United States v. Arredondo

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: April 30, 2025
• Docket: 24-50386
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Case: 24-50386 Document: 86-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/30/2025

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 24-50386 ____________ FILED April 30, 2025 United States of America, Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Anthony Arredondo,

Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:21-CR-432-1 ______________________________

Before Smith, Graves, and Duncan, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Anthony Arredondo pled guilty of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The predicate felony was his 2008 robbery conviction under Texas law. See Tex. Penal Code § 29.02. The appeal waiver in Arredondo’s plea agreement reserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). As he did in the district court, Arredondo now presses such a challenge on appeal, arguing

_____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 24-50386 Document: 86-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/30/2025

No. 24-50386

that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, both facially and as-applied, under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Arredondo concedes his facial challenge is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 459 (5th Cir. 2024), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 18, 2025) (No. 24-6625). But he contends that Diaz does not foreclose his as-applied challenge because that decision considered the predicate felony of Texas vehicle theft, see id. at 468–69, and not robbery. Whatever merit Arredondo’s as-applied challenge might have had, it too is now foreclosed by our precedent, as the Government asserts. In a published opinion, our court recently held that Diaz also forecloses an as- applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) when the defendant’s predicate felonies were, inter alia, robbery and burglary. See United States v. Schnur, 132 F.4th 863, 870–71 (5th Cir. 2025) 1; see also United States v. Collette, No. 22-51062, 2024 WL 4457462, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 10, 2024) (per curiam) (unpublished) (applying Diaz to foreclose as-applied challenge where defendant’s predicate felony was theft); United States v. Charles, No. 23-50131, 2025 WL 416092, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished) (same). AFFIRMED.

_____________________ 1 In Schnur, the defendant was convicted under an Illinois robbery statute substantively indistinguishable from the Texas robbery statute at issue here. See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/18-1 (“A person commits robbery when he or she knowingly takes property . . . from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force.”); compare Tex. Penal Code § 29.02(a) (“A person commits an offense if, in the course of committing theft . . . and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.”).