NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0101n.06
Case No. 23-5470
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Mar 06, 2024 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN ANTONIO TAYLOR, ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION )
Before: SILER, COLE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
COLE, Circuit Judge. After the district court found that he was competent to stand trial,
Antonio Taylor pleaded guilty to five offenses related to assault, kidnapping, and possession of a
stolen firearm. Taylor argues that, in making its legal competency determination, the district court
gave improper weight to one psychologist’s testimony and consequently disregarded evidence in
the record of Taylor’s personality disorders. Because the district court’s decision does not amount
to clear error, we affirm.
I.
On June 17, 2021, while Taylor was on supervised release for a previous conviction, a
federal probation officer visited Taylor at his home for a check-in visit. During that visit, Taylor
assaulted the probation officer, took her employer-issued gun, and struck her in the forehead with
the gun. Taylor then dragged her to his bedroom where he raped her repeatedly for approximately
three hours. Taylor eventually allowed the probation officer to leave, but he kept her gun. On Case No. 23-5470, United States v. Taylor
August 17, 2021, a grand jury in the Western District of Tennessee indicted Taylor with assaulting
a federal officer, kidnapping a federal officer, knowingly possessing a stolen gun, being a felon in
possession of a gun, and using a gun during a crime of violence. (Indictment, R. 2, Page ID 4−6.)
On September 7, 2021, Taylor’s counsel moved for a mental competency evaluation
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 and 4242. A yearlong dispute over Taylor’s competency followed,
resulting in two evaluations, a lengthy competency hearing, and two change-of-plea hearings. We
briefly summarize the relevant parts of the record regarding this dispute below.
At the behest of Taylor’s defense counsel, Dr. Megan Avery, a licensed psychologist,
conducted the first competency evaluation on October 1, 2021. Dr. Avery’s evaluation consisted
of a two-hour clinical interview with Taylor, her observations of Taylor speaking with his counsel,
clinical tests related to mental functioning and academic skills, and a test designed to detect the
feigning or exaggeration of mental disorders. Dr. Avery also interviewed Taylor’s mother, Tonya
Taylor, and reviewed certain records of Taylor’s medical history. On November 24, 2021, Dr.
Avery completed her report and concluded that Taylor was not competent to stand trial. Dr. Avery
diagnosed Taylor with “Schizoaffective Disorder,” “Antisocial Personality Disorder,”
“malingering,” and alcohol and cocaine use disorders. (Id. at PageID 62.) Her report defined
“malingering” as “the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or
psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as evading criminal prosecution.”
(Id. at PageID 63) Notably, Dr. Avery’s report also stated that “[m]alingering interfered with a
completely accurate assessment of [Taylor’s] competency,” and that “[a] competency study in a
prison setting (i.e., in the Bureau of Prisons) will also allow for more observation to delineate
which symptoms are psychosis and which are attributed to malingering.” (Id. at PageID 64.)
-2- Case No. 23-5470, United States v. Taylor
The government requested a second competency evaluation on December 2, 2021, which
the court granted. Dr. Lisa Feldman, a forensic psychologist, observed Taylor for a three-month
period at the BOP Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida, from January to April 2022. Dr.
Feldman’s evaluation similarly included a detailed review of Taylor’s medical records, general
background, and criminal history. And Dr. Feldman also reviewed the “extensive records”
available to her from the BOP’s “Psychology Services” team that had repeatedly evaluated Taylor
during a previous five-and-a-half-year period of incarceration starting in 2015. (Id. at PageID
144.)
In contrast to Dr. Avery, Dr. Feldman was not able to interview Taylor because he refused
to participate in an intake evaluation or submit to testing. (Id.) But Dr. Feldman’s psychological
team and other members of the BOP correctional staff continued to have contacts with Taylor and
observed him during this three-month period, which was done to “obtain a broader understanding
of [Taylor’s] adaptive and interpersonal skills.” (Id.) Dr. Feldman issued her report on April 29,
2022, concluding that Taylor was competent to stand trial. (Id. at Page ID 139, 154) (stating
“[Taylor] demonstrated no active mental states that would interfere with his rational understanding
of the proceedings against him or his ability to assist toward his defense, if he was motivated to do
so”.) She also diagnosed Taylor with malingering and antisocial personality disorder. With
respect to malingering in particular, Dr. Feldman explained that “[t]hroughout the evaluation, Mr.
Taylor’s behavior appeared purposeful and under his volitional control.” (Id. at 154)
The district court conducted a competency hearing on August 18, 2022, where it heard
testimony from Dr. Avery, Dr. Feldman, Taylor’s mother, and Taylor’s aunt, Ladaria Taylor. The
government presented supplemental evidence that they argued demonstrated Taylor’s competency,
including jail phone records where Taylor expressed to his mother that he needed a lawyer, records
-3- Case No. 23-5470, United States v. Taylor
of Taylor’s requests for medical treatment while incarcerated, and records of Taylor’s previous
appearances in court where he seemingly understood the nature of the proceedings.
