United States v. Atwood

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedMay 6, 1992
Docket91-2276
StatusPublished

This text of United States v. Atwood (United States v. Atwood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Atwood, (1st Cir. 1992).

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


May 6, 1992

_________________________

No. 91-2276

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

THOMAS P. ATWOOD,

Defendant, Appellant.

_________________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

_________________________

Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
___________

Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
______________

_________________________

Robert M. Napolitano on brief for appellant.
____________________
Richard S. Cohen, United States Attorney, and F. Mark
__________________ ________
Terison, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for the
_______
United States.

_________________________

_________________________

SELYA, Circuit Judge. This criminal appeal requires
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
______________

that we determine whether the government shortchanged the

appellant in respect to complying with a plea agreement. Finding

that appellant neglected to ask the government to do that which

he now condemns the government for not doing, we affirm the

conviction and sentence. Cf., e.g., John 16:24 ("Ask and ye
___ ____ ____

shall receive.").

I
I
_

Background
Background
__________

On March 13, 1991, a federal grand jury in the District

of Maine returned an indictment charging defendant-appellant

Thomas P. Atwood with conspiracy to distribute lysergic acid

diethylamide (LSD). In July, appellant pled guilty pursuant to a

written plea agreement (Agreement). The Agreement provided, in

relevant part, that appellant would cooperate with the government

and assist in ongoing investigations. In return, the prosecution

made three essential commitments:

1. To grant appellant use immunity (save
only for serious crimes of violence).

2. To refrain from opposing a two-level
reduction in the base offense level, U.S.S.G.
3E1.1, for appellant's acceptance of
responsibility.

3. To divulge the extent of appellant's
assistance in certain circumstances, viz.:
"At the request of the defendant, the United
________________________________
States Attorney's Office for the District of
Maine will make known the cooperation of the
defendant to any individual or entity to whom
the defendant wishes such information
disseminated." (Emphasis supplied.)

The Agreement contained no promise of a specific sentencing

2

recommendation. Rather, both parties reserved the right to

petition the district court "for the imposition of any lawful

sentence . . . ."

On November 26, 1991, appellant was sentenced. The

prosecutor recommended that the court impose a sentence at the

low end of the guideline sentencing range (GSR). Apart from this

comment, the prosecutor, to all intents and purposes, stood mute.

The court reviewed the presentence investigation report (PSI

Report), set the GSR at 210-262 months (offense level 34;

criminal history category IV),1 and sentenced appellant at the

range's nadir. This appeal followed.

II
II
__

Issue Presented
Issue Presented
_______________

On appeal, appellant is represented by a new attorney.

Counsel's argument is classic in its simplicity. He asseverates

that "the government breached the terms of the plea agreement

when it failed to advise the sentencing court of the nature and

extent of the defendant's cooperation." Had the government done

so, counsel's thesis runs, the sentencing court might have

departed downward, thus shortening appellant's sentence.2

____________________

1In establishing the GSR, the district court gave Atwood the
two-level credit for acceptance of responsibility contemplated by
the Agreement. The prosecution did not oppose this adjustment.

2By means of a supplemental brief, appellant has attempted
to raise a second issue, contending that the district court
improperly relied on two uncounselled "drunk driving" convictions
in determining his criminal history score. But, the PSI Report
stated specifically that Atwood "was always represented by
counsel" in his previous dealings with the courts. Atwood did
not object to, or contradict, this statement. Similarly, he did

3

III
III
___

Analysis
Analysis
________

A.
A.
__

Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Jurisdiction
______________________

We confront, first, a threshold issue: the government

contends that there is no appellate jurisdiction. We disagree.

It is settled beyond peradventure in this circuit that,

ordinarily, a criminal defendant cannot ground an appeal on the

trial court's failure to depart downward from the GSR. See,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Anthony Correale v. United States
479 F.2d 944 (First Circuit, 1973)
United States v. Robert Nathaniel Brown
500 F.2d 375 (Fourth Circuit, 1974)
United States v. Alfred Argentine
814 F.2d 783 (First Circuit, 1987)
United States v. Mark Hogan and Patricia Hogan
862 F.2d 386 (First Circuit, 1988)
United States v. Dennis Harotunian
920 F.2d 1040 (First Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Christopher J. Romolo
937 F.2d 20 (First Circuit, 1991)
United States v. Peter Alden Drown, Jr.
942 F.2d 55 (First Circuit, 1991)
United States v. William A. Dietz
950 F.2d 50 (First Circuit, 1991)
United States v. Hector Garcia
954 F.2d 12 (First Circuit, 1992)
United States v. Voccola
600 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Rhode Island, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
United States v. Atwood, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-atwood-ca1-1992.