainman or inspector, will make a full service application (251b. reduction of pressure) of the brakes, and hold them on until the trainmen or inspectors have examined the brakes cm iho tender and on each ear.’
“This must lie done; at the points designated in order to know, before starting. that brakes are in good condition.
“Trains on descending grades must be controlled by use of the air brakes, supplemented by the application of such hand brakes as may be necessary to insure the safe movement of the train.

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Bluebook (online)
176 F. 114, 1910 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 382, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-baltimore-o-r-pawd-1910.