Both psychologists’ testimony largely paralleled the conclusions found in their reports.
Importantly, Dr. Avery clarified that Taylor “probably” was not competent to stand trial, but she
could not “be 100 percent certain . . . because of the malingering. And [the] next step would be to
refer [Taylor] to the [BOP] for a more extensive study.” (Competency Hr’g Trans., R. 62 at PageID
236.) Regarding the other witnesses, Tonya and Ladaria Taylor’s collective testimony reflected
that, when he was as a minor, Taylor (1) was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, possible
schizophrenia, and a learning disability; (2) had general behavioral issues related to his diagnoses
that resulted in frequent altercations—often physical—with other children and family members;
and (3) was incarcerated on multiple occasions, which was traumatic for him and only intensified
his poor behavior. Taylor’s mother also noted that Taylor’s mental instability may stem from a
brain injury he sustained during a suicide attempt at age 20; specifically, that “oxygen was cut off
from [Taylor’s] brain,” and she was told that he would “never be the same mentally.” (Id. at Page
ID, 253)
The district court then found that Taylor was competent to stand trial. Taylor thereafter
pleaded guilty to all five counts in the indictment. Taylor now brings this appeal.
II.
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0101n.06
Case No. 23-5470
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Mar 06, 2024 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN ANTONIO TAYLOR, ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION )
Before: SILER, COLE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
COLE, Circuit Judge. After the district court found that he was competent to stand trial,
Antonio Taylor pleaded guilty to five offenses related to assault, kidnapping, and possession of a
stolen firearm. Taylor argues that, in making its legal competency determination, the district court
gave improper weight to one psychologist’s testimony and consequently disregarded evidence in
the record of Taylor’s personality disorders. Because the district court’s decision does not amount
to clear error, we affirm.
I.
On June 17, 2021, while Taylor was on supervised release for a previous conviction, a
federal probation officer visited Taylor at his home for a check-in visit. During that visit, Taylor
assaulted the probation officer, took her employer-issued gun, and struck her in the forehead with
the gun. Taylor then dragged her to his bedroom where he raped her repeatedly for approximately
three hours. Taylor eventually allowed the probation officer to leave, but he kept her gun. On Case No. 23-5470, United States v. Taylor
August 17, 2021, a grand jury in the Western District of Tennessee indicted Taylor with assaulting
a federal officer, kidnapping a federal officer, knowingly possessing a stolen gun, being a felon in
possession of a gun, and using a gun during a crime of violence. (Indictment, R. 2, Page ID 4−6.)
On September 7, 2021, Taylor’s counsel moved for a mental competency evaluation
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 and 4242. A yearlong dispute over Taylor’s competency followed,
resulting in two evaluations, a lengthy competency hearing, and two change-of-plea hearings. We
briefly summarize the relevant parts of the record regarding this dispute below.
At the behest of Taylor’s defense counsel, Dr. Megan Avery, a licensed psychologist,
conducted the first competency evaluation on October 1, 2021. Dr. Avery’s evaluation consisted
of a two-hour clinical interview with Taylor, her observations of Taylor speaking with his counsel,
clinical tests related to mental functioning and academic skills, and a test designed to detect the
feigning or exaggeration of mental disorders. Dr. Avery also interviewed Taylor’s mother, Tonya
Taylor, and reviewed certain records of Taylor’s medical history. On November 24, 2021, Dr.
Avery completed her report and concluded that Taylor was not competent to stand trial. Dr. Avery
diagnosed Taylor with “Schizoaffective Disorder,” “Antisocial Personality Disorder,”
“malingering,” and alcohol and cocaine use disorders. (Id. at PageID 62.) Her report defined
“malingering” as “the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or
psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as evading criminal prosecution.”
(Id. at PageID 63) Notably, Dr. Avery’s report also stated that “[m]alingering interfered with a
completely accurate assessment of [Taylor’s] competency,” and that “[a] competency study in a
prison setting (i.e., in the Bureau of Prisons) will also allow for more observation to delineate
which symptoms are psychosis and which are attributed to malingering.” (Id. at PageID 64.)
-2- Case No. 23-5470, United States v. Taylor
The government requested a second competency evaluation on December 2, 2021, which
the court granted. Dr. Lisa Feldman, a forensic psychologist, observed Taylor for a three-month
period at the BOP Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida, from January to April 2022. Dr.
