JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Anthony Caldwell appeals from his conviction of conspiracy to possess cocaine base with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (1988). The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court1 erred in denying Caldwell’s motion to suppress statements made to Detective Albert Upchurch because of inadequate Miranda2 warnings. Caldwell argues that the failure of Detective Up-church to tell him that he had a right to consult with an attorney before and during his interrogation invalidated the warnings provided by Upchurch. We affirm the conviction.
On January 7, 1990, Barbara Johnson opened a package delivered to the apartment of her grandmother, Gustine Sumner. The package was delivered by Federal Express and addressed to “Bob Johnson” at Sumner’s address. Johnson opened the package in Sumner’s apartment and saw a clear plastic bag with a white powder chunk. Johnson took the package upstairs to her apartment and called a neighbor, Vivian Jones. Jones lived in the same four-[498]*498family flat as Sumner and Johnson. Jones came to Johnson’s apartment, where Johnson showed her the package. Both women suspected that the package contained drugs. Jones called her eighteen year old son, Anthony Caldwell, over to the apartment. She showed Caldwell the package and asked whether he was expecting it. Caldwell first said he was not, and then admitted that he was expecting the package. Caldwell then left the apartment.
Jones and Johnson decided to seek advice from Mike Washington, a St. Louis police officer and a friend of Johnson’s. Washington came to Johnson’s apartment, looked at the package, and suspected that it contained drugs. Because Washington did not feel he had the necessary expertise to investigate a drug matter, he called the police department command post and requested that Detective Albert Upchurch come to the apartment.
While Washington was in Johnson's apartment, Caldwell called Jones at her apartment, which was on the same level as Johnson’s. Jones talked to Caldwell on the telephone and tried to persuade him to return to the apartment. Washington then went to Jones’s apartment and spoke with Caldwell on the telephone. Caldwell was upset and crying, and Washington told him that he should return to Johnson’s apartment to straighten this matter out, and that if he did not return, he could “probably be in a lot of trouble.”
Caldwell returned to Johnson’s apartment. Washington spoke to Caldwell, who was “scared, very frightened, [and] extremely nervous.” Caldwell’s voice was lower than usual and quivering. Jones was also visibly upset and pacing around the apartment. Washington did not advise Caldwell of his Miranda rights. Washington asked Caldwell about the package, and Caldwell told him that a couple of weeks earlier, he had met a man named “Ray” who promised him $500 if he would accept a package at his address. Caldwell admitted that he knew that the package would contain cocaine. Washington told Caldwell that he had called Detective Upchurch from the police command post and that it would be in his best interest to be as cooperative as possible with Upchurch.
Detective Upchurch arrived and Washington led him to the kitchen where Caldwell was seated. Upchurch looked at the package, which he believed to contain crack cocaine. Washington introduced Upchurch to Caldwell. Detective Upchurch immediately advised Caldwell of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, telling Caldwell:
You got the right to remain silent. Anything you say will and can be used against you in the court of law. You have a right for an attorney. If you can’t afford one, one will be appointed to you.
Upchurch then asked Caldwell whether he understood his rights. Caldwell shook his head indicating he understood. Up-church testified that Caldwell was “scared and hysterical looking.” Jones paced in and out of the kitchen, and Upchurch testified that she was “excited” and “hysterical.” Caldwell and Upchurch moved to the living room where Upchurch again asked Caldwell: “You sure you understood your rights?” Caldwell said that he did. Up-church then asked Caldwell what happened, and Caldwell repeated the same story he told Washington — that a guy named “Ray” agreed to pay him $500 to use his address to have cocaine delivered. At that point, Upchurch placed Caldwell under arrest, and after talking with his mother and looking at Caldwell’s room, took him to the narcotics office of the St. Louis Police Department. There, Upchurch again advised Caldwell of his rights and asked him if he understood his rights. Caldwell said that he did, and in answer to questions, Caldwell repeated the statements he had given before. Caldwell refused to sign a written statement.
