United States v. Arthur Young

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: March 30, 2026
• Docket: 25-11552
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 1 of 17

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-11552 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

ARTHUR GENE YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 3:23-cr-00010-TCB-RGV-1 ____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Arthur Young appeals his 168-month sentence for his con- viction of a single count of felon in possession of a firearm, in vio- lation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 2 of 17

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After review, 1 we affirm Young’s sentence. I. DISCUSSION Young raises five arguments on appeal regarding his sen- tence. He argues that (1) the district court erred by imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1) for possession of three or more firearms; (2) the district court erred by imposing a four-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possession of a firearm in connection with an- other felony offense; (3) the district court erred by imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for ob- struction of justice based on false statements made to a probation officer during a presentence interview; (4) the district court erred by imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from law enforcement officers; and (5) the district court abused its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. We address each argument in turn.

1 “We review a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines and

application of the Guidelines to the facts de novo, and we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Dimitrovski, 782 F.3d 622, 628 (11th Cir. 2015). “We review the substantive reasonableness of a sen- tence for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2016). USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 3 of 17

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A. Possession of Three Firearms Under § 2K2.1(b)(1), a district court must enhance a defend- ant’s offense level by two points if “the offense involved” between three and seven firearms. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). The district court imposed the § 2K2.1(b)(1) enhancement based on (1) the firearm that Young possessed at the time of his arrest for the underlying offense in May 2023, (2) a second firearm that Young unlawfully possessed in February 2021, and (3) a third firearm that Young unlawfully possessed in March 2021. Young asserts that the district court erred in imposing the § 2K2.1(b)(1) enhancement because (1) the government failed to present evi- dence at sentencing establishing that he possessed a firearm in Feb- ruary 2021, and (2) the February and March 2021 possessions were not relevant conduct for the underlying offense. Young is incorrect on both counts. First, the district court did not err in its conclusion that Young possessed a firearm in February 2021. The district court’s conclusion that Young possessed a firearm in February 2021 was based on a video of a recorded interview between Young and a po- lice investigator from March 2021. In that interview, Young admit- ted to possessing a firearm during a February 2021 incident in which Young purportedly threw the firearm at another individual, although Young denied throwing the firearm. That video was ad- mitted into evidence during a pretrial hearing via a motion in limine and then presented at trial. USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 4 of 17

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The district court was permitted to rely on the interview video to make its factfinding relating to the February 2021 posses- sion because a district court may rely at sentencing on evidence presented during trial. See United States v. White, 663 F.3d 1207, 1216 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The district court may base its findings of fact at sentencing on evidence presented at trial, undisputed state- ments in the PSR, and evidence presented at the sentence hearing.” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[A] sentencing court’s reliance on [evidence presented at the defendant’s trial] is entirely proper.”). It does not matter that the video was presented at trial for a different purpose than to prove the February 2021 possession or that Young pled guilty at the close of the government’s case. Young had the oppor- tunity to contest the video at the sentencing hearing by arguing that the video did not support that he possessed a firearm in Feb- ruary 2021 and by presenting any potential evidence to the con- trary. Given that the district court could rely on the interview video at sentencing and that Young admitted in the video that he possessed a firearm in February 2021, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Young possessed a firearm in Febru- ary 2021 to support the § 2K2.1(b)(1) enhancement. 2 See United

2 Young also argues that the district court erred by failing to make an explicit

factfinding relating to the February 2021 possession. We disagree. However, even if the district court’s factfinding relating to that possession was insuffi- USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 5 of 17

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States v. Stallings, 463 F.3d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 2006) (“For sentenc- ing purposes, possession of a firearm involves a factual finding, which we review for clear error.”). Second, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that the February and March 2021 firearm possessions constituted relevant conduct that could support the § 2K2.1(b)(1) enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. See United States v. Gyetvay, 149 F.4th 1213, 1239 (11th Cir. 2025) (“Whether an act qualifies as relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 is a question of fact reviewed for clear er- ror.”). Under § 1B1.3, in calculating a defendant’s guideline range, district courts can consider as relevant conduct acts “that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). In considering whether previous offenses are part of “the same course of conduct” as the offense of conviction for purposes of § 1B1.3, this Court con- siders three factors: “(1) ‘the degree of similarity of the offenses,’ (2) ‘the regularity (repetitions) of the offenses,’ and (3) ‘the time interval between the offenses.’” United States v. Brooks, 112 F.4th 937, 946 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(ii)). As to the first factor, this Court has explained that multiple instances of possessing separate firearms as a convicted felon are

ciently explicit, remand would be unwarranted because the district court’s de- cision was based on clearly identifiable record evidence, i.e., the interview video. See United States v. Gyetvay, 149 F.4th 1213, 1239 (11th Cir. 2025). USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 6 of 17