Feldman’s evaluation similarly included a detailed review of Taylor’s medical records, general
background, and criminal history. And Dr. Feldman also reviewed the “extensive records”
available to her from the BOP’s “Psychology Services” team that had repeatedly evaluated Taylor
during a previous five-and-a-half-year period of incarceration starting in 2015. (Id. at PageID
144.)
In contrast to Dr. Avery, Dr. Feldman was not able to interview Taylor because he refused
to participate in an intake evaluation or submit to testing. (Id.) But Dr. Feldman’s psychological
team and other members of the BOP correctional staff continued to have contacts with Taylor and
observed him during this three-month period, which was done to “obtain a broader understanding
of [Taylor’s] adaptive and interpersonal skills.” (Id.) Dr. Feldman issued her report on April 29,
2022, concluding that Taylor was competent to stand trial. (Id. at Page ID 139, 154) (stating
“[Taylor] demonstrated no active mental states that would interfere with his rational understanding
of the proceedings against him or his ability to assist toward his defense, if he was motivated to do
so”.) She also diagnosed Taylor with malingering and antisocial personality disorder. With
respect to malingering in particular, Dr. Feldman explained that “[t]hroughout the evaluation, Mr.
Taylor’s behavior appeared purposeful and under his volitional control.” (Id. at 154)
The district court conducted a competency hearing on August 18, 2022, where it heard
testimony from Dr. Avery, Dr. Feldman, Taylor’s mother, and Taylor’s aunt, Ladaria Taylor. The
government presented supplemental evidence that they argued demonstrated Taylor’s competency,
including jail phone records where Taylor expressed to his mother that he needed a lawyer, records
-3- Case No. 23-5470, United States v. Taylor
of Taylor’s requests for medical treatment while incarcerated, and records of Taylor’s previous
appearances in court where he seemingly understood the nature of the proceedings.
Both psychologists’ testimony largely paralleled the conclusions found in their reports.
Importantly, Dr. Avery clarified that Taylor “probably” was not competent to stand trial, but she
could not “be 100 percent certain . . . because of the malingering. And [the] next step would be to
refer [Taylor] to the [BOP] for a more extensive study.” (Competency Hr’g Trans., R. 62 at PageID
236.) Regarding the other witnesses, Tonya and Ladaria Taylor’s collective testimony reflected
that, when he was as a minor, Taylor (1) was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, possible
schizophrenia, and a learning disability; (2) had general behavioral issues related to his diagnoses
that resulted in frequent altercations—often physical—with other children and family members;
and (3) was incarcerated on multiple occasions, which was traumatic for him and only intensified
his poor behavior. Taylor’s mother also noted that Taylor’s mental instability may stem from a
brain injury he sustained during a suicide attempt at age 20; specifically, that “oxygen was cut off
from [Taylor’s] brain,” and she was told that he would “never be the same mentally.” (Id. at Page
ID, 253)
The district court then found that Taylor was competent to stand trial. Taylor thereafter
pleaded guilty to all five counts in the indictment. Taylor now brings this appeal.
II.
The competency determination “is a question of fact [that] we review for clear error.”
United States v. Dubrule, 822 F.3d 866, 875 (6th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). The bar
for incompetency is high, and we will not reverse the district court’s finding unless “on the entire
evidence [we are] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. Gypsum
-4- Case No. 23-5470, United States v. Taylor
Co. 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). As such, “[i]n the absence of such a definite and firm conviction,
we cannot reverse the district court’s findings—even if ‘[we] would have weighed the evidence
differently.’” Dubrule, 822 F.3d at 875 (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574).
III.
Taylor entered his guilty plea after the district court found that he was competent to stand
trial for the five counts in the indictment. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397−98 (1993).
To be competent to stand trial, the defendant must possess (1) “a sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and (2) “a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dubrule, 822 F.3d at 875 (quoting
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)). In making this determination, a court should
consider evidence including that of “irrational behavior, the defendant’s demeanor at trial and any
prior medical opinion concerning competence to stand trial.” United States v. Prigmore, 15 F.4th
768, 776 (6th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted).
Here, given the district court’s reliance on multiple portions of the record to make its factual
determinations, “[w]e see no error in the district court’s competency finding, let alone clear error.”
Id. at 776. Prior to making its competency determination, the district court conducted an extensive
hearing where it considered the testimony of two psychologists, discussed those psychologists’
competency evaluations at length, and heard testimony from Taylor’s family members. The
district court also considered supplemental evidence that was relevant to Taylor’s competency,
including records of Taylor’s jail phone calls, his requests for medical treatment while
incarcerated, his previous appearances in court, and a competency evaluation performed by Dr.
Ron Nieberding—a clinical psychologist—that found that Taylor was competent to stand trial for
a felon-in-possession charge in 2015.
