United States v. Ballard

704 F. Supp. 620, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14672, 1987 WL 49582
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. North Carolina
DecidedNovember 19, 1987
Docket87-525-HC, 87-992-HC, 87-526-HC and 87-991-HC
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 704 F. Supp. 620 (United States v. Ballard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Ballard, 704 F. Supp. 620, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14672, 1987 WL 49582 (E.D.N.C. 1987).

Opinion

ORDER

BRITT, Chief Judge.

In each of these cases the United States of America, as petitioner, has filed a motion for authority to involuntarily treat and medicate the respondent who is being held at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina, (Butner) pursuant to orders of this court entered under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 4246. Following the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Michael Francis Charters, Jr., 829 F.2d 479 (1987), all of the respondents refused to grant permission to authorities to administer to them psychotropic medication. Counsel was appointed for each of the respondents. Upon motion an independent psychiatrist was appointed to examine them and, if needed, testify on their behalf. Hearings were conducted on 24 October 1987 and 26 October 1987. In each of the four cases the government called as a witness Dr. Sally Johnson, who is the Director of Forensic Services and Clinical Research at the Mental Health Division of the Federal Correctional Institution at Butner, and each of the respondents called as a witness Dr. Billy Royal, a psychiatrist engaged in private practice in Raleigh, North Carolina.

Inasmuch as these are the first cases arising in this court since the Charters decision in which prison authorities at But-ner seek permission to forcibly medicate persons housed there, and in view of the similarity of the cases and the use as witnesses of the same psychiatrist, the court has elected to enter this single order.

DISCUSSION

The motions by the government must be considered by this court in the light of the decision of the court of appeals’ opinion in Charters. Although the factual setting in Charters was different 1 from that presented here and the court specifically limited its holding, 2 it is nevertheless apparent that that decision must provide the guidance for this court in making its decision.

Under Charters the first obligation facing this court is to determine whether each respondent is competent to consent to or refuse medical care. As the court said “until such time as [the respondent] is *622 found medically incompetent, 3 his decision to reject antipsychotic drugs is dispositive.” Charters, supra at 495. If the court finds that a respondent is incompetent to direct his own medical care, then the court must determine “what treatment the patient would, if competent, select for himself ...” if that can be done. Charters, supra at 484. If not, the court must then “direct treatment in accordance with the patient’s best interest.” Charters, id. Because the court here finds that with regard to each of the respondents the government has failed to prove that the respondent is incompetent to make a decision with regard to his own medical treatment, it will not be necessary for the court to engage in a “substituted judgment” analysis or a “best interest” analysis.

Each respondent is presumed competent until adjudicated incompetent. To determine a respondent’s competence, this court must evaluate whether he “... has followed a rational process in deciding to refuse antipsychotic medication and can give rational reasons for the choice he has made.” Charters, supra at 496.

Charters did not specify the standard of proof which the government must meet in order to overcome the presumption of competence although it can be implied that the court intended to adopt a “clear, cogent and convincing” standard. See n. 26, p. 496, where Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash. 2d 304, 422 P.2d 812, 815 (1967), was cited for the proposition that “to overcome the presumption of competency, proof must be had by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the patient does not comprehend the nature, terms and effect of a consent given for a surgical operation.” This court need not rely on that however as the government here has failed to meet even a lesser standard.

Guided by the principles above enunciated, the court will analyze the facts presented in each of the four cases.

JAMES M. BALLARD

Charged with mailing threatening communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876, and threatening court officers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, James M. Ballard (Ballard) was referred to Butner for psychiatric evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) where he was found incompetent to stand trial.

On 12 June 1987 the warden at Butner filed a certificate with this court that Ballard “is currently suffering from a mental disease or defect as the result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another” and that “suitable arrangements for state care and custody ... are not currently available” and requested a hearing pursuant to the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 4246(a).

At that hearing the court found that Ballard had threatened the life of one of his treating physicians and one of his correctional counselors and had mailed a threatening letter to Federal Judge Levin Campbell. Based on the opinion of the psychiatrist at Butner, concurred in by Dr. Bob Rollins an independent psychiatrist appointed to represent his interest, the court found that Ballard suffers from chronic schizophrenia and that his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to others or serious damage to the property of others. The court, therefore, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization in a mental health facility pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). ,

During a part of his stay at Butner Ballard has been kept in seclusion because of a determination by staff members that he was an imminent danger to both inmates and staff. At that time he was floridly psychotic. He was extremely distraught, having feelings of persecution and believing that he and others were going to die. He was extremely confused about his sexu *623 al identity and was convinced that the government was persecuting him. In the opinion of Dr. Johnson he was “rather pitiful.” The only treatment he was receiving during that period of time was psychotherapy. 4 Thereafter, Ballard was placed on medication, including Prolixin and Lithium.

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Bluebook (online)
704 F. Supp. 620, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14672, 1987 WL 49582, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-ballard-nced-1987.