The facts above are essentially as recited in the magistrate’s report and recommendation following the suppression hearing. United States v. Caldwell, No. 90-12-CR(6), slip op. at 2-7 (E.D.Mo. June 13, 1990). The magistrate recommended that Caldwell’s statements made in Johnson’s apartment to both Washington and Up-church be suppressed because Caldwell did [499]*499not voluntarily and intelligently waive his rights due to his upset mental state, his mother’s upset condition, and his age and inexperience. Id. at 9-10. The magistrate also held that Caldwell’s statement given at the police station should be suppressed because the circumstances of the interrogation were such that he was not shown to have intelligently waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel. Id. at 10.
The district court adopted the statement of facts concerning the motion to suppress the statements and the recommendation that Caldwell’s statements to Washington be suppressed. United States v. Caldwell, No. 90-12-CR(6), slip op. at 1-2 (E.D.Mo. Aug. 2, 1990). The district court, however, rejected the magistrate’s recommendation that Caldwell’s statements to Upchurch be suppressed, reasoning that Upchurch advised Caldwell three times of his constitutional rights and asked him twice if he understood those rights. Id. at 1-2. The court ruled that the circumstances did not “ ‘rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak ... within Miranda’s concerns.’ ” Id. at 2 (quoting Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990)).
A jury convicted Caldwell of conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. Caldwell was sentenced to a mandatory 121 month sentence, as the amount of cocaine was 197.2 grams of 85% pure crack cocaine with a wholesale value of $20,000-24,000. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5).
On appeal, Caldwell argues that the district court erred in failing to suppress his statements made to Upchurch because Caldwell was inadequately advised of his Miranda rights.3 Caldwell specifically argues that although Upchurch told him that he had the right to an attorney, he failed to tell him when that right accrued or that he had the right to consult with an attorney before and during his interrogation. The government responds that Caldwell was not in custody at the time he confessed to Upchurch, and therefore, no Miranda warnings were required.
As a threshold matter, we must first consider whether Caldwell was in custody for Miranda purposes when he confessed to Upchurch. Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect is in custody and is about to be interrogated. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). A suspect is considered “in custody” for Miranda purposes either when he has been formally arrested and not free to leave the location, or when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have considered his freedom of movement restrained to a degree that is usually associated with a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); United States v. Goudreau, 854 F.2d 1097, 1098 (8th Cir.1988).
The magistrate concluded that Caldwell was “in custody” for Miranda purposes when Officer Washington first began to question him in Johnson’s apartment. Slip op. at 7-8 (June 13, 1990). The district court did not decide whether Caldwell was in custody for Miranda purposes.4
We need not decide whether Caldwell was in custody for Miranda purposes when he first confessed to Upchurch. The government does not address Caldwell’s statement made during his interrogation at the police station where it is uncontradicted that Caldwell was under formal arrest, and therefore, in custody for Miranda purposes. In light of the confusion created by the district court’s ruling, we assume for purposes of this appeal that Caldwell was in custody at the time he returned to Johnson’s apartment.
Before considering the merits of Caldwell’s claim that he was provided with inad[500]*500equate Miranda warnings, we must first decide whether Caldwell properly preserved the issue of the adequacy of Miranda warnings for appeal. At oral argument the parties brought to our attention for the first time that Caldwell did not raise his objection to the adequacy of Miranda warnings before the magistrate judge or district court. Caldwell’s counsel initially admitted at oral argument that Caldwell’s court-appointed counsel did not raise the specific issue of the adequacy of Miranda warnings to the courts below, and later, stated that counsel did raise the issue in a motion to suppress. Our study of the district court file reveals that Caldwell raised a general issue as to the Miranda warnings in a motion to suppress filed with the magistrate judge,5 but failed to explain why the warnings were inadequate or specifically complain that Up-church failed to inform Caldwell of his right to counsel before or during interrogation. Motion of Defendant Anthony Caldwell to Suppress Alleged Statements of Defendant and Incorporated Memorandum of Law at 1, United States v. Caldwell, No. 90-12-CR(6) (E.D.Mo. Feb. 5, 1990). Neither the magistrate judge nor the district court addressed this issue,6 and following the district court’s reversal of the magistrate judge’s recommendation to suppress Caldwell’s statements to Upchurch, Caldwell failed to argue before the district court that the statements should be suppressed because of inadequate Miranda warnings.
