NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0311n.06
No. 25-5702
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Jul 17, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff -Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE ANTHONY L. WARD, ) Defendant -Appellant. ) OPINION ) )
Before: CLAY, GIBBONS, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. After surveilling Anthony Ward for several months, law
enforcement executed a warrant to search his home for evidence of drug trafficking. The warrant
rested on information obtained from a confidential informant, an out-of-state warrant for Ward’s
arrest on drug charges, hand-to-hand transactions that officers observed at or near Ward’s home,
and drugs they recovered from Ward’s vehicle. Ward moved to suppress the evidence seized from
his home, arguing that the warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause. The district court
denied his motion. Because the search warrant was supported by probable cause, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Ward challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from
a residence in Chattanooga, Tennessee. In evaluating whether probable cause supported the
warrant to search a residence, “we look only to the four corners of the affidavit.” United States v.
Brooks, 594 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2010). So we begin by describing the facts, as detailed in the
affidavit. No. 25-5702, United States v. Ward
For several months, officers in the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office investigated Anthony
Ward on suspicions of illegal drug possession and distribution. It appears that this investigation
began when a confidential informant told the officers that Ward was “engaged in the illegal sales
and possession of Heroin.” Warrant, R. 17-1, PageID 51. But the affidavit does not detail the date
of the tip, and it contains no information about the informant’s reliability, relationship with law
enforcement, or the basis of the informant’s knowledge about Ward’s alleged drug dealing.
During the two months that officers surveilled Ward, they observed two apparent “hand-
to-hand transactions” at or near Ward’s house. Id. The first transaction was between Ward and
another man at a Speedway half a mile from Ward’s home. After the transaction, Ward returned
directly home. Officers confirmed that the residence Ward returned to was his home because it
matched the address listed on his revoked Tennessee ID, issued less than six months before their
surveillance. The second transaction was between Ward and another person at Ward’s home.
While conducting their investigation, out-of-state authorities notified the sheriff’s office
that there were active warrants for Ward’s arrest for conspiracy to distribute heroin. The next day,
officers followed Ward as he drove from his house to another location. When Ward arrived at his
destination, officers arrested him for driving on a revoked license and the out-of-state warrants.
Officers then searched Ward’s car and found ten hydrocodone pills wrapped in a napkin in the
driver-side door handle. They also found a marijuana blunt in the vehicle’s center console.
From these facts, the affiant officer attested that there was probable cause to believe Ward
kept illegal narcotics at his home. He explained that he had been a law enforcement officer for
almost a decade and had “specialized training in and experience with the world of controlled
substances, their unlawful use, and the traffic therein.” Id. at PageID 50. Drawing from his
experience, he averred that “[s]treet sellers of drugs often carry only a small amount [of drugs] on
-2- No. 25-5702, United States v. Ward
their persons” while “keeping a large supply nearby.” Id. He therefore requested a warrant to
search Ward’s home.
Based on the warrant affidavit, a state judge concluded that there was probable cause to
search Ward’s home for evidence of drug trafficking and issued a search warrant. Officers
executed the warrant the same day. During their search they discovered approximately 94.8 grams
of suspected fentanyl and 7.1 grams of suspected marijuana, digital scales, a pouch filled with
small baggies, a pill bottle with 27 suspected hydrocodone pills, and approximately $9,720 in cash.
Ward was charged with one count of possession with intent to distribute at least 40 grams
of fentanyl. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his home, arguing
that the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant did not establish probable cause. In the
alternative, he claimed that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply since
any reasonable officer would have known that the warrant failed to establish probable cause.
Adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court rejected both arguments and
denied Ward’s motion.
Ward entered into a conditional plea agreement. He pleaded guilty to one count of intent
to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), while also reserving the
right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The district court sentenced
him to 168 months in prison. Ward timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress we review its factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Simmons, 129 F.4th 382,
386 (6th Cir. 2025).
-3- No. 25-5702, United States v. Ward
The Fourth Amendment requires “probable cause” for “Warrants [to] issue.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Probable cause is “not a high bar.” United States v. Sheckles, 996 F.3d 330, 337 (6th
Cir. 2021) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)). It requires only “a fair
probability” that law enforcement will find “contraband or evidence of a crime . . . in a particular
place.” United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). In other
words, there must be a “nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought.” United
States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 381 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d
591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004)). When deciding whether that “fair probability” exists, we assess “the
totality of the circumstances through the common-sense lens of ordinary people, not the technical
lens of trained lawyers.” Sheckles, 996 F.3d at 337.
