PER CURIAM:
Anne Njanja appeals her 37-month sentence for possession with intent to distribute heroin and importation of heroin. After review, we vacate Njanja’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
Njanja pled guilty, without a written plea agreement, to possession with intent to distribute at least 100 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) (Count One), and importation of at least 100 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960(2)(b)(A) (Count Two).
According to the PSI, Njanja arrived at the Atlanta airport from London on May 3, 2004. Customs and Border Protection inspectors selected Njanja for secondary inspection based on a lookout in the Treasury Enforcement Communication System linking Njanja with a woman arrested in November 2003 for attempting to smuggle heroin into the United States. After Njanja was advised that she was a suspected drug smuggler, she consented to an X-ray and admitted that she had ingested something. Njanja was taken to a hospital where law enforcement officers recovered 57 pellets containing 534.8 grams of heroin from her.
The PSI recommended a base offense level of 28.
The PSI also recommended a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and a two-level reduction because Njanja met the criteria for “safety valve” relief, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Thus, Njanja’s total offense level was 24. With a criminal history category of I, Njanja’s Guidelines range was 51-63 months’ imprisonment.
Njanja objected to the PSI, arguing that pursuant to
Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), she could be held responsible for
only 100 grams of heroin, the amount charged in the indictment. Njanja also objected to the denial of a role reduction and the denial of an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Prior to sentencing, Njanja and the government entered into a “Stipulation Regarding Testimony at Sentencing.” The stipulation set forth the facts that government witnesses would offer if they were to testify at the sentencing hearing. Although Njanja did not agree to the accuracy of those facts, the government and Njanja agreed that “the testimony set forth in this Stipulation should be considered by the Court in determining [Njanja’s] sentencing in this matter.” The testimony set forth in the stipulation was that 57 pellets containing 538.4 grams of heroin were recovered from Njanja.
During the sentencing hearing, the district court granted Njanja a two-level minor-role reduction, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Njanja also received an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district court rejected Njanja’s argument that under
Blakely,
her base offense level should be 26, based on the amount of drugs listed in the indictment, rather than 28, based on the total amount of drugs contained in the 57 pellets.
After the district court’s additional reductions for minor role and acceptance of responsibility, Njanja’s total offense level was 21. With a criminal history category of I, Njanja’s Guidelines range was 37-46 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Njanja to 37 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the Guidelines range.
Although the district court determined that
Blakely
did not apply to the Guidelines, the district court also provided an alternate sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment using the drug amount charged in the indictment in the event that
“Blakely
comes down in a way that allows the court to reduce it or where it seems appropriate.” In doing so, the district court stated:
But for right now I will sentence her at the level we have calculated because I have no other choice given the law. I will give an alternative sentence, though, in the event
Blakely
comes down so we don’t have to trouble her with coming back again if it’s going to be lowered by two more levels. So, right now [the base offense level is] going to be at 28. If
Blakely
comes down in a way that allows the court to reduce it or where it seems appropriate, [the base offense level] will be a 26.
II. DISCUSSION
In her initial brief on appeal, Njanja argues that the district court erred under
Blakely
(now
Booker)
by basing her sentence upon a drug quantity higher than the quantity to which she pled guilty. Because Njanja raised her
Blakely
objection in the district court and in her initial brief on appeal, we review her sentence
de novo. United States v. Paz,
405 F.3d 946, 948-49 (11th Cir.2005).
In
United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines made them incompatible with the Sixth Amendment’s guaranty of
the right to a jury trial where “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict [was not] admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Booker,
125 S.Ct. at 756. As explained in
United States v. Rodriguez,
398 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied,
— U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2935, — L.Ed.2d - (2005), “[t]he constitutional error is the use of extraverdict enhancements to reach a guidelines result that is binding on the sentencing judge; the error is the mandatory nature of the guidelines once the guidelines range has been determined.”
Based on
Booker,
we conclude that the district court violated Njanja’s Sixth Amendment rights by enhancing her sentence based on judicial fact finding of drug quantity in a mandatory Guidelines scheme.
Booker,
125 S.Ct. at 756. Although Njanja stipulated as to what the testimony of the government’s witnesses would be regarding the amount of heroin recovered, she did not stipulate that the amount was correct. Additionally, she timely objected to the use of this drug amount in determining her sentence.
Further, the government concedes that the error was not harmless.
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PER CURIAM:
Anne Njanja appeals her 37-month sentence for possession with intent to distribute heroin and importation of heroin. After review, we vacate Njanja’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
Njanja pled guilty, without a written plea agreement, to possession with intent to distribute at least 100 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) (Count One), and importation of at least 100 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960(2)(b)(A) (Count Two).
According to the PSI, Njanja arrived at the Atlanta airport from London on May 3, 2004. Customs and Border Protection inspectors selected Njanja for secondary inspection based on a lookout in the Treasury Enforcement Communication System linking Njanja with a woman arrested in November 2003 for attempting to smuggle heroin into the United States. After Njanja was advised that she was a suspected drug smuggler, she consented to an X-ray and admitted that she had ingested something. Njanja was taken to a hospital where law enforcement officers recovered 57 pellets containing 534.8 grams of heroin from her.