Even if Caldwell adequately raised the objection in his motion to suppress before the magistrate judge, he failed to renew the objection before the district court, and therefore, did not properly preserve the issue for appeal.7 See United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231, 1240 (8th Cir.1984) (defendants failed to preserve their objection to the introduction of statements made to law enforcement officers based on the officers’ failure to give Miranda warnings), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 3477, 87 L.Ed.2d 613 (1985). Accordingly, we may review Caldwell’s complaint about the adequacy of Miranda warnings on appeal only for plain error. Id. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b).
The Supreme Court has explained that the plain-error doctrine “authorizes the Courts of Appeals to correct only ‘particularly egregious errors' ... that ‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public [501]*501reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) and United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)). The plain error rule is to be “ ‘used sparingly,’ ” and only when there has been a fundamental error so basic and prejudicial that justice could not have been done, or when the error deprives the accused of a fundamental right. Young, 470 U.S. at 15, 105 S.Ct. at 1046 (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 163, 102 S.Ct. at 1592); United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1422 (7th Cir.1990). The question of whether Caldwell was given adequate Miranda warnings is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Connell, 869 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir.1989).8
Miranda requires that before a custodial interrogation a suspect must be informed, among other things, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him before any questioning if he desires. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Supreme Court cases interpreting Miranda have never directly considered whether a suspect must be explicitly warned that he has the right to have counsel present during interrogation, Nevertheless, several decisions are instructive. The Supreme Court reaffirmed Miranda in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979), and in dicta, stated:
The rule the court established in Miranda is clear. In order to be able to use statements obtained during custodial interrogation of the accused, the State must warn the accused prior to such questioning of his right ... to have counsel, retained or appointed, present during interrogation.
Id. at 717, 99 S.Ct. at 2568.
In California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981) (per curiam), the defendant argued that his Miranda warnings were inadequate because they failed to explicitly inform him of his right to court-appointed counsel before questioning. The Supreme Court observed that the defendant had been advised of his right to talk to an attorney before and during questioning, and to have an attorney appointed if he could not afford one. Id. at 361, 101 S.Ct. at 2810. Distinguishing those cases which expressly linked the right to appointed counsel to a future time after police interrogation, the Court held that the warning complied with Miranda. Id. at 360-62, 101 S.Ct. at 2809-11. The Court reasoned that the warning did not suggest “any limitation on the right to the presence of appointed counsel different from the clearly conveyed rights to a lawyer in general,” including the right to a lawyer before and during questioning. Id. at 360-61, 101 S.Ct. at 2809-10. In Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989), the Supreme Court held that informing a suspect that an attorney would be appointed for him “if and when you go to court” did not render the Miranda warnings inadequate because the suspect had already been told that he had the right to an attorney before and during questioning, and he had this right to an attorney even if he could not afford one. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 2879-80. Duckworth explained that Prysock did not hold that a warning was necessarily defective when the warning linked the appointment of an attorney to a future point in time. Id. at 2880-81. Instead, the Court explained that the vice pointed out in Prysock was the failure to “apprise the accused of his right to have an attorney present if he chose to answer questions.” Id.
The Supreme Court “has never indicated that the ‘rigidity’ of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant.” Prysock, 453 U.S. at 359, 101 S.Ct. at 2809. ‘Miranda itself indicate[s] that no talismanic incanta[502]*502tion [is] required to satisfy its strictures.” Id. Prysock recognized that Miranda “announced procedural safeguards including ‘the now familiar Miranda warnings ... or their equivalent.’ ” Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360, 101 S.Ct. at 2810 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 1687) (emphasis supplied in Prysock). Duckworth makes clear that “[Reviewing courts ... need not examine Miranda warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement." 109 S.Ct. at 2880. “The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably ‘convefy] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.” Id. (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361, 101 S.Ct. at 2810).