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“identical.” Id. Thus, Young’s multiple possessions of separate fire- arms as a convicted felon are highly similar to each other. As to the second factor, this Court has explained that pos- sessing separate firearms as a convicted felon on only two occa- sions does not establish a high degree of regularity. Id. However, Young’s possession of different firearms as a convicted felon on three separate occasions does exhibit at least some regularity of such conduct. As to the third factor, at first glance there does not appear to be significant contemporaneity between Young’s different firearm possessions. The February and March 2021 possessions occurred approximately two years prior to the May 2023 possession. This gap in time on its face suggests that the prior possessions could not be considered part of the same course of conduct as the latter pos- session. See United States v. Maxwell, 34 F.3d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that two acts that occurred over a year apart were “temporally remote” from each other for purposes of § 1B1.3). However, as the government noted at sentencing, Young was only out of prison for approximately thirty-eight days of the two-year period between the relevant possessions.3

3 Young does not challenge on appeal the district court’s conclusion that he

was out of prison for only thirty-eight days during the relevant two-year pe- riod, which was based on allegations in the presentence investigation report to which he did not object. See United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A] failure to object to allegations in a PSI admits the facts for sen- tencing purposes.”). USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 7 of 17

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Taking that into consideration, the period of time during which Young could actually possess a firearm in the relevant two-year period was comparable in length to the periods in cases where this Court determined that there was close temporal prox- imity between different firearm possessions. See Brooks, 112 F.4th at 946-47 (upholding a relevant-conduct finding where there was a gap of three months between different firearm possessions, and noting that other courts of appeals had upheld similar findings with gaps of up to nine months between different firearm possessions); see also United States v. Ruiz, 178 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n involuntary cessation of activity for a period of time may not con- note abandonment of the course of conduct, but instead may indi- cate that despite the participants’ efforts the scheme was put on hold temporarily. Thus, where the gap in time is explainable by non-volitional factors, such as by incarceration of the defendant in the interim . . . , it may not preclude a finding of a single course of conduct for sentencing purposes.” (citation omitted)). In light of these factors, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that Young’s February and March 2021 firearm pos- sessions were part of the same course of conduct as his May 2023 possession and thus constituted relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(2) that could be used to impose the § 2K2.1(b)(1) en- hancement. B. Possession of a Firearm in Connection with Another Felony Under § 2K2.1(b)(6), a district court must enhance a defend- USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 8 of 17

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ant’s offense level by four points if the defendant “used or pos- sessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another fel- ony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2024). 4 The district court imposed the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement based on the conclusion that Young committed the Georgia felony offense of willful obstruction of law enforcement officers during his arrest for the underlying offense in May 2023. The Georgia offense prohibits “knowingly and willfully resist[ing], obstruct[ing], or op- pos[ing] any law enforcement officer . . . in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer.” O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b). Young argues that the district court erred by imposing the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement because the government failed to prove that (1) he committed Georgia felony obstruction, or (2) he possessed the relevant firearm “in connection with” that felony of- fense. Young has failed to establish error on either ground. First, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Young’s actions during the May 2023 arrest qualified as Georgia felony obstruction. See Brooks, 112 F.4th at 947 (“For purposes of the sentencing determination, the district court could make any finding of fact that was supported by a preponderance of the evi- dence.” (quotation marks omitted)).

4 In the most recent edition of the Sentencing Guidelines, this provision was

moved to § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B). See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) (2025). USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 9 of 17

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At trial, the government submitted bodycam footage of the officers who arrested Young for the underlying offense in May 2023. That footage showed that Young refused to comply with multiple officers’ repeated commands to get on the ground and stop moving, and walked slowly away from the officers for several minutes into a busy road and then onto active train tracks. Then, when one officer approached Young on the train tracks and placed his hand on Young’s shoulder, Young tried to shove the officer away and grabbed the officer’s wrist. In the ensuing struggle, Young and the officer both fell down the raised embankment where the train tracks were located. While on the ground, Young did not immediately give up his hands to be handcuffed and con- tinued to struggle, so a different officer tased Young. Only after a brief additional struggle with a few more officers was Young hand- cuffed and detained. The district court could rely on this bodycam footage at sen- tencing, and the district court did not clearly err by concluding based on the footage that Young had committed Georgia felony obstruction. The elements for Georgia felony obstruction are that the defendant (1) “wilfully resist[ed] an officer” during a lawful ar- rest, and (2) “offered or did violence to the person of the officer.” Smith v. State, 669 S.E.2d 530, 531 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). Young only challenges the second element. Under Georgia law, “violently struggling with officers” during a lawful arrest sat- isfies the second element, even if the defendant did not actually strike or threaten any officer. Id. at 531-32. Georgia courts have USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 10 of 17