Based on the totality of the information in the affidavit on which the warrant was based,
this warrant was supported by probable cause. A confidential informant alerted the sheriff’s office
to Ward’s alleged drug trafficking. Then an out-of-state warrant confirmed that there was reason
to believe Ward was distributing heroin. The officers’ own surveillance confirmed those reports.
At a gas station, less than half a mile from Ward’s house, officers watched what appeared to be a
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0311n.06
No. 25-5702
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Jul 17, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff -Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE ANTHONY L. WARD, ) Defendant -Appellant. ) OPINION ) )
Before: CLAY, GIBBONS, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. After surveilling Anthony Ward for several months, law
enforcement executed a warrant to search his home for evidence of drug trafficking. The warrant
rested on information obtained from a confidential informant, an out-of-state warrant for Ward’s
arrest on drug charges, hand-to-hand transactions that officers observed at or near Ward’s home,
and drugs they recovered from Ward’s vehicle. Ward moved to suppress the evidence seized from
his home, arguing that the warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause. The district court
denied his motion. Because the search warrant was supported by probable cause, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Ward challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from
a residence in Chattanooga, Tennessee. In evaluating whether probable cause supported the
warrant to search a residence, “we look only to the four corners of the affidavit.” United States v.
Brooks, 594 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2010). So we begin by describing the facts, as detailed in the
affidavit. No. 25-5702, United States v. Ward
For several months, officers in the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office investigated Anthony
Ward on suspicions of illegal drug possession and distribution. It appears that this investigation
began when a confidential informant told the officers that Ward was “engaged in the illegal sales
and possession of Heroin.” Warrant, R. 17-1, PageID 51. But the affidavit does not detail the date
of the tip, and it contains no information about the informant’s reliability, relationship with law
enforcement, or the basis of the informant’s knowledge about Ward’s alleged drug dealing.
During the two months that officers surveilled Ward, they observed two apparent “hand-
to-hand transactions” at or near Ward’s house. Id. The first transaction was between Ward and
another man at a Speedway half a mile from Ward’s home. After the transaction, Ward returned
directly home. Officers confirmed that the residence Ward returned to was his home because it
matched the address listed on his revoked Tennessee ID, issued less than six months before their
surveillance. The second transaction was between Ward and another person at Ward’s home.
While conducting their investigation, out-of-state authorities notified the sheriff’s office
that there were active warrants for Ward’s arrest for conspiracy to distribute heroin. The next day,
officers followed Ward as he drove from his house to another location. When Ward arrived at his
destination, officers arrested him for driving on a revoked license and the out-of-state warrants.
Officers then searched Ward’s car and found ten hydrocodone pills wrapped in a napkin in the
driver-side door handle. They also found a marijuana blunt in the vehicle’s center console.
From these facts, the affiant officer attested that there was probable cause to believe Ward
kept illegal narcotics at his home. He explained that he had been a law enforcement officer for
almost a decade and had “specialized training in and experience with the world of controlled
substances, their unlawful use, and the traffic therein.” Id. at PageID 50. Drawing from his
experience, he averred that “[s]treet sellers of drugs often carry only a small amount [of drugs] on
-2- No. 25-5702, United States v. Ward
their persons” while “keeping a large supply nearby.” Id. He therefore requested a warrant to
search Ward’s home.
Based on the warrant affidavit, a state judge concluded that there was probable cause to
search Ward’s home for evidence of drug trafficking and issued a search warrant. Officers
executed the warrant the same day. During their search they discovered approximately 94.8 grams
of suspected fentanyl and 7.1 grams of suspected marijuana, digital scales, a pouch filled with
small baggies, a pill bottle with 27 suspected hydrocodone pills, and approximately $9,720 in cash.
Ward was charged with one count of possession with intent to distribute at least 40 grams
of fentanyl. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his home, arguing
that the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant did not establish probable cause. In the
alternative, he claimed that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply since
any reasonable officer would have known that the warrant failed to establish probable cause.
Adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court rejected both arguments and
denied Ward’s motion.
Ward entered into a conditional plea agreement. He pleaded guilty to one count of intent
to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), while also reserving the
right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The district court sentenced
him to 168 months in prison. Ward timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress we review its factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Simmons, 129 F.4th 382,
386 (6th Cir. 2025).
