United States v. Anderson S. Jackson, III Billy Ray Dew

313 F.3d 231, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23735, 2002 WL 31546543
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedNovember 18, 2002
Docket01-30888
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 313 F.3d 231 (United States v. Anderson S. Jackson, III Billy Ray Dew) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Anderson S. Jackson, III Billy Ray Dew, 313 F.3d 231, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23735, 2002 WL 31546543 (5th Cir. 2002).

Opinion

DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:

Anderson S. Jackson III and Billy Ray Dew appeal their convictions on eleven counts of conspiracy to violate and violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666; for theft by fraud and bribery. Jackson was director of the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) for the City of Monroe, Louisiana, which operates city golf courses, parks, the museum, civic center, and other recreational venues for the City of Monroe. The jury found that Jackson received kickbacks for awarding construction and repair contracts for the DCA to co-defendant Billy Ray Dew, owner of two construction businesses and to other contractors as well. Finding insufficient evidence that the DCA or the City of Monroe received over $10,000 per year in federal funding as required to satisfy a statutory element of the offense, we vacate the judgments of conviction and the sentences and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

I.

One element of the offense of conviction is that the organization, government, or agency of which Jackson was an agent received, in any one year period, over $10,000 in benefits from a Federal program. 1 Defendants raise a number of issues regarding the alleged federal character of the funds received by the DCA, one of which is a jurisdictional question.

We examine the question of jurisdiction as a threshold matter. To confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a federal court, an indictment need only charge a defendant with an offense against the United States in language similar to that used by the relevant statute. United States v. Desurra, 865 F.2d 651, 654 (5th Cir.1989). The indictment sufficiently invoked the district court’s jurisdiction, alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 666, including the allegation that the City of Monroe received federal funds in excess of $10,000 for each calendar year at issue. The district court had jurisdiction over the case because a violation of federal law was charged, id., regardless of the sufficiency of the Government’s proof.

II.

Defendants contend that the Government failed to prove: that the City received federal benefits in excess of $10,000; that federal funds were present in the accounts from which Jackson made disbursements; or any nexus between the federal funding and the offense conduct. 2 In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have *234 found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Greer, 137 F.3d 247, 249 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 920, 118 S.Ct. 2305, 141 L.Ed.2d 164 (1998).

A. Federal Sources.

We first consider the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence that the entity of which Jackson was an agent received over $10,000 per year of federal funds. The Government offered evidence of funding received by the City of Monroe for the Louisiana Folk Life Festival. Billy Gene Pearson, Director of Administration for the City, testified that, for the City’s fiscal year ended April 30, 1997, the DCA received $12,900 from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), and, for fiscal year ended April 30, 1998, $10,090 from the same source.

No grant documents in evidence substantiate receipts from the NEH of those amounts, however. 3 Dr. Michael Luster, Director of the Louisiana Folklife Festival, testified that the City received grants from only state and local entities. 4 The documentary evidence substantiated Luster’s testimony and demonstrated unequivocally that the $12,900 funding came from the Northeast Louisiana Arts Council (NE-LAC), and that other grants were from the state or local agencies. 5 No corroboration of any receipt of $10,090 is apparent from the documents. Dr. Luster testified that the amount was in error, that $10,000 was the correct amount, and that the grant was from the Louisiana Endowment for the *235 Humanities (LEH) — not NEH. 6 One of defendants’ exhibits would suggest such a receipt of $10,000 from LEH in calendar year 1997. 7 The Government concedes that the alleged federal funding was not received by the City directly but by Louisiana agencies for further distribution to local or regional arts projects meeting the criteria established by NEH or the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).

The record supports an inference that the City received some funding indirectly from those federal sources via local and state agencies. 8 Specifically concerning Pearson’s testimony that the DCA received $12,900 from NEH, the record contains evidence that this funding, although actually channeled through NELAC, did have federal origins. 9 Assuming Pearson’s testimony about $10,090 of NEH funds corresponds to the 1997 LEH grant agreement for $10,000, we will further assume for purposes of this analysis that the record will support an inference that some of that LEH grant had federal origins as well. 10

B. Minimum Per-Year Amounts.

The questions then become how much of the grants from local or state agencies were of federal origin, and when such funds were received. The evidence is insufficient if it shows only that the City received some federal funds; the statute requires proof that the organization or agency received federal benefits “in excess of $10,000” per year. 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). The one-year period may be any continuous twelve-month period that includes the commission of the offense. 18 U.S.C.' § 666(d)(5). This is an exact numeric minimum per year that must be supported by record evidence.

The indictment charged this monetary element for the calendar years 1997 and 1998. 11 The Government in its case in *236 chief attempted to show the requisite receipts with the testimony of Pearson, and argues that a finding of more than $10,000 in federal funds per calendar year is also supported by defendants’ exhibits.

1. Pearson’s Testimony — Fiscal Years.

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Bluebook (online)
313 F.3d 231, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23735, 2002 WL 31546543, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-anderson-s-jackson-iii-billy-ray-dew-ca5-2002.