-5- Case No. 23-5470, United States v. Taylor
The district court’s order addressed both psychologists’ reports and other portions of the
record to highlight that Taylor (1) expressed a need for a lawyer over the phone, (2) stated that his
“charges [were] ‘bad’,” (3) discussed the severity of kidnapping and sex charges with his lawyer
in front of Dr. Avery during the evaluation, (4) asked jurisdictional questions, and (5) “articulate[d]
the role of the judge and defendant . . . [and] also expressed that this attorney’s role is to ‘represent
him.’” (Sealed Order, R.67, PageID 690−93). Taylor also expressed an understanding of the
specific charges against him and discussed the underlying facts of the case in previous status
conferences and court appearances. This cumulative evidence, along with Dr. Feldman’s report,
permitted the court to conclude that Taylor had a sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer, and likewise had a rational understanding of the legal proceedings against him. (Sealed
Order, R.67, PageID 691.) The facts emphasized here closely resemble the types of evidence our
precedent has instructed district courts to review when making this determination. See United
States v. Miller, 531 F.3d 340, 348 (6th Cir. 2008).
Taylor’s primary rebuttal is that “the District Court based its [competency determination]
almost exclusively on Dr. Feldman’s opinion that [Taylor] was malingering,” and he consequently
asserts that the district court “disregarded/discounted [his] severe personality disorders.”
(Appellant Br. at 37−39.) His argument, however, fails on both legal and factual grounds.
First, as the district court acknowledged, the presence of a mental illness alone does not
categorically mean that a defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial. (Sealed Order, R. 67,
PageID 685−86) (citing United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1290 (“[I]t does not follow that
because a person is mentally ill he is incompetent to stand trial.”)). Taylor’s briefing focuses almost
exclusively on his personality disorder diagnoses. He connects these disorders to certain
challenging behaviors—such as his “disorganized behavior and speech,” “violent verbal
-6- Case No. 23-5470, United States v. Taylor
outbursts,” and the “physical altercations” resulting from his outbursts—to argue that these
behaviors prove legal incompetence. (Appellant Br. at 50, 56, 59.) But “[o]ur caselaw is replete
with instances of criminal defendants who exhibit[t] bizarre behavior . . . [but] nonetheless me[e]t
the Constitution’s competency standard.” Prigmore, 15 F.4th at 776–77 (collecting cases). Further
undermining what Taylor argues here, “[i]n some of those cases, that behavior [also] apparently
stemmed from severe personality disorders.” Id. at 777 (reiterating that “a severe personality
disorder is not alone sufficient to make one legally incompetent to stand trial”).
Second, as explained in detail above, Dr. Feldman’s conclusion that Taylor was
malingering was only one factor in the district court’s competency determination, and the
malingering finding was not, as Taylor argues, the linchpin of the court’s analysis. (See generally
Sealed Order, R. 67, PageID 687−94.) True enough, there are several places in the record
suggesting that Taylor was exaggerating certain aspects of his mental health and history to attain
favorable treatment and “avoid legal repercussions.” The district court was correct to highlight
that (1) “[p]ast medical providers have also diagnosed [Taylor] with malingering,” (2) “[b]oth
psychologists testified that Defendant’s malingering [was] intentional,” (3) Taylor also exhibited
an “exaggerated testing approach” when previously incarcerated, and (4) there were
“inconsistencies between what [Taylor] told Dr. Avery during her evaluation and previous BOP
reports . . . [,] indicat[ing] that [he] was engaging in deliberate behavior to appear more impaired
during his evaluation with Dr. Avery.” (R. 67, PageID 682, 689.)
Taylor again attempts to rebut this evidence by arguing that his mental health diagnoses
overshadow any evidence of malingering, and that Dr. Feldman’s analysis is centered on “a
[f]aulty [p]remise.” (Appellant Br. at 40−46.) This argument also fails, however, because the
district court was entitled to give more weight to Dr. Feldman’s opinion and report. See, e.g.,
-7- Case No. 23-5470, United States v. Taylor
United States v. Mathis, 738 F.3d 719, 740 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding no clear error where “the court
thoughtfully considered and weighed the testimony from the parties’ experts, finding the
government’s [expert] more persuasive”). Indeed, Dr. Feldman’s “opinion was based on a more
extensive evaluation of [Taylor], and her conclusions were more thoroughly [supported]” by the
BOP’s three-month examination than Dr. Avery’s report. See Dubrule, 822 F.3d at 876. As such,
“[o]n review of th[is] record, we cannot say that this finding was clearly erroneous.” Id.
IV.
On this record, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Taylor was competent to
stand trial for the offenses for which he was indicted. Taylor’s challenge to his guilty plea therefore
fails. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
-8-