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affirmed convictions for felony obstruction under facts similar to those in this case. See, e.g., Cole v. State, 614 S.E.2d 883, 883-85 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming felony-obstruction conviction where the defendant “resisted and shoved” officers and then “struggled and wrestled” with officers during arrest); Harris v. State, 622 S.E.2d 905, 907-08 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming felony-obstruction conviction where the defendant “struck and pushed” an officer during arrest). Based on these principles, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that Young violently struggled with the officers when he (1) pushed at and grabbed an officer, (2) struggled with the officer such that they both fell down an embankment, and (3) continued to struggle and refused to give up his hands to be handcuffed until he was tased. Second, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that Young possessed a firearm in connection with the felony-ob- struction offense. See United States v. James, 135 F.4th 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2025) (explaining that this Court reviews for clear error a determination that a defendant possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense). “[A] person possesses a firearm ‘in connection with’ another offense if the firearm possession is contextually, causally, or logi- cally related to that offense.” Id. at 1334. Reading the phrase “in connection with” expansively, this Court has held that a defendant is subject to a § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement if his unlawful posses- sion of a firearm during the commission of another offense “facili- tates, or has the potential of facilitating, the other offense.” Brooks, USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 11 of 17

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112 F.4th at 950. Under certain circumstances, “mere possession of a firearm can be enough to apply a sentencing enhancement,” for example if the firearm “potentially emboldens” the other offense. Id. at 949 (citation modified) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 276 F.3d 1231, 1234-35 (11th Cir. 2001)). On the other hand, a gun’s presence does not satisfy § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) if it is “the result of acci- dent or coincidence.” James, 135 F.4th at 1335 (quotation marks omitted). The district court did not clearly err by concluding that Young’s possession of the loaded firearm during the May 2023 ar- rest had the potential to facilitate his obstruction offense because Young knowingly possessed the loaded firearm while he violently resisted arrest. Significantly, Young could have used the loaded firearm to aid his resistance, and his possession of the firearm po- tentially emboldened his actions. It is true that Young did not ac- tually use the firearm or even reach for it during the arrest—aside from briefly patting the pocket where he stored the firearm—but he did not actually need to use it to qualify for the enhancement. See Brooks, 112 F.4th at 949-52. C. False Statements During Presentence Interview Under § 3C1.1, a district court must enhance a defendant’s offense level by two points if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentenc- ing of the instant offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. A USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 12 of 17

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§ 3C1.1 enhancement is warranted if a defendant provides “mate- rially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presen- tence or other investigation for the court.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(H); see also United States v. Dedeker, 961 F.2d 164, 166 (11th Cir. 1992). The district court imposed the § 3C1.1 enhancement based on its finding that Young lied to a probation officer during a presen- tence interview. Specifically, Young told the probation officer that his mother was a drug addict, introduced him to drugs when he was two or three years old, and drove him to Atlanta to purchase drugs while impaired. Young does not contest that his statements to the probation officer were false. However, he argues that (1) he did not make the false statements willfully, and (2) the statements were not material. Both of Young’s arguments on this issue fail. First, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that Young made the false statements to the probation officer willfully. See United States v. Beaufils, 160 F.4th 1147, 1162 (11th Cir. 2025) (“When reviewing a district court’s application of an obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement, we review the district court’s fac- tual findings for clear error, but review de novo its application of the Sentencing Guidelines to those facts.”). Willfulness in the context of § 3C1.1 means that the defend- ant “must consciously act with the purpose of obstructing justice.” United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). Young argues that he did not make the relevant USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 13 of 17

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false statements willfully because he genuinely believed that the statements were true as a result of delusions stemming from men- tal illness. In support, he cites to a report written by a psychiatric expert concerning his delusions that he submitted to the district court for sentencing. As the government explained at sentencing, Young did not disavow the false statements until after the government discovered that they were false, and Young was represented by counsel during the presentence interview. Given these facts, the conclusion that Young intentionally lied about his upbringing is at the very least plausible, and thus the district court did not clearly err. See Gyetvay, 149 F.4th at 1242 (“We will not find clear error unless we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”); see also Beaufils, 160 F.4th at 1162 (“[W]e give significant deference to the district court’s credibility assessments.”). Second, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that Young’s false statements were material. A false statement is material for purposes of § 3C1.1 if it con- veys “information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.” United States v. Doe, 661 F.3d 550, 566 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.6). The false information does not actually need to hinder or affect the relevant determination, and the threshold for materiality is “conspicuously low.” Id. The district court’s conclusion that Young’s false statements about his purportedly traumatic childhood were material was not USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 14 of 17

