United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP

374 F.3d 281, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11814, 2004 WL 1344957
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJune 16, 2004
Docket02-21200
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 374 F.3d 281 (United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11814, 2004 WL 1344957 (5th Cir. 2004).

Opinion

*284 PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Today we decide one of the many cases arising from the rubble of Enron Corporation, which fell from its lofty corporate perch in 2001 wreaking financial ruin upon thousands of investors, creditors, and employees. Like a falling giant redwood, it took down with it many members of its supporting cast. Our present focus is upon one of those, Arthur Andersen, LLP, then one of the largest accounting and consulting firms in the world.

Arthur Andersen appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in the Southern District of Texas upon a jury verdict finding it guilty of obstructing an official proceeding of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2). The indictment leading to the conviction was returned on March 7, 2002, charging Andersen in a single count of corruptly persuading one or more Andersen personnel to withhold, alter, destroy, or conceal documents with the intent to impair their availability in an official proceeding. That proceeding, which the government said Andersen knew was imminent and inevitable, was an investigation by the SEC into the relationship between Enron and Andersen, from whom Enron obtained accounting, auditing, and consulting services.

Trial commenced on May 6, 2002, and the verdict was returned on June 15, 2002. Writ large, the government says that Andersen, in an effort to protect itself and its largest single account, ordered a mass destruction of documents to keep them from the hands of the SEC.

Andersen asks this court to reverse its conviction, urging errors in four evidentia-ry rulings, misconduct by the prosecutor in his rebuttal jury summation, and two legal contentions regarding the required proof under § 1512(b)(2). The evidentiary rulings include admitting extensive evidence regarding two unrelated SEC enforcement actions against Andersen, excluding evidence of the volume of documents Andersen did not destroy, and excluding impeachment evidence. Regarding the proof required by § 1512(b)(2), Andersen urges that given its element of “corruption,” the government had to prove more than that it acted with an intent to impede the SEC. Finally, Andersen asserts that the government had to prove that Andersen intended to interfere with a “particular” proceeding.

We are not persuaded that this conviction is flawed by reversible error and we affirm the judgment of conviction.

I

During the 1990’s, Enron transformed itself from a natural gas pipeline operator into a trading and investment conglomerate with a large volume of trading in the energy business. Andersen both audited Enron’s publicly filed financial statements and provided internal audit and consulting services. By the late 1990’s, Andersen’s “engagement team” for its Enron account included more than 100 people, a significant number of which worked exclusively in Enron quarters in Houston, Texas. From 1997 through 2001 the engagement team’s leader was David Duncan. He was in turn subject to certain managing partners and accounting experts in Andersen’s Chicago office. Enron was a valued client producing 58 million dollars in revenue in 2000 for Andersen with projections of 100 million for the next year. Enron’s Chief Accounting Officer and Treasurer throughout this period came to the employ of Enron from the accounting staffs of Andersen, as did dozens of others. This was a close relationship. Indeed, the jury heard evidence that Andersen removed at Enron’s request at least one accountant *285 from his assignment with Enron after Enron disagreed with his accounting advice.

With Enron’s move to energy trading and rapid growth came aggressive accounting, pushing Generally Accepted Accounting Principles to its advantage. Part of this picture included- Enron’s use of “special purpose entities,” SPEs. These were “surrogate” companies whose purpose was to engage in business activity with no obligation to account for the activity on Enron’s balance sheet. Four of these SPEs — called Raptors — play a-large role in this story. They were created in 1999 and 2001, with the assistance of Andersen, largely capitalized with Enron stock. The Raptors engaged in- transactions with “LJM,” an entity run by Andrew Fastow, Enron’s Chief Financial Officer. By late 2000 and early 2001, the traded price of Enron’s stock was dropping and some of the Raptor’s investments were also turning downward. Some of the SPEs were profitable and some were experiencing sharp losses. But aggregated they reflected a positive return to Enron. GAAP would not permit such an aggregation of the four entities and Andersen’s Chicago office told David Duncan that it would not — that it was a “black and white” violation. That advice was ignored and the losses were buried under the profits of the group in the public reporting for the first quarter 2001. The slide of Enron stock continued, dropping some 50% from January to August 2001.

The summer of 2001 brought problems to Andersen on other fronts, and these “unrelated” events later become important to the issues before us. In June 2001 Andersen settled a dispute with the SEC regarding Andersen’s accounting and auditing work for Waste Management Corporation. Andersen was required to pay some $7 million, the largest monetary settlement ever exacted by the SEC, and Andersen suffered censure under SEC Rule 102(e). Then in July 2001, the SEC sued five officers of Sunbeam- Corporation and the lead Andersen partner on its audit.

Meanwhile, events at Enron began to accelerate. On August 14, 2001, Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s CEO, resigned, pushing Enron stock further downward. Within days, Sherron Watkins, a senior accountant at Enron, formerly at Andersen, warned Enron’s Chairman, Kenneth Lay, that Enron “could implode in a wave of accounting scandals.” She also warned David Duncan and Michael Odom, an Andersen partner in Houston who had oversight responsibility for Duncan. Chairman Lay promptly asked Enron’s principal outside legal counsel to examine the accused transactions. And by early September, senior Andersen officials and members of its legal department formed a “crisis-response” group, including, among others, its top risk manager and Nancy Temple, an in-house lawyer in Chicago assigned to Enron matters on September 28, 2001.

Possible proceedings became a reality on November 8, 2001, when Andersen received an SEC subpoena. The time line between September 28 and November 8, from a possibility of a proceeding to fact, is important and we turn briefly to that narrative. 1

On October 8, Andersen contacted a litigation partner at Davis, Polk and Ward-well in New York regarding representation of Andersen. The following day, Nancy Temple discussed the problem of Enron with senior in-house counsel at Andersen. *286 Her notes from this meeting refer to an SEC investigation as “highly probable” and to a “reasonable possibility” of a restatement of earnings.

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374 F.3d 281, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11814, 2004 WL 1344957, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-arthur-andersen-llp-ca5-2004.