United States v. Armaghanian

31 C.C.P.A. 135, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 135
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedNovember 1, 1943
DocketNo. 4435
StatusPublished

This text of 31 C.C.P.A. 135 (United States v. Armaghanian) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Armaghanian, 31 C.C.P.A. 135, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 135 (ccpa 1943).

Opinion

Jackson, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States Customs Court, Second Division; sustaining four protests of importers which had been consolidated by stipulation for trial. The protests are numbers 70584-K/16435, 70585-K/18887, 70586-K/19034, and 70598-K/24011, and were made by the following importers respectively: D. H. Armaghanian, Colonial Process & Supply Corp., N. Y. Bolting Cloth Co., and Silk Screen Supplies. The involved merchandise was-classified for duty by the Collector of Customs at the port of New York under paragraph 1205 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as woven fabrics in the piece, wholly or in chief value of silk, not specially provided for, at 55 per centum ad valorem. It was claimed by the importers and held by the trial court to be properly dutiable under that paragraph as modified by the trade agreement with Switzerland, January 9, 1936, T. D. 48093, 69 Treas. Dec. 74, as silk bolting cloth not specially provided for at 30 per centum ad valorem. The only silk bolting cloth specially provided for in said act is set out in paragraph 1626, wherein such cloth imported expressly for milling purposes and so permanently marked as not to be available for any other use is free of duty.

By stipulation approved by the trial court it was agreed that the merchandise involved in the case of D. H. Armaghanian et al. v. United States, protest 6467-K etc., C. D. 451, was similar in all material respects to the merchandise here involved, and it was further stipulated that the record with all the exhibits in that case, and the record in the case of United States v. D. H. Armaghanian, 27 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 170, C. A. D. 81, should be incorporated in the instant case.

[137]*137At the trial, which was held in. the city of New York, the Government contended that the provision for “silk bolting cloth” in paragraph 1205 as amended , is not a use provision and the manner in which the involved merchandise is employed is not a bolting use.

The trial court held that the additional evidence in the instant case did not change the factual situation from that of the two incorporated cases, and on the authority of the decisions in the incorporated cases sustained the involved protests.

The issues here are the same as those presented to the lower court, and if either should be decided in favor of appellant the judgment appealed from must be reversed.

In the Armaghanian case, 27 C. C. P. A. supra, the record consisted solely of the testimony of the importer. Neither a sample of the importation nor any illustrative exhibit was before the court. The record in that case disclosed that the importer had been for a long time in the silk business and that his main business, at the time of taking testimony, was the importation of bolting cloth. He stated that the cloth covered by the invoice was bolting cloth and that it might be used for bolting, sifting, or passing through liquids or paints or dyes in liquid, near liquid, or in powdered form. He further-testified that the merchandise in suit was natural, pure silk. He admitted he did not understand the meaning of the terms “gauze woven” or “leno woven” silk. He stated that the merchandise in suit was leno woven, synonymous in his opinion with line woven, and that the merchandise was not bleached. The witness stated that the goods were always used on screens put in a frame, that they could not otherwise be used, and that they were not good for anything else. He testified that he had seen the imported cloth used for passing through pigments in the form of paint, straining syrup, straining paint “and other things in order to get it fine, even getting the liquid out of it,” and that he had seen it used in screen printing. The witness stated that he ordered the merchandise as bolting cloth and sold it as bolting cloth “or sometimes we ca)l it stencil cloth. It is bolting cloth for stencil. They are the only two forms and two-names we use in the trade.” The witness described bolting cloth as being made of pure silk with a certain degree of strength and non-sagging whether wet or dry. The cross-examination of the witness was directed entirely to his knowledge of weaves, concerning which he knew practically nothing.

The Government in that case contended before the trial court that-the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case, and in its brief here on appeal it set out the definition appearing on page 257 of a publication by the United States Tariff Commission entitled “Concessions Granted by the United States in .the Trade Agreement with Switzerland,” 1936, reading as follows: “Silk bolting cloth is a strong, [138]*138fine, leno (gauze) fabric, not weighted or bleached, and having a light gum finish.” In support of its contention the Government also quoted from Cyclopaedia of Textile Work, published by the American Technical Society, volume III, pages 6 and 237; and from a work “The Textile Industries” by William S. Murphy assisted by experts in textile technology, published by Gresham Publishing Co., London, England, volume VI, at pages 104 and 106.

We affirmed the judgment of the lower court sustaining the protest, ■and held that even though the testimony of the witness was not as clear and definite in some of its phases as it might be there was no conflict between any of his statements, and that he had established a prima jade case that the imported merchandise was chiefly used for bolting purposes and was therefore the kind of bolting cloth provided for in paragraph 1205 as amended.

In the case of D. H. Armaghanian et al. v. United States, C. D. 451, witnesses appeared for both parties and several exhibits were received in evidence. In that case a witness for plaintiffs, who was one of the importers, testified that as far as he knew the chief use of the involved merchandise there (which was testified to be the same as the goods imported in the prior Armaghanian case, supra) was in screen process printing. He also testified that all of his merchandise was sold to the screen printing trade. A witness for the Government in that •case, vice president of a company said to be the largest importer of bolting cloth in the United States, testified that the imported merchandise was never known as bolting cloth but was just a plain weave with the threads simply going under and over each other and was known as silk taffeta and was exclusively sold to the screen process printing trade. The witness identified what was conceded to , be silk bolting cloth and said that it had to be made with a leno weave. He described that weave as follows: “The warp threads are twisted around each other between two weft threads, and afterwards the next weft threads which are again crossed come to their first position. That is repeated indefinitely.” The witness defined a plain weave as “a weave in which one pick is raised over all the odd ends of the wai’p and passes under all the even ends of the warp; and the next pick is raised over all the even ends and passes under all the odd ends of the warp. But all the warp ends run parallel; they do not cross each other.” He stated that cloth such as the imported merchandise is designated as “taffeta weave” to distinguish it from bolting cloth which is more expensive and made with “leno weave.” The witness further testified that the primary reason why bolting cloth and taffeta weave cloth were not interchangeable was that the bolting trade would never accept the taffeta weave for bolting purposes.

The record in the case of

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31 C.C.P.A. 135, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 135, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-armaghanian-ccpa-1943.