Caldwell’s only complaint is that Up-church failed to specifically warn him of his right to counsel before and during the interrogation. Upchurch did, however, generally warn Caldwell that he had the right to an attorney. That warning immediately followed Upchurch’s warnings that Caldwell had the right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used against him. If there was a deficiency in the warning, it is in the ambiguity of the warning, not that the warning actively misled Caldwell by suggesting a false limitation of his right to counsel.
It is true that the warnings given in both Prysock and Duckworth specifically stated that the suspect had a right to an attorney before questioning, but the claimed deficiency rejected in Prysock was that the suspect was not explicitly informed of his right to have an attorney appointed before questioning. 453 U.S. at 361, 101 S.Ct. at 2810. In Duckworth, the Court held the warnings adequate when the suspect was informed that he had the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before questioning, to have him present during questioning, and that one would be appointed “if you wish, if and when you go to court.” 109 S.Ct. at 2877.
It is apparent that the warning in this case does not suffer from the inadequacy discussed in both Duckworth and Prysock, namely, linking the right to appointed counsel to a future point in time after interrogation. When the only claimed deficiency is that of generality, the teaching of Duck-worth that we are not construing a will or defining the terms of an easement convinces us that we cannot hold the warning in this case amounts to plain error.
Moreover, this court has not strictly required that a defendant be explicitly advised of his right to an attorney before and during questioning.9 Indeed, this court in Evans v. Swenson, 455 F.2d 291 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929, 92 S.Ct. 2508, 33 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), affirmed the denial of the defendant’s habeas corpus petition, holding that the warnings provided complied with Miranda. Id. at 296. In that case, a police officer advised the defendant that he had the right to make a telephone call and the right to an attorney. Id. at 295. We concluded that informing the defendant that he could make a telephone call right before telling the defendant that he had the right to an attorney, suggested that the defendant could call an attorney before the interrogation, and therefore, in substance complied with Miranda. Id. at [503]*503296. Cf. South Dakota v. Long, 465 F.2d 65, 70 (8th Cir.1972) (defendant’s warnings inadequate when defendant not advised of right to presence of an attorney and right to appointed attorney); cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130, 93 S.Ct. 951, 35 L.Ed.2d 263 (1973).10
A panel of this court recently declined to consider the precise question before this court in Butzin v. Wood, 886 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 2595, 110 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). Nevertheless, Judge Beam, in a concurring opinion, indicated that the warning provided, which was almost identical to the one here, complied with Miranda. Id. at 1019. Chief Judge Lay dissented, opining that the warning was defective because it failed to specifically inform the defendant that he had a right to consult with an attorney before he was interrogated. Id. at 1019-23.
Narcotics agents provided almost the same warning to the defendant in Sweeney v. United States, 408 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.1969), as did Upchurch in this case. Id. at 124. In Sweeney, agents told the defendant that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him, that he was entitled to an attorney, and that if he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed. Id. Agents also told the defendant that he could use the telephone. Id. The court held that although the “warning was not as explicit as it might have been,” the agents adequately communicated the substance of the Miranda rights. Id. The court reasoned that the reference to the right to counsel immediately following the warning as to the right to remain silent and an explanation of the risk in not remaining silent, would “be taken by most persons to refer to the contemplated interrogation.” Id. Accord United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 376-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 907, 91 S.Ct. 150, 27 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970); United States v. Cusumano, 429 F.2d 378, 380 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830, 91 S.Ct. 61, 27 L.Ed.2d 61 (1970); United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1074-75 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174, 103 S.Ct. 823, 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357 (7th Cir.1973), held that the warnings that the defendant had the right to remain silent, right to counsel, and court-appointed counsel were adequate. Id. at 361-62. The court held that the failure to specifically inform the defendant of his right to an attorney during questioning was not fatal, especially when the police provided the warnings “on the street” and not at the police station. Id. at 362. “ ‘It is unrealistic to expect the same degree of formality with respect to waiver and question “on the street” as in the station-house.’ ” Id. at 362 (quoting Cusumano, 429 F.2d at 380).
