United States v. Arlan Harrell

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 3, 2023
• Docket: 22-50035
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 3 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-50035

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00404-AB-1

v. MEMORANDUM* ARLAN WESLEY HARRELL, AKA Fritters, AKA Kronos, AKA Soole, AKA The Dread King,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 14, 2023 Pasadena, California

Before: W. FLETCHER, BERZON, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Arlan Harrell appeals from the district court’s order sentencing him to life in

prison for child exploitation, production of child pornography, and possession of

child pornography. He argues that his constitutional rights were violated at

sentencing because (1) the district court impermissibly based its sentencing decision

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. on unreliable information from a victim impact statement and (2) the government

and the victims’ parents used harsh language to describe him.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and

we affirm the district court. Because Harrell did not object while the sentencing

proceedings were underway, we review his claims for plain error. See United States

v. Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2009).

1. The district court did not violate Harrell’s rights by impermissibly

relying on a victim impact statement in which the mother of two of Harrell’s victims

suggested that Harrell is a psychopath who is likely to recidivate. To establish that

a district court inappropriately relied on unreliable information in sentencing, the

defendant must show that the unreliable information “demonstrably made the basis

for the sentence.” Id. at 935–36 (quoting United States v. Ibarra, 737 F.2d 825, 827

(9th Cir. 1984)). We presume that a sentencing judge reviewing victim impact

statements “applied the law . . . and considered only evidence that he knew was

admissible.” Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011).

In this case, there is insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that

the district court disregarded any unreliable information in the mother’s victim

impact statement. See id. The district court never mentioned the mother’s

recidivism-related statements when explaining its decision to impose a life sentence.

Although the mother and district court both described Harrell as “manipulative,”

2 there is nothing notable about their common use of the term, as there was significant

evidence that Harrell’s behavior was manipulative and the word “manipulative” is

not a term of art. And the district court expressed uncertainty about Harrell’s

rehabilitation prospects both before and after the mother spoke, suggesting that the

mother’s statements did not affect the district court’s assessment of this issue.

Harrell’s alternative argument that he did not receive adequate notice of the

mother’s statements (as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32) also

fails because the mother’s statements were fully disclosed “in open court at the

sentencing hearing.” See United States v. Baldrich, 471 F.3d 1110, 1114–15 (9th

Cir. 2006). And Harrell had a meaningful opportunity to challenge her statements,

as the district court gave him the chance to make objections after the victim impact

statements were completed.

2. The harsh language used during the sentencing proceedings did not

violate Harrell’s constitutional rights. Victim impact statements are “admissible at

sentencing unless their admission would be ‘so unduly prejudicial that it renders the

sentence fundamentally unfair.’” Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997)). Improper

language from the government violates a defendant’s rights only where it “so

infected the [sentencing proceedings] with unfairness as to make the resulting

[sentence] a denial of due process.” Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1015 (9th Cir.

3 2005) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). Absent evidence

to the contrary, we presume that sentencing judges know the law and consider only

admissible evidence. See Rhoades, 638 F.3d at 1055; see also Hurles v. Ryan, 752

F.3d 768, 783 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir.

2008) (en banc).

Although the government and victims’ parents used strong language at times

to describe Harrell and some parents expressed a desire for vengeance against him,

no evidence suggests that the harsh language swayed the district court. See id. The

district court never used dehumanizing language to describe Harrell, and it gave no

indication that it overlooked any mitigating circumstances. Its expressions of

sympathy for the victims’ parents do not suggest that the district court shared the

parents’ desire for vengeance against Harrell. In sum, nothing in the record disturbs

the presumption that the district court properly applied the law in its sentencing

decision, notwithstanding the strong language from the victims’ parents and the

government.

Nor did any error arise from the fact that the victim impact statements

extended beyond describing the impact of Harrell’s crimes to opine on his personal

characteristics and the appropriate punishment. Although the Eighth Amendment

prohibits a victim’s family members from commenting on “the crime, the defendant,

and the appropriate sentence” in a death-penalty case, Bosse v. Oklahoma, 580 U.S.

4 1, 3 (2016), this rule applies only in the capital context. See Booth v. Maryland, 482

U.S. 496, 509 n.12 (1987), overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Tennessee, 501

U.S. 808 (1991). Victim impact statements are meant “to force the defendant to

confront the human cost of his crime,” Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 435 F.3d 1011, 1016

(9th Cir. 2006), and it is unavoidable that some victims will use charged language

against the defendant in doing so. We have recognized that such language is

admissible “as a reflection of the anguish [the crime] caused.” See Gretzler, 112

F.3d at 1009. Thus, the strong language used during Harrell’s sentencing

proceedings did not violate his rights, given that there is no evidence that it

influenced the district court.

AFFIRMED.