-3- No. 25-5702, United States v. Ward
The Fourth Amendment requires “probable cause” for “Warrants [to] issue.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Probable cause is “not a high bar.” United States v. Sheckles, 996 F.3d 330, 337 (6th
Cir. 2021) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)). It requires only “a fair
probability” that law enforcement will find “contraband or evidence of a crime . . . in a particular
place.” United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). In other
words, there must be a “nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought.” United
States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 381 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d
591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004)). When deciding whether that “fair probability” exists, we assess “the
totality of the circumstances through the common-sense lens of ordinary people, not the technical
lens of trained lawyers.” Sheckles, 996 F.3d at 337.
Based on the totality of the information in the affidavit on which the warrant was based,
this warrant was supported by probable cause. A confidential informant alerted the sheriff’s office
to Ward’s alleged drug trafficking. Then an out-of-state warrant confirmed that there was reason
to believe Ward was distributing heroin. The officers’ own surveillance confirmed those reports.
At a gas station, less than half a mile from Ward’s house, officers watched what appeared to be a
drug transaction, after which Ward returned home. See Sanders, 106 F.4th at 462–63; United States
v. Ellison, 632 F.3d 347, 349 (6th Cir. 2011). A second apparent drug transaction followed, this
one in front of Ward’s home. See Ellison, 632 F.3d at 349. And when officers ultimately arrested
Ward and found drugs in his car, he had just come from home. See Sanders, 106 F.4th at 462.
Moreover, the affiant, an officer in the Hamilton County Sherriff’s Office, had almost a decade of
experience and was thus “versed in the field of law enforcement,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
232 (1983) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)), when he implied that
although Ward only carried a “small amount” of drugs in his car, he was likely “keeping a larger
-4- No. 25-5702, United States v. Ward
supply nearby.” Warrant, R. 17-1, PageID 50. Thus, the totality of the facts detailed in the warrant
affidavit provided a “substantial basis” for the magistrate to find probable cause to search Ward’s
home for drugs. See Sheckles, 996 F.3d at 339.
Ward resists this conclusion. But his arguments are not persuasive considering the totality
of the circumstances.
Ward takes issue with the fact that the hard-to-hand drug transactions that the officers
observed were not confirmed via a “controlled buy,” or “direct observations of a reliable
confidential informant.” Appellant Br. at 19–20. Absent “confirmation that drugs were actually
involved,” Ward contends there was insufficient evidence to connect drug trafficking to his home.
Id. at 14.
We disagree. Law enforcement need not always conduct a controlled buy to establish
probable cause. We judge an affidavit based on “what it does contain, not on what it lacks, or on
what a critic might say should have been added.” United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 975 (6th
Cir. 2000) (en banc). The affidavit here did not definitively state that the observed transactions
were drug deals, but it did not need to. United States v. Christian, 925 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir.
2019). It needed only to “allege facts that create[d] a reasonable probability” that the transactions
were drug deals. United States v. Tagg, 886 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2018). The officers, drawing
on their “training and experience,” United States v. McMullen, 103 F.4th 1225, 1230 (6th Cir.
2024), viewed those transactions in light of the investigation’s broader context. In their judgment,
the transactions exceeded the “degree of suspicion” required for probable cause. Tagg, 886 F.3d
at 586. And our own “common-sense” reading of the affidavit leads to the same conclusion. See
Sheckles, 996 F.3d at 337. Given all the other information in the affidavit, including the out-of-
state warrant and the drugs found in Ward’s car, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that
-5- No. 25-5702, United States v. Ward
the hand-to-hand transactions they observed were drug deals. The absence of a controlled buy,
then, was not fatal to the probable cause finding.
Ward next challenges the affidavit’s reliance on a confidential informant. He is right that
the confidential informant in this case lacked the indicia of reliability that our cases typically
require. United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 479 (6th Cir. 2009). When an affidavit contains
information from a confidential informant, we consider “three factors in connection with the
totality of circumstances inquiry”: the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of the
informant’s tip. Id. The affidavit here did not contain any of that information. Thus, we agree with
the district court that, “[i]f the CI’s tip was the only basis for the search warrant, the Court would
have no issue concluding that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause.” D. Ct. Op., R. 24,
PageID 129. But it was not. As already detailed, the affidavit contained sufficient “relevant data
point[s]”—a law enforcement report that Ward was trafficking drugs, two observed hand-to-hand
transactions at and near his home, and drugs recovered from Ward’s vehicle—that, evaluated in
their totality, provided a “substantial basis” for the magistrate to find probable cause to search
Ward’s home. Christian, 925 F.3d at 311.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
-6-