United States v. Antun Lewis

521 F. App'x 530
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedApril 16, 2013
Docket12-3262
StatusUnpublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 521 F. App'x 530 (United States v. Antun Lewis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Antun Lewis, 521 F. App'x 530 (6th Cir. 2013).

Opinion

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

On May 21, 2005, a fire at 1220 East 87th Street (“1220 House”), a Section 8 rental home in Cleveland, Ohio, killed eight children and one adult. One adult, Nicole Bell, was severely burned but escaped. Another adult, Teon Smith, escaped without injury. In connection with that fire, on October 1, 2008, Antun Lewis was charged with arson resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Lewis’s case was tried before a jury in January and February 2011, culminating in a guilty verdict. Lewis filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. On February 8, 2012, the district court granted Lewis’s motion in a 95-page *531 memorandum and order. The United States filed a timely notice of appeal. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial, we affirm.

I.

Lewis filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, arguing that the jury’s guilty verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that “[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” A motion for a new trial should be granted only “in the extraordinary circumstance where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 592 (6th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When considering a motion for a new trial, the district court “may act as a thirteenth juror, assessing the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence.” Id. at 593. Although we have not squarely addressed whether a district court may consider evidence not presented at trial when evaluating a Rule 33 motion, the district court in this case declined to consider evidence that was not admitted at trial.

We review a district court’s grant of a new trial to a defendant under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Sypher, 684 F.3d 622, 626 (6th Cir.2012). An abuse of discretion occurs when we are persuaded that a mistake has been made due to the district court’s reliance on “ ‘clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard.’ ” United States v. Allen, 619 F.3d 518, 523-24 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting Ross v. Duggan, 402 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir.2010)). We have noted that the district court is entitled to a great deal of deference in appellate review of Rule 33 motions, given that “ ‘the trial judge, not an appellate court reading a cold record, can best weigh the errors against the record as a whole to determine whether those errors in the conduct of the trial justify a new trial.’ ” United States v. Breinig, 70 F.3d 850, 851 (6th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. McBride, 862 F.2d 1316, 1320 (8th Cir.1988)). However, we have also recognized that this deferential standard must be weighed against the fact that new trial motions “are disfavored and should be granted with caution.” United States v. Willis, 257 F.3d 636, 645 (6th Cir.2001). We do not second-guess the district court’s credibility determinations, but review only for a “clear and manifest abuse of discretion.” United States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 589 n. 6 (6th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the district court carefully and thoroughly reviewed the voluminous transcript, evaluated the credibility of government and defense witnesses, and did not abuse its discretion in granting Lewis’s motion for a new trial.

II.

Lewis was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), which provides that “[w] ho ever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce” has committed a federal crime. At trial, the government presented three primary categories of evidence: Marion Jackson’s eyewitness testimony, the testimony of inmate informants regarding statements made by Lewis while incarcerated, and the testimony of other witnesses who knew *532 Lewis in the community and had knowledge relating to Lewis’s possible motives for committing the arson. Marion Jackson’s testimony provided the most direct and comprehensive account of Lewis’s involvement of the arson. However, the district court found his testimony internally inconsistent, unreliable, and lacking corroboration. The inmate informants purported to have heard Lewis incriminate himself in the arson, but the district court found significant the fact that the informants were all connected in some way to an inmate who had received prior benefits from ATF. Moreover, the court discounted their testimony because the inmate informants’ stories were uncannily similar in superficial ways and were not corroborated by witnesses who knew the residents of the 1220 House. The community witnesses, including Samantha Collins, George Hightower, Carmella Smith, and Charise Frazier, testified to statements Lewis made about the fire and his possible motives for setting the fire. The district court concluded that the credibility of these witnesses was undermined by their initial unwillingness to provide their statements to law enforcement and the lack of corroboration of their stories through Lewis’s phone records. When evaluating the record as a whole and acting as the thirteenth juror, the district court’s concerns about the credibility of Jackson, the inmate informants, and the community witnesses call into question a large portion of the government’s proof. As a result, the district court found that these inconsistencies called into question the likelihood that Lewis was the arsonist and weighed heavily against the jury’s guilty verdict. Viewed in this context, we discuss the evidence relied upon by the district court and the government’s arguments of error.

A.

At trial, the government’s key witness was Marion Jackson, who testified that he was Lewis’s accomplice in the arson and the only eyewitness to the crime. At the time of the fire, Jackson was fifty-five years old and had a thirty-year criminal record, including multiple theft crimes.

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Bluebook (online)
521 F. App'x 530, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-antun-lewis-ca6-2013.