The PSI recommended a base offense level of 28.
The PSI also recommended a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and a two-level reduction because Njanja met the criteria for “safety valve” relief, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Thus, Njanja’s total offense level was 24. With a criminal history category of I, Njanja’s Guidelines range was 51-63 months’ imprisonment.
Njanja objected to the PSI, arguing that pursuant to
Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), she could be held responsible for
only 100 grams of heroin, the amount charged in the indictment. Njanja also objected to the denial of a role reduction and the denial of an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Prior to sentencing, Njanja and the government entered into a “Stipulation Regarding Testimony at Sentencing.” The stipulation set forth the facts that government witnesses would offer if they were to testify at the sentencing hearing. Although Njanja did not agree to the accuracy of those facts, the government and Njanja agreed that “the testimony set forth in this Stipulation should be considered by the Court in determining [Njanja’s] sentencing in this matter.” The testimony set forth in the stipulation was that 57 pellets containing 538.4 grams of heroin were recovered from Njanja.
During the sentencing hearing, the district court granted Njanja a two-level minor-role reduction, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Njanja also received an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district court rejected Njanja’s argument that under
Blakely,
her base offense level should be 26, based on the amount of drugs listed in the indictment, rather than 28, based on the total amount of drugs contained in the 57 pellets.
After the district court’s additional reductions for minor role and acceptance of responsibility, Njanja’s total offense level was 21. With a criminal history category of I, Njanja’s Guidelines range was 37-46 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Njanja to 37 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the Guidelines range.
Although the district court determined that
Blakely
did not apply to the Guidelines, the district court also provided an alternate sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment using the drug amount charged in the indictment in the event that
“Blakely
comes down in a way that allows the court to reduce it or where it seems appropriate.” In doing so, the district court stated:
But for right now I will sentence her at the level we have calculated because I have no other choice given the law. I will give an alternative sentence, though, in the event
Blakely
comes down so we don’t have to trouble her with coming back again if it’s going to be lowered by two more levels. So, right now [the base offense level is] going to be at 28. If
Blakely
comes down in a way that allows the court to reduce it or where it seems appropriate, [the base offense level] will be a 26.
II. DISCUSSION
In her initial brief on appeal, Njanja argues that the district court erred under
Blakely
(now
Booker)
by basing her sentence upon a drug quantity higher than the quantity to which she pled guilty. Because Njanja raised her
Blakely
objection in the district court and in her initial brief on appeal, we review her sentence
de novo. United States v. Paz,
405 F.3d 946, 948-49 (11th Cir.2005).
In
United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines made them incompatible with the Sixth Amendment’s guaranty of
the right to a jury trial where “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict [was not] admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Booker,
125 S.Ct. at 756. As explained in
United States v. Rodriguez,
398 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied,
— U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2935, — L.Ed.2d - (2005), “[t]he constitutional error is the use of extraverdict enhancements to reach a guidelines result that is binding on the sentencing judge; the error is the mandatory nature of the guidelines once the guidelines range has been determined.”
Based on
Booker,
we conclude that the district court violated Njanja’s Sixth Amendment rights by enhancing her sentence based on judicial fact finding of drug quantity in a mandatory Guidelines scheme.
Booker,
125 S.Ct. at 756. Although Njanja stipulated as to what the testimony of the government’s witnesses would be regarding the amount of heroin recovered, she did not stipulate that the amount was correct. Additionally, she timely objected to the use of this drug amount in determining her sentence.
Further, the government concedes that the error was not harmless.
Thus, we must vacate Njanja’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing. We recognize that the district court stated that it would give an alternative sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment if
Blakely
applied to the Guidelines and the district court could not consider the increased drug quantity of 534.8 grams of heroin. However, as explained above, the constitutional error is not simply the use of an extra-verdict enhancement, “[t]he constitutional error is the use of [the] extraverdict enhancement ] to reach a guidelines result
that is binding on the sentencing judge;
the error is the mandatory nature of the guidelines once the guidelines range has been determined.”
Rodriguez,
398 F.3d at 1301 (emphasis added). Thus,
post-Booker,
extra-verdict enhancements can be used in an advisory Guidelines scheme.
We note that although there is a Sixth Amendment violation in this case, there was sufficient evidence to support the district court’s fact finding that Njanja was responsible for 538.4 grams of heroin and the district court properly calculated the Guidelines range as 37-46 months’ imprisonment.
United States v. Crawford,
407 F.3d 1174, 1178-79 (11th Cir.2005) (stating that after
Booker,
district courts must consult the Guidelines and “[t]his consultation requirement, at a minimum, obliges the district court to calculate
correctly
the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines”). On remand, the district court is required to sentence Njanja under an advisory Guidelines regime, and shall consider the Guidelines range of 37-46 months’ imprisonment and “other statutory concerns as well, see [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) (Supp. 2004).”
Booker,
125 S.Ct. at 757.
VACATED AND REMANDED.