United States v. Babcock

24 F. Cas. 913, 3 Dill. 581
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri·Decided July 1, 1876·Published·Cited by 17 cases

Opinion

DILLON, Circuit Judge

(charging jury). In preparing what I have to say to you, I am happy in having had the assistance of my Brother TREAT, and his concurrence in all the statements and propositions which follow.

Gentlemen, if it is a source of gratification to the court and counsel that their respective labors in this ease are drawing to a close, it must be doubly so to you, since, for more than two weeks, you have been restrained of your liberty, deprived of the society of family and friends, cut off from intercourse with the world, and not allowed to converse, even among yourselves, on that subject which has filled the minds of everybody else. The court would willingly have relieved you of this constraint, but the great public interest the case has excited, and the pronounced course of many public journals respecting it — some prejudging it on the one side, and some on the other — and the many Imperfect reports of the trial which have met our observation, made it not only proper but necessary, in the interest of justice, that you should be removed beyond the reach of any popular feeling, however strong or subtle, whether favorable to the government or to the defendant; beyond the influence of the press, one of whose plainest public duties it is to abstain, pending a trial, from a course calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice; in a word, beyond any influence whatever, except that to which the solemn oath you have taken confines you, namely, “the law and the evidence given you in court.”

The constitutional guaranty of a trial by jury, upon legal evidence, under the supervision of the court, is designed to protect the innocent and punish the guilty, and this wise provision will be practically subverted if it be not sedulously guarded from all improper influences: and this is especially necessary in cases which, for any reason, are attended with great public interest or feeling.

Gentlemen, it is justly due to tbe cheerful patience with which you have submitted to this long confinement, not less than to the attentive care you ha ve given, day after day, to the coming in of the vast mass of testimony now before you for your consideration, that we should, before proceeding to give you directions as to the law of the case, thus publicly recognize and commend your course and conduct.

The court has had the benefit of all the suggestions and arguments that could he offered on the one side'or the other by the eminent counsel in the ease, touching the questions of law arising in it. Thus aided, our duties on the trial were made comparatively easy, and. fortunately, the duty that yet remains to us is plain: for there is no principle of law now belonging to the case which is [915] •controverted by counsel, or which has not ■been long settled by the courts of Great Britain and this country.

Our further duty is ..simply to state and ■define these rules of law, and to.make such observations as will assist you in properly applying these rules to the case which the testimony presents for your decision.

' The case against the defendant is one which mainly depends upon circumstantial •evidence, and it is in such cases that counsel can be ot great assistance to the jury in directing their attention to those circumstances which are considered material to their respective theories, and in commenting upon their force and effect. " It has been your good fortune, gentlemen, to listen to arguments, both for the government and for the defendant, which have been marked in no common ■degree with dear statement, great ability, and masterly analysis.

Declaring that you enter the jury-box wholly free from opinion or bias, one way or the other; kept aloof, pending the trial, from any influence that could improperly affect you; aided by the argument of counsel, and by such instructions and advice as the court is able to give, you come to your deliberations with every circumstance which can conduce to the formation of sound conclusions, and the rendition of a true verdict,, according to the law and evidence given you on the trial. 'The two main questions presented for your ■consideration are:

’ 1. Was there such a conspiracy as is described in the indictment, and was any one ■of the overt acts committed, as alleged, in furtherance of said conspiracy?

2. If such conspiracy existed, was the defendant a member of it, or one of the conspirators?

As to the first of these questions, you may, perhaps, have very little difficulty. It is not necessary to constitute a conspiracy that two or-more persons should meet together, and enter into an explicit or formal agreement for an unlawful scheme, or that they should, directly, by words or in writing, state what the unlawful scheme was to be, and the details of the plan or means by which the unlawful combination was to be made effective. It is sufficient if two or more persons, in any manner, or through any contrivance, positively or tacitly come to a mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful design. In other words, where an unlawful end is sought to be effected, and two or more persons, actuated by the common purpose of accomplishing that end. work together, in any way, in furtherance of the unlawful scheme, every one of said persons becomes a member of the conspiracy, although the part he was to take therein was a subordinate one, or was to be executed at a remote distance from the other conspirators. A combination formed by two or more persons, to effect an unlawful end, is a conspiracy, said persons .acting under a common purpose to aeeom-plish the end designed. Any one who, after a conspiracy is formed, and who knows of its existence, joins therein, becomes as much a party thereto, from that time, as if he had originally conspired.

The charge in the indictment is substantially that a conspiracy was formed to defraud the United States of the tax of seventy' cents per proof gallon on distilled spirits to be produced thereafter in the distilleries named in the indictment. It is necessary, in order to prove the conspiracy as charged, to establish also that some one of the overt acts named was committed by the person alleged in the indictment to have been guilty of said overt act, and that he was one of the conspirators, doing the act to promote the unlawful scheme.

Upon the evidence' in the case, and the concessions of counsel, you will, probably, have no doubt as to the existence of a conspiracy. of enormous proportions, between the distillers on the one hand and certain internal revenue officers on the other, formed and maintained in the city of St. Louis, whereby the government was systematically plundered for a long period of time, of revenue to a vast amount. It was the duty of the government,' on discovering this conspiracy, to crush it — to stamp it out of existence — and to bring the guilty to justice and deserved punishment. But the government sustains a relation and owes a duty to its citizens, as well as to its revenues, and its interests do not demand and will not be promoted by the conviction of any one who is not proved, in the manner required by the rules of law, to be guilty of the offence imputed to him; and. so, gentlemen, you must come to a dispassionate consideration of this case, recollecting that the court, and the jury, as a part of the court' have but one duty to discharge, but one object to attain, and that is to ascertain the truth, and to do justice with absolute impartiality and fearless independence.

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United States v. Babcock, 24 F. Cas. 913, 3 Dill. 581 (circtedmo 1876).

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