Although Upchurch could, and arguably should, have been more explicit in advising Caldwell of his right to an attorney, we believe the decisions cited above further support our conclusion that the warning provided does not rise to the level of plain error.11 Here, Upchurch, at the very least, advised Caldwell that he had the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Upchurch warned Caldwell that anything [504]*504he said could be used against him, and that if he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed. Upchurch also advised Caldwell that he had the right to a court-appointed attorney, cf. Long, 465 F.2d at 68, and did not link Caldwell’s right to an attorney to a future point in time after police questioning. See Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360, 101 S.Ct. at 2810; cf. Windsor, 389 F.2d at 533. Moreover, the general warning that Caldwell had the right to an attorney, which immediately followed the warning that he had the right to remain silent, could not have misled Caldwell into believing that an attorney could not be present during questioning.12 Cf. United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir.1968); see Sweeney, 408 F.2d at 124.
Caldwell also argues that the district court erred in admitting his confessions because he did not waive his constitutional rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Caldwell says that “coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect,” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689, and that the suspect's mental condition is a significant factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession.
Whether a defendant waives his constitutional rights has two distinct inquiries. “First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). “Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id.
We review the district court’s factual findings concerning whether a defendant waived his rights under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071, 1084-85 (8th Cir.1988). We review the ultimate determination of whether waiver occurred, however, as a question of law subject to de novo review. Id. See also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115, 106 S.Ct. 445, 452, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (“[T]he ultimate question of the admissibility of a confession merits treatment as a legal inquiry requiring plenary federal review”).
In this case, the district court found that there was no compulsion or coercion, and made no specific factual findings regarding waiver. In denying Caldwell’s motion to suppress, the district court did, however, cite United States v. Filiberto, 712 F.Supp. 482, 486-87 (E.D.Pa.1989), aff'd, 915 F.2d 1560 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 708, 112 L.Ed.2d 697 (1991). In Filiberto, the court held that the defendant made a valid waiver of his rights when, as here, the defendant responded to questioning without invoking his rights to counsel or to remain silent, and no evidence of police coercion existed. Id. Thus, we can only conclude that the district court believed that Caldwell made a valid waiver of his constitutional rights.
We have carefully reviewed the transcripts of the evidentiary hearing and trial in this case. It is undisputed that Up-church advised Caldwell of his rights and asked him if he understood those rights on at least two occasions. Cf. Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 100 S.Ct. 652, 62 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980) (per curiam). There is no doubt that Caldwell was inexperienced, upset, and nervous when he confessed to Upchurch. Caldwell points to no conduct on the part of the police, however, which rises to the level of coercion. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 412, 106 S.Ct. at 1135 (“the record is devoid of any suggestion that police resorted to physical or psychological pressure to elicit the statements”); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (“Miranda protects defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that.”) Fare, 442 U.S. at 726-27, 99 S.Ct. at 2572-73 (no improper interrogation tactics). Nor does Caldwell [505]*505argue that he was incapable of understanding the warnings provided him or the consequences of his decision to waive his rights. Moran, 475 U.S. at 422, 106 S.Ct. at 1141. Accordingly, looking at the totality of the circumstances and the entire course of police conduct, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1297, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), we conclude that the government met its burden of proving that Caldwell waived his constitutional rights, and that the district court correctly denied Caldwell’s motion to suppress.
The issue before us is determining whether the requirements of Miranda were observed in this case. We recognize the extreme harshness of the penalty which results from application of the statutory mandatory minimum ten year sentence. The harsh sentence should not cause us to decide the Miranda question in a manner other than required by our reading of the applicable cases.
We affirm the conviction.