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clearly erroneous because, if the district court had believed the statements, they “could have affected the determination of his sen- tence.” See United States v. Odedina, 980 F.2d 705, 705 (11th Cir. 1993). A defendant’s “history and characteristics” is one of the sen- tencing factors that a district court must weigh in deciding what sentence to impose. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). In fact, the district court in this case decided to impose a sentence below the statutory maximum because of Young’s mental-health problems despite its serious concerns about the threat Young posed to society. There- fore, it is possible that if the district court believed Young’s false statements about his childhood, it could have been induced to im- pose an even shorter sentence. D. Reckless Endangerment During Flight Under § 3C1.2, a district court must enhance a defendant’s offense level by two points “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. “‘Reckless’ refers to ‘a situation in which the defendant was aware of the risk created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted a gross de- viation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a situation.’” United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1197 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 392 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004)). Flight alone is insufficient to warrant a § 3C1.2 enhancement; instead, “[t]he flight must be accompanied USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 15 of 17

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by a ‘substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to others,’ and the defendant must ‘recklessly create’ that risk.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 392 F.3d at 1247). “It is the defendant’s conduct, not that of the pursuing officers, which must recklessly create the substan- tial risk of death or serious bodily injury to others.” Wilson, 392 F.3d at 1247. The district court did not clearly err by imposing the § 3C1.2 enhancement based on Young’s flight from law enforcement offic- ers during the May 2023 arrest. The bodycam footage of the May 2023 arrest that was ad- mitted at trial showed that Young fled from multiple police officers at walking speed while they were trying to detain him. Young led the officers into a busy road and then onto active railroad tracks. Additionally, Young kept a loaded firearm in his pocket and physi- cally struggled with the officers while they were trying to lawfully arrest him, causing him and one officer to fall down an embank- ment. It was not clear error for the district court to conclude that Young recklessly created a substantial risk of death or seriously body injury for the officers by leading them into a dangerous envi- ronment and physically struggling with them while possessing a loaded firearm. See Matchett, 802 F.3d at 1197-98 (affirming a § 3C1.2 enhancement where the defendant wrestled with an officer with a loaded firearm in his pocket because the firearm could have accidentally discharged). Although none of the officers were in- jured during the arrest, based on these facts, it was justifiable for USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 16 of 17

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the district court to conclude that “there was a substantial risk that something could have gone wrong and someone could have died or been seriously injured.” Id. at 1198. E. Substantive Reasonableness Lastly, Young argues that his 168-month within-guideline sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court overemphasized a single factor—the danger Young posed to soci- ety—to the exclusion of the other sentencing factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Young to 168 months’ imprisonment. The primary basis for the district court’s sentence was the threat it viewed that Young posed to society. However, the district court also explicitly considered the need for Young to obtain treatment for his mental-health prob- lems and declined to impose the statutory maximum sentence be- cause of those problems. The district court’s decision to give great weight to the dan- ger Young posed to society was appropriate because a district court “is permitted to attach ‘great weight’ to one [sentencing] factor over others.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 57 (2007)); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 34 F.4th 961, 977 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he weight given to any of the § 3553(a) factors is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”). Although the district court did not explicitly discuss each of the relevant sentencing factors, it was not required to do so as long as it considered all of them. See United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). USCA11 Case: 25-11552 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 03/30/2026 Page: 17 of 17

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In light of the great deference that we must afford to a dis- trict court’s weighing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, we con- clude that Young’s sentence is substantively reasonable. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1191 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“A dis- trict court’s sentence need not be the most appropriate one, it need only be a reasonable one. We may set aside a sentence only if we determine, after giving a full measure of deference to the sentenc- ing judge, that the sentence imposed truly is unreasonable.”); United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (“In re- viewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we will not substitute our own judgment for that of the sentencing court and we will af- firm a sentence so long as the court’s decision was in the ballpark of permissible outcomes.” (quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Sotelo, 130 F.4th 1229, 1245 (11th Cir. 2025) (“While we do not formally presume that a within-guidelines-range sen- tence is reasonable, we ordinarily expect it to be.” (quotation marks omitted)). II. CONCLUSION The district court did not err in its calculation of Young’s guideline range. Additionally, Young’s within-guideline sentence is substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm Young’s sen- tence of 168 months’ imprisonment. AFFIRMED.